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This research proposes to examine the composition and evolution of the Colombian military’s 
approach to counter-insurgency since the origins of the internal armed conflict that affects the 
country.  Following the lineaments of strategic theory, it will endeavour to understand how the 
military came to view the utilisation of armed force, amongst other means, since the beginning 
of the armed conflict. To construct the Colombian military strategic tradition, it will attempt to 
identify its value–system, that is, the ideological precepts, motivational patterns and 
assumptions that throughout the years have influenced the military’s use of the main 
instruments at its disposal.  It will explore how these diverse factors have shaped different 
understandings of the character of the conflict, views of its political conduct, and of the role 
and limits of armed force, amongst other issues. This analysis will allow to establish lines of 
continuity and change in Colombian military thinking.  In this respect, the research argues that 
the formative years of the Colombian strategic tradition during the 1960s, and in particular the 
influence of counter-insurgency thinking, has been fundamental in shaping the military’s 
different, and at times conflicting, judgements about the conflict, the nature of their enemies 
and the limits of armed force during the past 20 years of escalation of violence in Colombia.  
Overall, the research shows that the inherent tensions visible in Colombian military thinking 
have undermined the formulation of strategy, that is, the translation of means into political 
















‘Tell me something, old friend: why are you fighting?’ 
‘What other reason could there be?’ Colonel Gerineldo Marquez answered. ‘For the great 
Liberal party.’ 
‘You're lucky because you know why,’ he answered. ‘As far as I'm concerned, I've come to 
realize only just now that I'm fighting because of pride.’ 
‘That's bad,’ Colonel Gerineldo Márquez said. 
Colonel Aureliano Buendia was amused at his alarm. ‘Naturally,’ he said. ‘But in any case, 
it's better than not knowing why you're fighting.’ He looked him in the eyes and added with a 
smile:  
‘Or fighting, like you, for something that doesn't have any meaning for anyone.’ 
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In February 2002, the Colombian government ordered the Colombian military (Colmil) to 
initiate the reoccupation of a 42,000 km2 demilitarised zone, in which failed peace negotiations 
with the insurgents of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia) –  FARC – had been taking place for almost four years. Since 
then, the South American country has seen the longest period of sustained military activity 
against one of the many insurgencies that have contested the established political order since 
the early 1950s. The still on-going campaign against the FARC, as well as the implementation 
of a robust counter-narcotics policy and, above all the involvement of the United States, has 
attracted the attention of scholars and practitioners around the world. Since the re-emergence 
of counter-insurgency (COIN) as a topic of academic interest, and the quest for diverse 
experiences to inform its implementation by the West in far-flung places like Afghanistan, the 
Colombian case has been brought in the spotlight as a success story. Take for instance the 
answer to the question: how would victory in Afghanistan would look like? As stated by the 
Chair of Military History at Ohio State University, retired US Army Colonel Peter Mansoor 
who served as General David Petraeus’ executive officer during the Iraq War: 
At this point the best the United States can hope for is to support an Afghan government that 
can keep the country together after 2014 and convince the Taliban that it cannot win the war in 
any conceivable time frame. In my view, this will require the election of an Afghan president 
with some real leadership abilities, unlike Hamid Karzai. With good leadership and support 
from the United States and our NATO allies, anything is possible. For a view of what winning 
might look like, look at Colombia. A decade ago the country seemed on the verge of disaster 
with the FARC on the ascendancy, but now the war there is all but over. Good Colombian 
presidential leadership and U.S. support were the keys to victory.1 
 
                                                          
1 Quoted in: Paul Szoldra, ‘The Most-Fascinating Insights From The Man Closest To General Petraeus During 
The Iraq ‘Surge’, Business Insider, 3 January 2014. Available at: < http://www.businessinsider.com/peter-
mansoor-reddit-ama-2014-1#ixzz3HREoiChh>. (Accessed 13 March 2014). 
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In this respect, Colombia is currently being cited as a model for what has begun to be termed 
‘small-footprint’ COIN  – that is, the dispatch of advisors and cash to bolster the efforts of 
indigenous forces – which is seen as a promising alternative, in that it remedies two of the 
major shortcomings of expeditionary COIN as it was applied in Iraq and Afghanistan: the lack 
of cultural knowledge on the part of the invader, and opposition from their home population 
with little appetite for large expenditures and significant casualties in remote battle fields.2   
Whilst Mansoor rightly points out the importance of good local political leadership and the 
assistance of allies in war in accounting for the alleged success in Colombia, it is crucial to 
underline that the combination of these two elements was peculiar to the country’s political 
context. In other words, key contingent factors make Colombia a poor case model of ‘Small 
footprint’ intervention to inform Western policy options elsewhere.  However, attention given 
to the current Colmil experience as a model of small footprint assistance appears to leave out 
the evolution of thought throughout more than half a century of involvement in a protracted 
internal conflict.  As this study will show, the overemphasis on the study of the Colmil’s latest 
operational and technical progress –  developed in great part via US assistance – represents in 
full measure counter-insurgency’s ‘technocratic conceit’ as a compendium of tactics and best 
practices transferable across time and culture to deal with any insurgency.3 Such an approach 
has minimised among other factors, the analysis of the politics that shape strategic thought, that 
is, paraphrasing John Stone, how an actor’s judgments and views on how the employment of 
varied techniques – the means of war – are to be translated into political effects.4 In other words, 
tactical proficiency and innovative military techniques count for naught if there is no correct 
                                                          
2 See for instance: Paul Schute, ‘“What do we do if we are never Going to do this Again?” Western 
Counterinsurgency Choices after Iraq and Afghanistan’, In Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and 
M.L.R. Smith (eds), The New Counterinsurgency Era in Critical Perspective (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014), pp.343-44. 
3 Colin Jackson, ‘Government in a Box? Counterinsurgency, State Building, and the Technocratic Conceit,’ In 
Gventer et. al., The New Counterinsurgency Era, p.82. 
4 John Stone, Military Strategy. The politics and technique of war (London: Continuum, 2011), p.4. 
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understanding of the uniqueness of the context, and where the politics and underlying values 
that influence the actor’s definition of ends and selections of means are relegated to matters of 
secondary importance. 
 The general purpose of this thesis will be, in this sense, to put the Colombian military 
experience in historical perspective, by analysing the composition and evolution of its thinking, 
placing particular emphasis on the origins of the Colombian conflict from the late 1940s to the 
end of the 1960s.  It is premised on the notion that the latest experience of the Colombian 
military cannot be explained without referring to a wider historical and political context, which 
has had a bearing on the military’s judgements about the employment of various means to 
confront the diverse number of armed groups that have challenged the authority of the state. In 
this sense, any well-founded assessment of the experience of the Colombian military 
experience of the last decade needs to examine fundamental issues about their behaviour, 
selection of aims, objectives and methods which requires acknowledging more than six decades 
of experience engaged in Colombia’s conflict. This implies that the small footprint assistance 
of the US in the last decade has occurred alongside the big footprint of the ‘host nation’, 
functioning within the Colmil’s strategic outlook, which has a long history. The experiences of 
state-building since the 1930s, early involvement in La Violencia, the origins of a longstanding 
relationship with the US since the Korean War and the early embracing of counter-insurgency 
theory in the 1960s, are just a few landmarks in a long chronology of events that have shaped 
the Colombian military mind. 
To yield insight into the subject in hand, this research will engage with various questions, 
such as: What are the factors that have influenced the military’s thinking throughout the years? 
What are the characteristic elements of the strategic tradition of the Colombian military? Are 
there any tensions between their understanding of the utility of force and the political conduct 
of the conflict? And in this sense, do they have an idea of the limits of armed forces in the 
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conflict?  To address these and other questions, the study will follow the lineaments of strategic 
theory to derive several hypotheses about the development of Colombian military thinking. In 
essence, it will analyse how different influences (understood, for example, as values, ideologies 
or political calculations) have, throughout time, been translated into different strategic options 
for the utilisation of diverse means at the military’s disposal.   
Strategic Theory: A conceptual framework for the study of the Colombian Military 
mind 
 
Strategic theory is a method of analysis through which the study of strategy is formalised.  
Following Michael Howard, its subject matter involves the analysis of the ‘use of available 
resources to gain any objective,’ in which the notion of resources implies amongst others the 
utilisation of military force as an instrument for the attainment of political objectives.5  
Proponents of the theory have suggested it does not aspire to be a rigid, scientific, all-embracing 
model of analysis because it recognises that each socio-political context is diverse and 
contingent. Nonetheless, it permits the study of each context under its unique characteristics 
through a general rationale which delineates a set of rules of understanding, or purposive 
assumptions, about expected forms in which political actors will relate means to ends.6  
Fundamentally, it is accepted that the assumptions it proposes about the expected use of force 
are what structure it as a theory and formalise it as a method of analysis applicable to any case 
study. But, what are the basic assumptions of strategic theory and precisely how can they help 
address the Colombian military? 
Up to the end of the Second World War the definition of strategy remained more or less 
unchanged, still conserving its relation to the ancient Greek term ‘strategos’, or the art of the 
                                                          
5 Michael Howard, The Causes of War (London: Counterpoint, 1984), p.36. 
6 M.L.R. Smith and John Stone, ‘Explaining Strategic Theory’, Infinity Journal Issue 4 (2011), p. 27.; see also: 
M.L.R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement (London: Routledge, 
1997), p. 4. 
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General,  with a direct link between the use of military resources in war.7 This notion of strategy 
also permeated the definition offered by the Prussian philosopher Carl von Clausewitz who 
presented it as the ‘use of battles to achieve the aim of war.’8 The eventual recognition of the 
rigidness of such a definition began to open the door for its formalisation through strategic 
theory during the late 1940s. Basil Liddell Hart, for example, considered that Clausewitz’s 
definition narrowed its meaning as it circumscribed it to the study of battles as the only means 
to achieve strategic ends9 and hence proposed a broader description which is to date one of the 
most satisfactory: ‘the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of 
policy.’10 Liddell Hart’s definition of strategy broadened the spectrum for its study as an 
instrument of policy. 
Indeed, the recognition of military force as a functional aspect of power is the central 
assumption of strategic theory.11 The theory’s proponents agree that this conception was 
already inherent in Clausewitz work, who neatly described war as ‘the continuation of politics 
by other means’.12 Through this overly quoted and constantly misunderstood phrase, the 
Prussian thinker underpinned the argument that war always stems from politics, and that this 
element will be the supreme consideration for its conduct, shaping the ends to be achieved as 
well as the means and  level of effort required for it. War, Clausewitz concluded, should never 
be thought of as an isolated act, but always as an instrument of policy, capable of being 
                                                          
7  Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 
p. XVIII.; See also: Smith and Stone, ‘Explaining Strategic Theory’, p.29. 
8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Everyman’s Library, 2003), p.87. 
9 John Garnett, ‘Introduction,’ in John Garnett, Theories of Peace and Security. A Reader in Contemporary 
Strategic Thought (London: MacMillan, 1970), p.14. 
10 Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber, 1967), p.335. 
11 Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, pp. 3-4. Smith asserts that the assumption of the instrumentality of war is 
underpinned by the notion of power politics as used by the realist school of International Relations – International 
historian E.H Carr probably coined the term when he pointed out that ‘politics are[… ]in one sense always power 
politics,’ See his Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1938) p.102. Realists see political actors competing 
in the international system to enhance their power and defend their own interests, scenario in which the use of 
violence is an eventuality when there is a clash of interests amongst the actors. Hence, military power is to be 
considered as one of the instruments of political power.  
12 Clausewitz, On War, p.99. 
19 
 
circumscribed, moderated and even modified by altering the goals pursued and the means used 
to achieve them, a notion of great importance for the analysis of protracted conflicts where the 
dynamics of the use of violence tend to vary greatly in time: 
 
War moves on its own goal with varying speed, but it always lasts long enough for influence to 
be exerted on the goal and for its own course to be changed one way or another – long enough, 
in other words, to remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence.13  
 
Clausewitz’s synthesis was the product of his effort to understand war as an absolute 
phenomenon in contrast to its real form.  If war is understood as ‘an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will’, then in absolute terms it would be an instantaneous discharge of force 
to render the enemy powerless.  In the abstract then, the use of force would have no limitations, 
as opponents would be driven to an extreme in the effort to render the other side defenceless 
first. However, war, explains Clausewitz, is brought down to reality from the absolute by a 
series of material and intangible factors; geographic conditions, available resources, the nature 
of the motivations, the type of objectives sought, and so forth. Therefore, real war is not about 
the application of brute military force to simply destroy an adversary, but rather an exercise in 
which violence can be used instrumentally, to coerce rather than annihilate, for the achievement 
of political goals.  
The Prussian philosopher’s insights on the instrumentality of war help to introduce 
several concepts that are at the core of strategic theory. During the early 1950s,  a group of 
‘formal strategists’ devoted themselves to the construction of theory, going back to 
Clausewitzian first principles and promoting new precepts for the utilisation and threat of use 
of force under the challenges posed by the advent of thermonuclear weapons, which appeared 
to change the character of war.14  According to Thomas Schelling, one of the main exponents 
of this school of taught, ‘military strategy could no longer be the science of military victory. 
                                                          
13 Ibid., p.xx. 
14 Freedman, Nuclear Strategy, p.171. 
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Rather it would be the art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence.’15 For Schelling, conflicts 
can, in turn, be viewed as bargaining situations where the ‘ability of one participant to gain his 
ends is dependant to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant 
will make.’16 Military force accordingly, can be considered as the power through which a 
bargain can be struck, or in other words, not strictly employed as brute force to overcome the 
opponent and destroy him, but rather as a power to hurt, through threats and coercion as to 
affect the opponents interests  and intentions.17  The notion of bargaining in war helps to 
appreciate better the functioning of strategic theory as a method of analysis - in Schelling’s 
words,‘[t]he art of looking at the problem from the other’s point of view, identifying his 
opportunities and his interests.’18 Specifically, it highlights the concepts of interdependency 
and rational behaviour. 
The idea that conflict is interdependent, that is, it involves interaction between at least 
two opponents, where the actions of one will elicit a response from the other, was already 
present in Clausewitz who noted that in war the opponent is never an abstract person, but 
someone who makes choices and takes decision, and thus, one’s own course of action will 
depend on what we consider the actions of the other will be. In this sense, following John Stone, 
it is the requirement of taking the response of a reasoning adversary into account that makes 
the process of strategic formulation a difficult one, specifically with regard to the selection of 
objectives that can be attainable through force.19  The concept of rational behaviour, for its part, 
is associated with the idea that actors calculate the advantages of a particular course of action 
according to a consistent value system.20 Strategic theory does not consider actors to be 
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perfectly rational and fully efficient in maximising benefits, rather it supposes their rationality 
to be bounded and simply denoting, in the words of Uruguayan economist Francisco López-
Alves, that ‘actors decisions are made after careful cost-benefit calculation, and the means 
chosen seem optimal to accomplish the desired end.’21 Consistency, then, is a key term when 
talking about rational behaviour in strategy. For one part, that the measure of the anticipated 
costs of using force is consistent to the anticipated benefits, on the other, that the motivations 
and values which structure the ends be consistent with the means selected to achieve them.22  
Furthermore, the assumption of rationality does not imply a value judgement. As the 
proponents of strategic theory emphasise, analysts are not concerned with the moral validity of 
the motivations, means and ends of an actor but rather on evaluating how well the choices and 
decisions taken are applied for the consecution of their stated goals.23  Analysis using strategic 
theory endeavours, following Schelling is ‘to be neutral, even cold-blooded towards the parties 
in a situation,’ by firstly, focusing on the situations rather than on the individuals, and secondly 
on the tactics that can be employed.24  
In summary, strategic theory is a method of approaching that possesses considerable 
utility for studying the complex reality of the Colombian conflict.  It is, in essence, a conceptual 
framework, rather than a rigid or all-embracing model of analysis, which allows the 
comprehension of the content of an actor’s value system and to appreciate how this influences 
the formulation of strategy. It also allows the critical evaluation to proceed in a systematic 
fashion in the way it proposes to use available means for the achievement of the set goals. With 
this in mind, this research will endeavour to study the evolution of Colombian military thinking 
within its unique historical context. It will do so through an evolutionary perspective, as the 
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method to organise the analysis, which is useful in the sense that it can serve to trace lines of 
continuity in the process of strategic formulation of a political actor.25  As Professor Lawrence 
Freedman has noted, the use of the term evolution on how strategic thinking develops might 
be misleading as it may suggest progress along a learning curve, thus implying that 
understanding is higher with the passing of time, however, strategic debates have tendency to 
be of a cyclical character, as much of the postures that are offered as insightful and novel today 
were already said yesterday.26 This seems to be precisely the case with the Colombian military, 
where the current judgements and views about the employment of the resources at hand have 
had a long standing tradition in its thinking.  
Literature review  
 
In a country with one of the longest active internal conflicts in the world, it is not surprising 
that its study has been at the centre of attention for local academics. The high appeal for the 
study of the diversity of actors and aspects of the conflict by a large element of the social 
science community in the country, led to the christening of their subject of study as a separate 
knowledge field in itself: ‘violentology.’27 Since the late 1960s, the academic niche of the so 
called ‘violentologists’ has been Bogota’s National University, the most important public 
university in the country, initially within its sociology department and, since its foundation in 
1986, at its Institute of Political Studies and International Relations (IEPRI). At the IEPRI, 
legions of sociologists, political scientists, historians and economists have theorised, under 
different schools of thought, about the nature and socio-political implications of endemic 
violence in Colombia.  The general surveys and interpretative analysis produced by these 
academics, especially due to their multidisciplinary approach, are important to consolidate 
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26 Freedman, Nuclear Strategy, pp. XVI – XVII. 
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general background knowledge on the history and dynamics of the conflict, but given the span 
of their work it would be impractical to reference them all. 
 However, it is worth mentioning the volume Pasado y Presente de la Violencia en 
Colombia (1986), which is a collection of selected essays by the main figures of the 
‘violentology’ community of scholars, and one of the most comprehensive overviews covering 
the antecedents and development of the conflict since its origins in the mid-1940s, and until 
the first peace process with the FARC which began in 1982. Curiously, the volume 
incorporated a chapter by French rural sociologist Pierre Gilhodés, a well renowned academic 
in Colombia for his works on agrarian struggles, who offered  an interpretative study on the 
character of military thinking in the country, ‘El Ejército Colombiano analiza La Violencia’ 
(The Colombian Army analyses La Violencia). The volume of essays was later expanded and 
translated into English under the title Violence in Colombia: The contemporary crisis in 
Historical Perspective (1992), but sadly Gilhodés’ analysis of the Colombian military was left 
out. His chapter is well sourced and clearly written, building on diverse written documents 
including Colombian military journals, Ministerial reports to Congress and officers’ 
publications, amongst other sources, to shed light onto the rudiments of Colombian military 
thinking from the early 1930s to the late 1970s. Gilhodés’ main contribution was to establish 
the different attitudes and lines of thought that developed within the military establishment in 
their approach to the internal conflict. He offered illuminating insight into the tensions that 
arose during the genesis of revolutionary insurgency in the 1960s, and uncovered the divisions 
that consolidated in the military’s conception of the conflict divisions  between a ‘traditionalist’ 
school, loyal to its Prussian origins and hence, in his opinion favouring the maintenance of the 
status quo through the use of force; and a ‘Korean’ school, of more progressive officers who 
promoted a new military doctrine that placed emphasis on military initiatives of economic 
development. However, Gilhodés’ work shows serious weakness. For a start, it is heavily 
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opinionated and forces the argument that the military has been merely an instrument of the 
Colombian elite, and had a fixation with uncovering internal enemies. In reducing the military 
to an agent of superior political interests, Gilhodés also insists on common places, like the one 
that all of the military’s ideological and motivational influences are product of undue pressure 
from the United States. Likewise, some of his conclusions are dubious and showcase his lack 
of knowledge of strategic affairs, for example that no relationship can be established between 
the army’s analysis and the characteristics, scope and frequency of military operations to 
combat the insurgency; or confusing and simplistic affirmations, such as: ‘the rule of military 
classic thought, is that in war, first one shoots then one reflects.’  Despite its deficiencies, his 
essay is important for this thesis as it was the first academic work to define the oscillatory 
nature of Colombian military thinking.   
In general, the aforementioned community of Colombian social scientists has favoured 
the study of the nature and dynamics of violent social and political protest, and of the role 
played by the diverse armed groups that pullulate in the country.  Noteworthy, for example are 
the works of sociologist Gonzalo Sánchez, founding father of ‘violentology’.  His book 
Bandits, Peasants and Politics: The Case of la Violencia in Colombia (2001 English edition), 
which was highly praised by the late Eric Hobsbawm who wrote the foreword of its first edition 
in Spanish in 1983, helped to place the period of escalation of the conflict between 1948 and 
1965 in historical perspective.  Likewise, Eduardo Pizarro’s diverse works on the history of the 
revolutionary guerrilla groups, and especially his seminal work which was recently updated, 
Las Farc: De guerrilla campesina a máquina de guerra, 1949-2011(The FARC: From Peasant 
Guerrilla to War Machine 1949- 2011) are all well sourced solid accounts that help understand 
the longevity of the insurgency thanks to the a study of the development, application and 
revisions of their political and military strategies.  
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Pizarro has also gone beyond the socio-historical approach to the insurgency. It is 
important to note his 1996 book Insurgencia sin revolución: La Guerrilla colombiana en 
perspectiva comparada (Insurgency without  Revolution: The Colombian Guerrilla in 
Comparative Perspective) which is a more analytical study, with constant references to military 
and revolutionary thinkers, to trace how different guerrilla warfare theories transitioned 
through Latin America, and evaluates how they were adopted, applied and revised in Colombia 
by different groups in different time periods. Pizarro moves to experiment with a series of 
concepts to evaluate the conflict, which can come handy in an analysis of the military and its 
own characteristics and problems in the formulation of strategy. For example he coined the 
term ‘negative stalemate’, as an alternative to ‘military stalemate,’ to convey the idea that 
despite maintaining its strategic superiority, the Colombian  military was for many decades 
incapable of defeating or even weakening its adversaries. But Pizarro did not really intend to 
expand in the reasons behind the military’s own strategic deficiencies. In general terms, the 
Colombian military is merely ambient noise in the ‘violentologits’ works. Nonetheless, it is a 
body of work that is a useful secondary source for our own purposes, as the in-depth analysis 
they offer about the armed groups and insurgencies programmes can be used to obtain a better 
idea of the characteristics of the military’s thinking from the perspective of its adversaries.  
There are a number of general histories of Colombian politics that are worth mentioning 
in this review that have served as important background reading for this study so far. David 
Bushnell’s The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (1993) is the first 
history published in English of what the author defined as one of the least studied, and probably 
the least understood of the Latin American countries. Bushnell’s is by far the most 
comprehensive introduction to Colombian modern history. The chapters dedicated to the 20th 
century give a solid account on the particularities of the political context from which the 
conflict emerged, though there are only scattered ideas about the history of the military in the 
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book. John Henderson’s, Modernization in Colombia: The Laureano Gomez Years, 1889-1965 
(2001) is also a detailed and well narrated political history of the first half of 20th century. The 
last part of this book, which is an assessment of the socioeconomic development of the country 
during the latter 50s and early 60s, coupled with an earlier work by the same author, When 
Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima (1995) which is essentially a microhistory 
concerned with the emergence of the conflict in the Magdalena valley region of Colombia, 
were useful readings for the first part of this study.  Marco Palacio’s Between Legitimacy and 
Violence:  A History of Colombia 1875–2002 (2006) and Daniel Pecaut’s 2001 book Orden y 
Violencia: Evolución socio-política de Colombia entre 1930 y 1953 (Order and Violence: 
Socio-political evolution of Colombia between 1930 and 1953) are two well researched social 
histories of the country that interpret the escalation of violence in Colombia as the product of 
a precarious state unable to impose its authority and legitimise itself. Pecaut’s work is mainly 
analytical, focusing on the configuration of violence as a category of the political process in 
Colombia during the first half of the 20th century, and concluding that the military got involved 
in the political process both ways, as a perpetrator of violence against a particular political 
grouping, but also as an arbiter between parts.   
The few Colombian academics that have written solely about the military have been 
mainly sociologists and political scientists that have leaned especially towards issues of civil-
military relations and the fixation with military rule and civilian control of the armed forces, 
following the Latin American trend. Possibly, as a an American observer points out, the 
relatively minor role the Colombian military has played in the nation’s political affairs, 
compared to the armed forces of other counties in the region, contributed to its lack of appeal 
as a subject of research. Francisco Leal’s, El Oficio de la Guerra: La Seguridad Nacional en 
Colombia (The Trade of War: National Security in Colombia) published in 1994 is considered 
the classic work devoted to the Colombian civilian-military relations in the country. Professor 
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Leal is a sociologist of the ‘violentologist’ school trained in the US, who devoted himself in 
this book to analyse the impact in the Colombian military of what he denominated the backlog 
of the National Security Doctrine in the post-Cold War.  His principal goal was to offer a set 
of recommendations for a redefinition of the concepts that had defined military thought in the 
country. Although the book is mostly conceptual with rigorously researched chapters devoted 
to the explanation of the rise and fall of the doctrine to later contextualise the way it was 
understood and applied in Colombia, two of its chapters are strictly historical in its scope, 
analysing with all its mishaps the evolution of military policy in the country from 1958 to 1991. 
One of Leal’s contributions, and which is of vital importance to this study, is his evaluation of 
the problems that since the 1960s the institutional autonomy of the Colombian military has 
generated for the design of defence and security policy in the country. His book is extremely 
well sourced, not only with a huge array of official documents, which he liberally quotes, but 
with interviews to key military officers which he transcribed.  
Adolfo Atehortúa and Humberto Vélez, Estado y Fuerzas Armadas en Colombia (The 
Armed Forces and the State in Colombia) also from 1994, traces the institutional development 
of the modern military since its inception in the early 1900s up to the Korean War. The 
objective of the authors was to analyse the evolution of the relationship of the military 
establishment with the state, civil society and the political elites, and its functions with respect 
to the political system. It gives a detailed account of the early process of professionalisation of 
the Army and the influence of the diverse European military missions that tutored them, well 
sourced with written documents and statistics, permits the antecedents of the ideological 
strands which underpin military thinking in the country to be identified.  The book, however, 
stops short by the mid-1940s proposing spurious conclusions resonant of the common places 
that characterise the military as an unreflective institution that turned into a coercive tool of the 
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political elite, and, that in the post war period it simply became ‘entrapped in the doctrinarian 
and strategic parameters of US continental policy.’28  
In terms of civil-military relations another work worth mentioning is a thought 
provoking chapter by Douglas Porch, ‘Preserving autonomy in Conflict: Civil-Military 
relations in Colombia,’ which he prepared for the volume  Global Politics of Defense Reform 
(2008), edited by his colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, Thomas 
Bruneau  and Harold Trinkunas. Porch is a military historian that has left his mark with highly 
praised books on the French Army.  During the early 2000s Professor Porch found himself 
teaching a great number of Colombian officers at NPS and regularly flying south to advise on 
diverse security and military matters, he became so interested in the country that he decided to 
spend a sabbatical there to deepen his knowledge. In this chapter Porch offers an extremely 
clear-sighted historical overview of the difficulties in civil-military interaction in the country 
and its consequences for the formulation of strategy. He charts a number of factors that help 
explain why, even though the Colombian military has been traditionally subordinate to political 
authority, the civilian government has struggled to make efficient use of military power. His 
analysis has been useful to delineate some of the constitutive elements of the Colombian 
strategic tradition in Chapter I.   
Military history in Colombia has also been a neglected academic field. It has long been 
a monopoly of retired officers and civilian armchair historians who mainly concentrate on 19th 
century battlefield histories about the war of independence from Spain or the eight civil wars 
that followed.  There is only one authorised history of the Colombian Armed Forces (Historia 
de las Fuerzas Armadas en Colombia), edited in 1996 by one of Colombia’s most renowned 
Generals, Álvaro Valencia Tovar.  One volume, of the six it contains, is dedicated to the 
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military in the 20th century, and although its scope is narrow and sometimes apologetic, it 
provides some appreciation of the way the military has understood the conflict, and is an 
indispensable source for factual information. More recently, the origins of the professional 
Colombian Army and also the country’s participation in the Korean War, which is considered 
by historians as a turning point, are subjects that have received some scholarly attention. Saul 
Hernández’s 2006 book, La influencia de los Estados Unidos en el Ejército Colombiano 1951-
1959 (The Influence of the United States in the Colombian Army 1951-1959) is a pioneer work 
by a new generation of Colombian historians. One weakness of this work is that it approaches 
the configuration of the military under U.S influence focusing strictly on technical and 
organisational matters. But beyond the adoption of olive drab uniforms, US staff structure, 
doctrine, and other technicalities what has been, for example, the extent of Washington’s 
influence in the formulation of military strategy? This is a central question which the author 
does not address.  
On the other hand, the study of the Colombian military by Anglophone authors has 
followed a very different path to the work produced locally. Security assistance and military 
reform and modernisation have been two prime subjects of study in the past four decades. One 
set of authors who produced their work during the late 1960s and early 1970s were mostly 
former US officers who served in the Panama Canal Zone at Fort Gulick (The School of the 
Americas) or were part of the US Military Mission to Colombia. These works are essentially 
reminiscences of the first teams of counter-insurgency mentors and consultants like Richard 
Maullin’s, Soldiers Guerrillas and Politics (1973) and Russell W. Ramsey’s Guerrillas and 
Soldiers (1981), which are pertinent readings that highlight some of the views the US had of 
the conflict and the Colombian military during the early stages of the conflict.  A second set of 
Anglophone authors have been producing their work since the early 1990s, and have benefited 
from a great deal of declassified documents of the US Government, hence amplifying the 
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description of the role played by Washington in assisting the Colombian military.  Dennis 
Rempe is a Canadian political scientist with an interest in US policy in Latin America during 
the 1960s. He was the first to study the US military assistance programmes to Colombia during 
the period using recently declassified documents. His work was the first to highlight the 
immense potential for research about US involvement in Colombia during the early Cold War, 
publishing various articles in the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies.29 Rempe’s work is 
extremely descriptive, citing long tracts of the documents he undusted and does not engage 
with any analysis of the sources, taking for granted the information produced by the US 
authorities.  Conversely, Bradley Coleman’s, Colombia and the United States: The Making of 
an Inter-American Alliance, 1939-1960 (2008) can be singled out as the most thoroughly 
researched book on the early history of the origin and consolidation of military and security 
relations between both countries. Coleman’s scholarship is undeniable, well familiarised with 
the literature produced in Colombia, and utilising a wide variety of archives in both countries, 
he offers a well-balanced narrative that serves to show that the appropriation of the concepts 
and means offered by Washington to the Colombians in those early years of the conflict was 
not lineal or clear cut, and that local considerations of a varied kind eventually determined the 
configuration of the aid and influenced the development of military strategy in the country. In 
this regard his work has been extremely useful as reading for the initial phases of this research 
which will focus precisely in his period of expertise. 
In the past decade, with the initiation of ‘Plan Colombia’, a reinforced billion dollar 
assistance package that Washington offered the country between 1999 and 2010 for the upgrade 
of the armed forces, there has been a surge in the works produced in English about the 
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Colombian military. However, most of these have been strongly influenced by the advent of 
the so-called ‘Low Intensity Warfare’ literature that has decontextualised the Colombian 
conflict in an attempt to draw off ‘lessons learned’ that can be replicated elsewhere. Good 
examples of this sort of literature are Richard Downie’s Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare: 
The Challenge of Colombia in the 21st Century (1999) which argued that the Colombian 
military was an inefficient fighting force because it lacked essential organisational learning 
practices. Also, Russell Ramsey III, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The 
Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998-2008 (2009), Thomas Mark’s, Colombian Army 
Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (2002), and also his most recent book chapter ‘Regaining the 
Initiative : Colombia versus the FARC insurgency’(2011).30 These works have merely focused 
on the operational aspects and technical innovations of the last decade, especially those offered 
by US assistance, whilst minimising a six decade long history of Colombian military 
involvement in internal counter-insurgency as a mere historical contingency.  Conversely, the 
chapter written by Douglas Porch and Christopher Muller, ‘Imperial Grunts Revisited: The US 
Advisory Effort in Colombia’ for Donald Stoker’s Military Advising and Assistance: From 
Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815- 2007 (2008) takes a different approach, placing the role of 
US military assistance to Colombia within its historical context. As a critique of the ideas of 
analysts like Andrew Keprinevich and Robert Kaplan, who suggested that security assistance 
was a key tool for the success in the ‘war on terror’ through the transfer knowledge and 
technology to partner nations, the authors use the Colombian case to demonstrate that 
assistance seldom transfers unaltered to other national environments, mainly as it plays out in 
a strategic and political context that is unique to the recipient.  Although Porch and Muller’s 
assessment is principally devoted to the experience post-2000, they offer the reader an accurate 
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picture of the composition of the value-system of the Colombian military after decades engaged 
in the conflict, and hint how the extensive US influence combined with local factors to 
influence the formulation of strategy. 
In terms of more detailed strategic analysis, it is only possible to point to one single 
book chapter written by Román Ortiz and Nicolas Urrutia, two local experts who advised the 
Colombian Ministry of Defence on military and defence policy. Their chapter ‘A Long Road 
to Victory: Developing Counterinsurgency Strategy in Colombia’, in James Forest’s 
compendium Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International 
Perspectives (2006) gives a general overview of the evolution of the Colombian military 
response to insurgencies from the 1950s up the early 1990s, but it does so through a very 
technical-organisational approach.  The authors are interested in the evolution of the strategic 
tradition as a means to contextualise the military campaign after 2002. They purport the current 
experience marks a breakthrough in quantitative and qualitative terms in comparison to 
previous decades thanks to a slow but successful process of military modernisation and reform; 
the introduction of novel operational concepts and the aid offered by the US which served to 
overhaul the counter-insurgency campaign. Their narrow synopsis of the early configuration 
and development of the military’s strategic tradition evidences the need to expand the subject 
of study and produce a more comprehensive and systematic analysis. This thesis will attempt 
to make a contribution in this respect.   
Primary Sources 
 
A part from identifying gaps in the literature, the review has also served to highlight some of 
the relevant works relating to the Colombian conflict in general and the military in particular, 
which will serve to consolidate important background knowledge for the study proposed.  The 
core of this research will, however, be based on primary sources.  There is a great amount of 
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primary sources capable of being evaluated with reference to strategic theory to help construct 
an impression of the process of strategic formulation in Colombia during the formative years 
of the counter-insurgency tradition, that is, between 1948 and the late 1960s.  Various types of 
sources provide the core documentary material for the study. Firstly, a number of unpublished 
declassified documents produced by the military including:  manuals, strategic concepts and 
operational plans available in Colombian military’s service school libraries. Also, published 
military official documents including diverse training material and journals like the Revista 
Militar (Military Review) Revista de Infanteria (Infantry Review) and the Revista del Ejército 
(Army Review) that contain a number of accounts and pronouncements of diverse Colombian 
officers that inform about their major strategic discussions. Secondly, a number of Colombian 
unpublished government documents which have arrived to the Archivo General de la Nacion 
(the National Archive) and the Presidential Archive, both in Bogotá, despite the lack of 
comprehensive declassification laws in the country.  Thirdly, the research was based on 
memoirs by retired officers, which offer some important insight about their value-system and 
allows an understanding of how they see themselves. A crucial text was General Álvaro 
Valencia Tovar’ Testimonio de una Época (Testimony of an Epoch) published in 1992 and Mis 
Adversarios Guerrilleros (My guerrilla adversaries) published in 2006. Both books are in part 
a personal historical interpretation of Colombia in the 20th century, and also autobiographical 
with an account of his military experience during his Cadet years up to his promotion to Army 
Chief of Staff (CoS).  Whilst obviously biased and self-praising, these books are revealing 
about the strategic debates within the military during the 1960s and the tense relations with the 
civilian governments.  Other important books used are collections of articles and essays which 
expose some of the main ideas of  varied military commanders, like General Alberto Ruiz 
Novoa’s  1965 book  El Gran Desafío (The Great Challenge), and General Fernando 
Landazábal’s 1985 El Precio de la Paz (The Price of Peace) and his 1988 El Desafío – 
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Colombia: Sus problemas y soluciones (The Challenge. Colombia: Its problems and solutions).  
The study has also used a great number of public statements and speeches of Colombian 
military and civilian leaders, available in compilations and in the press. Following from this, 
the Colombian and international press has been used to provide further support to analyse the 
course of the conflict and the evolution of military thinking in the country, and has served to 
contextualise official documentation and balance the ex post facto accounts of Colombian 
officers 
Finally, Colombian sources will be combined with foreign unpublished sources. The 
study has relied extensively on a wide selection of US official documents that extend from the 
1940s to the early 1970s produced by different agencies, including the US Embassy in Bogota; 
the Department of State; Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
This documentation has been obtained from the Hoover Archives in Stanford, the National 
Archives in Washington, the Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), and the 
National Security Archive as well as its online version the Digital National Security Archive, 
both administered by the George Washington University. These sources have been 
complemented with a token of British sources available at the National Archives in Kew, 
mainly originating from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that discussed Colombian 
military matters during the period studied.   
Conclusion 
 
The originality of this research resides in the method of analysis selected to approach the 
subject of study. In this sense, more than a history of the conflict and the Colombian military, 
which is already an understudied area, by using strategic analysis it will be possible to assess 
how as an actor the Colombian military has viewed the instrumentality of force and the political 
conduct of the conflict, which can provide useful answers as to the longevity of the conflict 
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itself. As has been shown in the literature review, there are only a few timid attempts, mainly 
at the level of book chapters and articles that have used strategic analysis to address some issues 
about the Colombian military’s present experience in managing the internal conflict.  Thus, 
this thesis will attempt to make a contribution to knowledge by examining thoroughly an 
understudied protracted internal war, utilising the conceptual framework of strategic theory. 
Moreover, the production of a comprehensive systematic analysis about the composition and 
evolution of military thought in Colombia, that is to say, the way the military conceived the 
use of means and ways to achieve ends, will offer insight into the recent behaviour of the 
military in the conflict and the challenges faced in the ongoing peace process with the FARC 
insurgency in Havana. 
 Having said this, it is necessary at this point to clarify the structure of the research.  
The thesis will begin by constructing the strategic tradition of the Colombian military, which 
provides the objective of both Chapters 1 and 2.  Normally an evolutionary analysis like the 
one proposed in this research proceeds chronologically, however, the thesis takes a different 
approach. Chapter 1 begins with an analysis of the latest events, given the topical interest in 
the ongoing challenges of the Colombian conflict amidst the peace negotiations that began in 
Havana in November 2012, and the academic and policy debates over the future of counter-
insurgency; that is the emphasis on what has been termed ‘light’ or ‘small-foot print’ assistance 
for which Colombia is being used as an instructive model to inform Western military needs.  
In this respect, Chapter 1 aims to place the current commentary on Colombia in historical 
perspective, introducing what can be termed as the long-term drivers of its military thinking, 
and which have been neglected due to the focus on the operational and organisational ‘lessons 
learnt’ approach of recent counter-insurgency literature. Chapter 2, for its part, introduces the 
themes that have historically influenced the evolution of Colombian military thought. The 
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themes examined serve as an analytical tool to structure the evolutionary analysis in subsequent 
chapters.   
The intention, in the succeeding chapters will be to analyse how the crucial features of 
the Colombian military mind have influenced the way they have endeavoured to utilise the 
means at their disposal in different periods of the conflict. Chapter 3 will examine the origins 
of the Colombian military tradition. It will focus on the civil war known as La Violencia which 
raged through the 1950s and which can be considered as the foundational period of the debates 
that led to the adoption of counter-insurgency thinking in the country. The core arguments of 
the thesis are then developed in Chapters 4 and 5. These two chapters are devoted to the study 
of the 1960s where the weight of the analysis is placed on the reasons behind, and the dynamics 
of, the evolution of counter-insurgency thinking in the country. The early 1960s, which is the 
focus of Chapter 4, is a transitional period when the principal features of the varied strategic 
views of the Colmil are clearly discernible, and start interacting in oscillatory manner. For its 
part, the mid-1960s, as is discussed in Chapter 5, mark the maturation and consolidation of 
counter-insurgency in the Colombian military’s strategic tradition amidst the escalation of the 
conflict.  Finally, the evolutionary analysis of the origins of the Colombian strategic tradition 
will allow to reflect on how the formative period has shaped the current understanding of the 
nature of the conflict, the inclination to privilege certain means above others, and ultimately, 










THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY AND ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE   FARC INSURGENCY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 
 
As emphasised in the introduction, whilst Colombia’s recent offensive against the FARC is 
being considered a successful example at least in terms of battlefield results of both successful 
counter-insurgency and effective foreign security assistance by the US, there is a need to place 
in historical perspective the most recent effort by Comil to defeat the now half century old 
insurgency, that during the 1990s threatened to drop the government in Bogota to its knees.  In 
this regard, it is necessary to restate once more that the main rationale behind this thesis is that 
the Comil’s behaviour today against their main adversary, cannot be thoroughly understood 
without considering its protracted struggle against multiple bandit and insurgent groups.  
In the preceding section it was also noted that most of the existing works dealing with 
the conflict mention the Colmil’s past experience en passant, as a simple means to place their 
work within a wider context. Conversely, more specialised military literature dealing with 
Colombia since the 1990s has been strongly influenced by Low Intensity Warfare theory, and 
recently by the resurgence of counter-insurgency literature which echoes the theoretical 
precepts of the former. As strategic theorists have noted, both types of literature disconnect 
disparate conflicts from their historical and political settings by attempting to make theoretical 
generalisations based on tactics and the means employed by belligerents. 2 This, in part, 
explains the emphasis of recent commentary about the Colmil produced in the West on issues 
of operational and tactical adaptation. Lately, the search has included that of transferable best 
                                                          
1 An edited version of this chapter was published online as an article in The Journal of Strategic Studies in May 
2015. See: Jorge E. Delgado, ‘Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP insurgency, 2002-
2014’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38:6 (2015), pp.826-851. 
2 See for example: M.L.R. Smith., ‘Guerrillas in the mist: reassessing strategy and low intensity warfare’, Review 
of International Studies Vol. 29 (2003), p.23; M.L.R. Smith, D.M Jones and John Stone, ‘Counter-COIN: 
Counterinsurgency and the Preemption of Strategy’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35:9 (2012), p.603. 
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practices in foreign military assistance, with the object of informing future interventions, 
particularly under the rubric ‘small foot-print’.3 The Colombian experience in the past decade 
has been cited as a promising example of this sort of approach.  
Indeed, it is the tendency of counter-insurgency thinking to focus on the sequencing of 
tactical methods as the ordering principle for action which has led strategic theorists like 
M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones to define it as a form of ‘antipolitical instrumentalism’. 
According to them, COIN increases ‘complexity and flawed judgments and commitments 
when advanced as a standard model.’4  This occurs because COIN proponents have claimed 
that insurgency and COIN are a distinct category of conflict, and so insist that Clausewitz’s 
observation that war is a political phenomenon applies only to inter-state conflict. For this 
reason, COIN thinking ignores the importance that Clausewitz attached to ‘shaping one’s 
actions in regard to the wider political context in which they occur.’5 Likewise, military 
historians have also highlighted this apolitical feature of COIN thinking, arguing that the 
rejection by its proponents of the Clausewitzian character of war comes in favour of a Jominian 
posture, with tactics and operational methods as substitute for cohesive, balanced strategic 
judgement.6 
With these points in mind, a contention of this thesis, then, is that any valuable analysis  
of the Colmil experience in the last decade requires us to go beyond the focus on the tactics 
                                                          
3 Examples of commentary and analysis include: Stephen Watts, et.al, The Uses and Limits of Small Scale 
Intervention (RAND Co: Santa Monica, 2012); Linda Robinson, The Future of US Special Operation Forces, 
Special Report No.66 (NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013); Dana Priest, ‘Covert Action in Colombia. U.S. 
Intelligence, GPS bomb Kits Help Latin American Nation Cripple Rebel Forces’, The Washington Post, 21 
December 2013; James Stavridis, ‘Inshallah and Ojalá: The lessons of counterinsurgency and nation-building in 
Colombia can also apply to the Arab world’, Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2014. 
4  See for example: M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones, ‘Whose hearts and whose minds? The Curious Case 
of Global Counterinsurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33:1 (2010); M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones, 
‘Grammar but no logic Technique is Not Enough – A Response to Nagl and Burton,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 
33:3 (2010). 
5 Smith, et.al, ‘Counter-COIN’, p.603. 
6 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), p.318; 
Alex Marshall, ‘Imperial Nostalgia, the Liberal Lie, and the Perils of Postmodern Counterinsurgency’, Small Wars 
& Insurgencies 21:2 (June 2010), p.243. 
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and best practices transferred by United States to enhance the ‘host’ country’s capabilities. 
While US assistance has obviously played an important role in shaping the Colmil’s operational 
performance, the present analysis intends to focus on the long-term drivers that have defined 
the Colmil’s process of strategic formulation since the inception of the conflict. Following from 
this, the argument of this first chapter is that the contours of the offensive initiated under the 
presidency of Álvaro Uribe from 2002 can only be fully analysed in the context of the Colmil’s 
strategic tradition. This implies taking into account the factors that have formed the Colmil’s 
distinctive intellectual framework.  
The aim in this chapter is to go beyond a mere narrative of operational success, and 
instead identify the tensions that have traditionally underpinned strategic thinking in Colombia. 
After all, strategy is about matching ends to means, and it would be surprising if over the last 
half-century of conflict Bogotá and its armed forces were not at times in disagreement over 
where that balance lay. Today, as former defence minister President Juan Manual Santos caps 
off a decade of operational success by initiating peace talks with the FARC, is one of those 
times when the government and its military appear to be significantly at odds over the 
instrumentality of force to achieve political effects. Current civil-military altercations over the 
peace process are more than simply a debate over its timing. Rather, they shed light on how 
the military and the civilian leadership harbour differing views on the nature and behaviour of 
their FARC adversary, the objectives to be sought in the campaign, the limits of force in the 
conflict, and the meaning of victory. However, before commencing with the analysis of the 
basic assumptions and outlook that characterise Colombian military thinking, it is necessary to 
understand the recent political context, and in particular the changing government perceptions 




The politico-military setting, 1996-2014 
 
The FARC insurgency only turned into a serious challenge to the Colombian state by the mid-
1990s. Bolstered by the proceeds of cocaine production, it began to escalate the offensive it 
had set out in its 1982 ‘Strategic Plan for the Seizure of Power’. Militarily the plan called for 
a spreading of operations throughout the country, the levy of an army of 10,000 troops and a 
strategic deployment from the hinterlands onto the western Andes cordillera to encircle 
Bogotá.7 The plan began to be executed at full force by 1996, when then the FARC began to 
enjoy success on the battlefield, inflicting humiliating defeats on a static, under sourced, and 
demoralised military caught off guard by the increased operational tempo of the guerrillas. 
Resembling what some experts refer to as ‘swarming,’ in well planned operations executed by 
at least three independent FARC units, combined forces of 450 to 1500 guerrillas would attack 
an enemy target from different directions. In that manner, in just one year, eight army and police 
bases were overwhelmed and two army battalion size units almost annihilated.8 The insurgents 
also began to resource a massive reserve in the south-eastern jungles to sustain their strategy, 
as well as to hold hundreds of prisoners taken in their ambushes, along with civilian hostages 
who not only served to extract ransoms but also were expected to be bargained in negotiations 
with the government.9  
                                                          
7 Corporación Observatorio para la Paz, Guerras Inútiles. Una historia de las FARC (Bogotá: Intermedio Editores, 
2009), p.78. 
8 The main humiliating defeats of the Colmil in the period were the fall of the army base of Patascoy in December 
1997 and the almost total destruction of a counter-guerrilla battalion in El Billar in March 1998. See: Russell 
Ramsey III, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998-
2008 (Ft Leavenworth KA: CSIP, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2009). For detailed local accounts, see: ‘El 
Billar el mayor desastre military de la historia,’ El Tiempo, 28 April 2008. Available at: 
<http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-4129924 > (Accessed 13 March 2014); ‘12 años de la toma 
de cerro Patascoy’, Semana, 23 December 2009. Available at: < http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/12-anos-
toma-cerro-patascoy/111455-3>. (Accessed 13 March 2014). 
9 A detailed analysis of  FARC’s use of political hostages as negotiation tool with the government can be found 
in the strategic dossier of the IISS: ‘The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of “Raúl 
Reyes,”’An IISS Strategic Dossier, International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2011. 
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The military’s situation in this period was also aggravated by a serious political crisis, 
triggered by accusations of links between President Ernesto Samper (1994-98) and drug cartels 
which had financed his campaign, who spent the duration of his mandate fighting against his 
impeachment. Samper effectively relegated military policy to a secondary matter of 
government, only to be startled by the FARC offensive which came to the fore with the fall of 
Las Delicias military base in Putumayo on 30 August 1996, the first major setback for the 
Army, in which 27 soldiers were killed and 60 taken prisoner.10 Eventually, FARC offered as 
a ‘goodwill gesture’ to release the soldiers they had bagged in exchange for the temporary 
demilitarization of Cartagena del Chaira a 13,000 km2 municipality in Caquetá.  According to 
the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Harold Bedoya, the guerrilla was black-mailing the 
President with its demands to clear territory for the prisoner exchange, and to follow suit was 
to put ‘national security at risk. 11 Despite the recommendations of his military chiefs, the 
government went ahead with the decision to demilitarize the area, which sparked one of the 
most acute civil-military crisis since the 1970s.  
There was an increasing hostility from the military towards Samper, with rumours of 
coup d’ état voiced at least twice between 1996 and 1997.12 Amidst the operational setbacks 
of the army, the prisoner release demands of the FARC and the decertification of the Colombian 
government by Washington for its unreliability in the fight against drug trafficking, which 
brought military assistance to a halt,13  General Harold Bedoya declared in the national press 
that there was an ‘evident lack of political will to face the FARC,’ and that rather than 
                                                          
10 ‘Interrogantes sobre el as alto a las Delicias’, El Tiempo, 3 September 1996.  
11 Maria Teresa Ronderos, ‘Harold Bedoya. De la Guerra a la Politica,’ El Tiempo, 10 May 1998. 
12 Porch, ‘Autonomy in Conflict’, p.131. 
13 In 1996 and 1997 the State Department ‘decertified’ Colombia’s cooperation with US. International drug control 
strategy, resulting in the cut off of many types of military assistance to the country. For more information and 
primary documents see: Michael Evans (ed.), Guerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S. Colombia Policy, 
1988-2002, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 69. Washington D.C: George Washington 
University, 2 May 2002. Available at: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/part3.html#39 > 
(Accessed 13 March 2014).  
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negotiating with the enemy and giving him political recognition by ceding to its territorial 
demands, what was required was will to face the in its own terms and defeat it. 14  
After the prisoner release went ahead in June 1997 and the subsequent dismissal of 
General Bedoya for his opposition to the President’s order, the military’s misgivings with 
Samper’s conduct of the conflict increased, particularly as the operational setbacks of the 
Colmil kept on mounting until the end of his administration in August 1998. During that year 
the FARC captured a further 200 soldiers and police of all ranks which they began to hold in 
makeshift prison camps in the jungle and paraded on national television. Amidst the escalating 
violence and the military’s prostration, the opening of peace talks with the guerrillas became a 
feasible political alternative which began to receive wide popular support. In fact, the day local 
elections were held in October 1997 Colombians also had the chance to vote for a ‘consultative 
poll’ known as the Citizen Mandate for Peace to voice their support for a negotiated solution 
to the conflict and a ‘humanitarian accord’ to liberate all hostages and captured police and army 
personnel. Ten million votes were cast in favour of the initiative, setting the tone for the 
presidential election of May 1998 in which the subject of peace talks was to be the central 
issue. Conservative candidate, Andrés Pastrana, was able to secure an easy victory at the 
election. He got ahead of his competitors at the end of the campaign by meeting FARC 
commander ‘Tirofijo’, who agreed to initiate talks if the government guaranteed the insurgents 
the control of a Switzerland sized zone in the south of the country and removed all presence of 
the Colmil. The demand was considered to be attainable given the precedent of the 
demilitarisation for the prisoner release of Las Delicias.  Pastrana agreed and disingenuously 
presented the zone as a gesture of goodwill from the administration in order to establish the 
peace process, not as a military gain by FARC. The Government did not refer to the area as a 
DMZ as the insurgent army would be in control and baptized it with the term zona de 
                                                          
14 Ronderos, ‘Harold Bedoya,’ El Tiempo, 10 May 1998. 
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distension, literally, détente zone. It was evident that the insurgents had the opposite reading 
about the nature of the area, referring to it as a ‘cleared area’ (zona de despeje). The political 
decision to remove the armed forces from the area was, for the FARC, the recognition of a 
military fait accompli: that they had gained effective control of the territory as part of their 
offensive and were, thus, a legitimate belligerent.15  Under the circumstances, the Colmil was 
left with no other option but to accept the Mandate for Peace and the terms of the ensuing 
negotiations, even if initiating them under the ascendancy of the FARC and ceding physical 
space to the adversary was seen as a self-defeating action by the Pastrana administration.   
The Colmil was completely dismissive of the FARC’s peace intentions. Soldiers argued 
that FARC was not going to call off the ‘plan for the seizure of power’, and that in fact its 
strategy would be to combine the negotiations with a more assertive use of force to advance its 
end goal of toppling the government.16 These anxieties intensified on the eve of Pastrana’s 
inauguration the 6 August 1998, when FARC mounted more than 60 simultaneous attacks on 
military and civilian targets with the objective of paralysing the country, including the 
attempted destruction of Miraflores, the main counter-narcotics base of the country which was 
resourced by the US and were 129 of the 190 police and military officers present were taken 
prisoner. Despite the offensive, Pastrana did not change his mind about commencing the talks, 
and maintained that his will was to seek peace via an accord with the FARC. In the meantime, 
his recently appointed cabinet avoided further criticism with the simplistic argument that the 
latest insurgent attacks were a mere ‘farewell gift’ for the unpopular Samper rather than a 
message to the new President with whom they had the commitment to negotiate.17  
                                                          
15 Corporación Observatorio para la Paz, Guerras Inútiles, p.100. 
16 Román Ortiz,  ‘La Guerrilla Mutante,’ In Francisco Leal (ed.), En la encrucijada: Colombia en el siglo XXI,  
(Bogotá: Uniandes - Editorial Norma, 2006) p.335. 
17 See for example: ‘Pastrana dice que ante todo continuara proceso‘, El Tiempo, 6 August 1998;  ‘Tenemos 129 
prisioneros: Mono Jojoy’, El Tiempo, 8 August 1998. 
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President Pastrana’s resolve to negotiate was put to the test in early November, a 
fortnight after the signature of the executive decree that authorised the creation of the cleared 
zone when 1,500 guerrilla fighters occupied Mitú, capital city of the Amazonian department of 
Vaupés in the frontier with Brazil. The occupation of a regional capital had been envisaged by 
the FARC’s military commanders as the culminating point of the 1982 Strategic Plan, and amid 
the negotiations it gained new significance as it expected to generate greater political impact 
and increase bargaining options. It took the military almost three days to reclaim the city, 
pushing its scarce resources to the limit given the distance from Bogotá, including a plea to 
Brazil to allow the use of its airfields to refuel. An intercepted dispatch from the FARC military 
commander ‘Mono Jojoy’ to his troops on the aftermath of the operation was harbinger of the 
hard times to come for the military. ‘We are at war and shall continue at war, nothing and 
nobody can distract us from our activities,’ it read. The blow generated by the fall of Mitú, 
including the capture of 30 policemen – many of whom had to endure more than 12 years of 
captivity until their eventual rescue - and the publication of the guerrilla dispatch in the media, 
was followed by controversy in Bogotá over the benefit of offering the FARC a cleared area. 
The shock generated by the insurgent offensive, did not affect the President’s decision to go 
ahead with the establishment of the zone.  
While President Pastrana had assured his Chiefs of Staff that the zone would only have 
a duration of three months after the official initiation of talks in January 1999, it became a 
permanent fixture of the peace talks. It was renewed seven consecutive times until the collapse 
of the process in February 2002. Each executive decision to renew the zone, combined with 
the lack of definition protocols for its management, and the FARC’s reticence to allow an 
international verification commission to act as guarantor only served to augment the 
frustrations of the Colmil. There was a general feeling that the government was improvising, 
and even worse, making a disproportionate concession to the insurgency without substantial 
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advances in the talks. Indeed, many officers felt the President was being pig-headed, as if he 
did not want to accept the strategic consequences of his decisions; in short, that the zone was 
providing the FARC with a safe haven from which to escalate its armed campaign and achieve 
its political goals.18 As ‘Simon Trinidad’ a member of the FARC’s Secretariat, stated in an 
interview for the international press early in 2001, ‘the cleared zone is a State in gestation.’ His 
bold claim did not elicit a government response which only served to increase civil-military 
tension.19 Colmil’s calls to put an immediate end to the cleared zone became more intense when 
intelligence sources found evidence that the FARC had built clandestine airstrips in the zone 
and that there was a substantial flow of weapons and hostages.20  In August 2001, for example, 
three members of the Provisional IRA were arrested by the police after exiting the zone.  Traces 
of explosives were found in their clothes confirming that they were providing training to the 
FARC.21 Despite all these dangerous signs, Pastrana ignored the demands of his Colmil chiefs 
to put an end to the zona de distensión. 
How did President Pastrana maintain control over the military despite the unpopularity 
of the process and the graveness of the situation generated by the cleared zone? Basically, the 
president was able to prevent the military’s alienation thanks to the fact that since the early 
days of the administration he had hinted via his Defence Minister that that the strengthening of 
the military’s capabilities was going to be priority for his administration because it would serve 
as a guarantee for the peace process.22  Two early moves were essential in this regard. First he 
promoted a military leadership eager for reform after the debacle of the Samper era and the 
                                                          
18 ‘Gobierno de Andrés Pastrana,’ Semana, 1 April 2004, Available at: <http://www.semana.com/on-
line/articulo/gobierno-andres-pastrana/62716-3 > (Accessed 13 March 2014). 
19Ibid.   
20 Embassy to DOS, ‘Military Assessment of Situation in Putumayo and Impact on Plan Colombia’ Secret, Cable, 
Excised Copy, 010056, 14 November 2000. Accessed via DNSA. 
21 For context, see for example: Jeremy McDermott, ‘Colombian Attacks ‘Have Hallmark of IRA,’ BBC News, 
11 August 2002. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2186244.stm (Accessed 13 March 2014). 
22 Embassy to DOS, ‘CODEL Spence Meetings with Defense Minister Lloreda and military forces Chief General 
Tapias,’ Confidential, Cable, Excised Copy, 009798, 27 August 1998. Accessed via DNSA. 
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latest operational set-backs. Pastrana was to provide Chief of the Armed Forces General 
Fernando Tapias and Army CoS General Jorge Enrique Mora, two reform minded senior 
officers, with the political will and the resources required to begin a process of expansion and 
professionalization of the armed forces in exchange for their acquiescence to the terms of the 
peace negotiations. Respectively, the Chiefs of Staff guaranteed they would respect the 
President’s political prerogative to conduct peace talks, with the caveat that it was their 
prerogative to voice concerns about the impact of the process to National Security which should 
not be considered as intervention in politics.23  Second, the president began to lobby the Clinton 
administration arguing that any process of military upgrade depended on the reestablishment 
of US security assistance which had been frozen with the ‘decertification’ of Colombia during 
the Samper administration. The rapprochement with Washington was largely welcomed by the 
Colmil.  The renewal of US military assistance required, however, a commitment from the 
Colmil to deal more bluntly with the drug trade and to take steps to improve its human rights 
record. But, despite its overemphasis on the counter-narcotics component, which forced the 
Colmil to recast essential strategic assumptions about the conflict, and consent to the US view 
that its solution required giving priority to the drug problem and not to the FARC’s armed 
campaign.  However, the support for Plan Colombia within the Colmil was unanimous, as it 
secured US$6 billion in assistance for military and police modernisation.  
However, 11 September 2001 radically changed the strategic setting and led 
Washington to recast its security priorities in Colombia. Fearing the growth of terrorist activity 
in the country due to the escalation of violence by the FARC and the paramilitaries, the new 
priority was to ‘deepen engagement’ with the Colombians to develop enhanced 
                                                          
23 See: ‘Gobierno de Andrés Pastrana,’ Semana, 1 April 2004, Available at: <http://www.semana.com/on-
line/articulo/gobierno-andres-pastrana/62716-3 > (Accessed 13 March 2014). 
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counterterrorism capabilities.24 Five months after the attack against the World Trade Centre in 
New York, the FARC took an airliner hostage in mid-air and forced it to land in the cleared 
zone in order to kidnap Jorge Eduardo Gechem, a Senator from conflict torn Huila, and who 
was a prominent member of the peace commission of the Chamber.25 This action not only 
expedited the FARC’s international designation as terrorist organization, but more importantly 
was the trigger for the fulminant termination by President Pastrana of the fruitless four-year 
long peace negotiations, who immediately ordered the reoccupation of the zona de despeje by 
the Colmil. Two months later, in May 2002, Álvaro Uribe was elected president of Colombia.  
Inaugurated in August 2002, Uribe pledged to take the fight to the FARC, then rebranded as a 
terrorist group. Undeniably, while Uribe’s landslide victory in the polls represented a public 
endorsement for a more aggressive posture in dealing with the FARC, increased support from 
the US government negotiated by Uribe’s predecessor put muscle behind Uribe’s threat. In 
particular, the George W. Bush administration allowed Uribe to use key US military assets 
against the insurgency, most notably a robust fleet of Blackhawk helicopters and advanced 
intelligence platforms which had been originally allocated for counter-narcotics operations 
under Plan Colombia.26 
Perhaps the most remarkable change brought in by Uribe was his view of the nature of 
the enemy faced by the Colombian state. Whilst Pastrana indirectly bestowed a degree of 
recognition of FARC’s political status by ceding to it a large swath of de-facto sovereign 
territory and agreeing to negotiate, Uribe on the other hand, never ceased to insist that 
Colombia faced a ‘narco-terrorist’ threat that had to be dealt with by force. ‘Traditional 
Colombian politicians were in favour of dialogue with the armed groups, as the solution to 
                                                          
24 US embassy to DoS, ‘Enhancing Our Counterterrorism Strategy for Colombia’, Secret, Cable, Excised Copy, 
008767, 28 September, 2001, Accessed via DNSA. 
25 Juan Forero, ‘Colombian Rebels Hijack a Plane and Kidnap a Senator’, The New York Times, 20 February 2002.  
26 Dos to US Embassy Bogota, ‘Targeting Terrorist Leaders in Colombia’ [Heavily Excised], Secret, Cable, 
008083, 6 September 2002. Accessed via DNSA. 
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violence,’ Uribe recounts in his memoirs; ‘in my opinion they erroneously equated 
appeasement with civility, as if the only function of the State was to act as mediator, instead of 
being the guarantor of security and territorial control.’27 The emphasis on regaining territorial 
control for the state against a FARC that ruled much of the south-eastern territory and regularly 
severed highways connecting Colombia’s major cities, would serve as the guiding plan of 
action for his government’s counter-insurgency policy known as Politica de Defensa y 
Seguridad Democratica (Democratic Security Policy - DSP) published in June 2003.   
By the end of 2006, the levels of carnage in the country had been significantly reduced. 
Homicide rates for example plummeted by 45 per cent, and the threat of FARC related violence 
in the main urban areas dissipated as well as the scourge of kidnapping-for-ransom, a reduction 
of 90 per cent according to official statistics.28  The achievement of what could be termed 
‘acceptable levels of violence’ appeared to move the conflict to a matter of secondary 
importance for Colombians, at least in the main urban areas.  The progress in security assured 
Uribe a swift re-election for a second term in office in May 2006, after a bitter legislative and 
judicial fight to alter the Constitution to permit a president to succeed himself. Never before, 
in its four decades of existence, had the FARC-EP been subject to such persistent and tenacious 
military and political pressure during two consecutive presidential terms. Indeed, the pattern of 
Colombian counter-insurgency since its inception in the mid-1960s had traditionally seen hard-
line presidents pursuing military action for a four year term followed by another four years of 
appeasement by presidents who hoped to convince guerrilla forces to lay down arms through 
persuasion. 
Uribe’s re-election signalled a sustained military effort that further dislocated the 
FARC’s 1982 strategic plan. By 2006, the FARC which at the turn of the twenty-first century 
                                                          
27 Álvaro Uribe Vélez, No Hay Causa Perdida (London: Penguin 2012), p.101. 
28 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Anuario estadístico del sector seguridad: 2003 -2009 (Bogotá: Imprenta 
nacional 2009), p.145. 
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appeared to hold the whip hand with a guerrilla army estimated at 20,000 and formal control 
of the zona de despeje found that its manpower had been reduced by half, and that it had been 
relegated to the sparsely inhabited jungle periphery as the ‘territorial control’ phase of the DSP 
policy began to advance.  The FARC retreat was particularly significant in Cundinamarca, 
Colombia’s capital department, which broke the insurgent’s stranglehold on the corridors 
leading to Bogotá from its main area of operations in the south eastern jungles.  
In May 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was elected to succeed Uribe as President of 
Colombia. An economist who had transitioned from the leadership of ministries of trade and 
finance to serve as Minister of Defense during Uribe’s second presidential term, Santos had 
been one of the main architects of the Colombia’s military regeneration. Even informed 
observers expected him to continue Uribe’s policies untouched, and at first, things went 
according to script attempting to maintain the same offensive spirit.29 Santos vowed to maintain 
his popular predecessor’s military pressure on the FARC.  True to his promise, during his first 
year as president, Santos continued to intensify the military effort. He also stepped up the High 
Value Targets (HVTs) programme, a decapitation scheme that Santos had championed during 
his tenure as Minister of Defence. By November 2011, the government had been able to locate 
and eliminate the FARC’s top two commanders in succession:  Jorge Briceño alias ‘Mono 
Jojoy’ and Guillermo Saenz alias ‘Alfonso Cano’. These high profile killings came on the heels 
of other spectacular successes including a cross-border attack in the Spring of 2008 of a FARC 
camp in Ecuadorian territory where the insurgent’s ‘foreign minister’ Raul Reyes was killed, 
                                                          
29 As the Wall Street Journal Colombia correspondents recalled after the killing of one of FARC’s most able 
military commanders, ‘Mono Jojoy’: ‘Mr. Santos was beginning to feel political heat, as Colombians wondered 
whether he would be able to maintain the gains made by Mr. Uribe. On Thursday, Mr. Santos vowed to continue 
the campaign against the guerrillas. "This was Operation Welcome," he said in New York. "To the rest of the 
FARC—We are going after you.” […]Mr. Rivera, the defense minister, renewed a call to FARC leaders to turn 
themselves in. "Surrender and we will guarantee your lives," he said.’ Quoted in: José Córdoba and Darcy Crowe, 
‘Colombia kills Guerrilla chief’, The Wall Street Journal, 24 September 2010. Available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703384204575509732682999678  (Accessed 13 May 2013).  
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and later that year of the hostage rescue operation Jaque which lent credence to the government 
narrative that Colombia’s counter-insurgency apparatus had fully taken the measure of the 
FARC.30 In conjunction with this decapitation scheme, Santos also continued Uribe’s counter-
insurgent ‘territorial consolidation’ approach which aimed to bolster government legitimacy 
through the delivery of essential services to the peasant population in areas reclaimed from 
insurgent control. This reclamation scheme included the promotion of alternatives to coca 
cultivation used by the FARC to finance its operations.31  The prospect of the end of a 
movement that had for a half century disturbed the peace of the nation often through brutal 
actions caused government popularity to increase substantially among a war-weary population. 
Santos, however, abruptly changed tack a year into his presidency, as he began to 
distance himself from Uribe’s ‘terrorist menace’ mantra, and instead announced the 
commencement of another round of peace negotiations with FARC in November 2012. The 
peace negotiations, which at the time of writing are ongoing in Havana, hold out the prospect 
of achieving peace via an agreement to cease the violence and incorporate the FARC insurgents 
into the political process. To lay the foundation, Santos’ legislative agenda has included two 
laws ratified in May 2011: one to redistribute land to peasants -an issue which has been 
considered a main cause of the conflict- and another to pay reparations to victims of violence 
from public funds, including those affected by the actions of the armed forces. These were 
followed by the introduction of a constitutional reform act, known as Marco para la Paz (Legal 
Framework for Peace), which will put in place transitional justice measures for a reconciliation 
with FARC.  
Santos’ move is hardly without precedent in modern Colombian history. La Violencia, 
the civil war between the Liberal and Conservative parties, was resolved with a negotiation in 
                                                          
30 Ramsey III, From El Billar to Operations Fenix, passim. 
31 Jorge E. Delgado, ‘Counterinsurgency and the limits of state-building: An analysis of Colombia's policy of 
territorial consolidation, 2006–2012’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 26:3 (2015), p.413. 
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1958 which concluded with the amnesty and an attempted rehabilitation of pro-Liberal guerrilla 
groups. Likewise, the M-19, an urban guerrilla group, voluntarily disarmed in the late 1980s 
and formed a political party that had considerable success at the polls in the 1990s.32 Even 
Uribe negotiated the demobilization of the paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006. He 
also put more resources into an individual demobilization programme which had basically 
offered guerrillas who turned in their weapons benefits for reintegration.33 However, his 
protégé’s decision to launch formal negotiations unsettled former President Uribe, who 
vehemently insisted that FARC ‘terrorists don’t meet the requirements for belligerent status’ 
and questioned Santos’ judgment in ‘opening that door’.34 Ever since, Uribe has emerged as 
Santos’ most vocal political opponent, accusing him of betraying his mandate. ‘Colombia is 
governed by someone who has equated our soldiers with terrorists,’ the former President 
asserted in July 2013, accusing Santos of reviving a moribund insurgency by offering a 
superfluous dialogue.35 Santos was surprised to discover that Uribe and his narrative still 
resonated with sectors of the Colombian public, to the point that a new political party, which 
emerged under the ex-president’s leadership to oppose Santos’ policies, succeeded in capturing 
the second largest number of seats in the March 2014 congressional elections, and narrowly 
failed to defeat Santos’ bid for a second term in the May-June presidential elections.36    
But even with the presidential elections behind him, Santos must contend with a Colmil 
that remains highly suspicious of its former defence minister and now commander-in-chief. 
                                                          
32 See: Mauricio García, Vera Grabe and Otto Patiño, The M-19’s journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 
Politics, Berghof Transitions Series No. 1 (Berlin: Berghof Center, 2008). Available at: http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions_m19.pdf (Accessed: 13 
May 2013). 
33 William Rosenau, et.al, ‘Why They Join, Why They Fight, and Why They Leave: Learning From Colombia's 
Database of Demobilized Militants’, Terrorism and Political Violence 26:2 (2014), pp.277-285. 
34 ‘“Hace rato hay conflicto armado” dice JM. Santos’, El Tiempo, 4 May 2011.  
35 ‘Colombia no está en guerra, el Gobierno trata de justificar asesinato de soldados: Uribe’, Caracol Radio, 28 
July 2013, <www.caracol.com.co/noticias/actualidad/colombia-no-esta-en-guerra-el-gobierno-trata-de-justificar-
asesinato-de-soldados-uribe/20130728/nota/1940649.aspx>  (Accessed on 4 August 2013). 
36 ‘Uribe’s wrath’, The Economist, 31 May 2014. 
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That suspicion comes naturally to a military that nurtures a congenital ‘stab in the back’ 
anxiety. Uribe articulated a view within an influential sector of the Colmil that feels the FARC 
is not only on the ropes and close to defeat, but also that the guerrilla leadership has no real 
interest in peace. Soldiers argue that the FARC-EP will not call off their 1982 ‘Strategic plan 
for the seizure of power’, given that their Marxist-Leninist creed translates into a belief that the 
triumph of their revolutionary goals is inevitable. Hence, members of the Colmil have argued, 
like they have done in past negotiations, that for the FARC, peace talks are nothing more than 
a tactical ruse which will allow them to regroup and muster international support for their 
cause.37 A second, less publicized fear is that the termination of successful negotiations may 
see some soldiers prosecuted for war crimes, although Santos has attempted to pre-empt this 
by urging congress to pass a law that expands the jurisdiction of military courts, where few 
convictions are anticipated.38 
These attitudes toward the adversary combined with the peace process began to rekindle 
civil-military tensions that had lain dormant during the operationally triumphal Uribe years 
(2002-2010). The fact that the FARC, for the first time in history, is negotiating from a weak 
military and political position has done little to assuage military anxieties.  In such situations 
in the past, elements of the Colmil have colluded with vigilante paramilitary groups or used 
‘dirty war’ tactics, including assassination, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, to 
undermine the government’s peace initiatives.39 Allegations circulated during the 2014 
                                                          
37 A good source with in-depth commentary about Colmil anxieties with the Peace process in Havana is the  
Human Rights advocacy group Washington Office on Latin American (WOLA).  Adam Isacson, a Senior 
Associate of WOLA with years of expertise on the country, has documented various episodes of military unease 
and quoted various senior officers opinions on various reports. For a summary see his blog entry: ‘Colombia’s 
military: Supporters or Saboteurs of the Peace Process?’ WOLA Commentary and Analysis, 21 January 2015. 
Available at: http://www.wola.org/commentary/colombia_s_military_and_the_peace_process (Accessed 11 
October 2015). 
38 Joel Gillin, ‘UN urges Colombia not to further amplify military justice’, Colombia Reports, 30 September 2014, 
Available at: http://colombiareports.co/un-urges-colombia-not-to-further-amplify-military-justice/  (Accessed 19 
November 2014). 
39 One documented case of vigilante action by discontent sections of the armed forces, who retaliated against the 
insurgent’s use of terrorist tactics with their own proactive use of terrorism, was that of the Alianza Anticomunista 
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elections that Uribe’s camp attempted to sow indiscipline within the ranks, and that rogue 
elements within Army intelligence have been illegally eavesdropping on FARC and 
government negotiators with the intention of sabotaging the process.40  There are no doubt 
several agendas here, among them political and patronage networks in the military that are in 
competition as part of talks of ‘post-conflict scenarios’ that include defence budget and 
personnel reductions.41 But more significantly, Uribe’s opposition to Santos’ peace 
negotiations with FARC is more than a mere dispute over timing and methods, but also reveals 
fundamental differences in the understanding of the conflict, not just between Santos and Uribe, 
but also between distinct sectors of the Colmil.  
Recognising the limits of military force and understanding that, in the Clausewitzian 
sense, war tends toward escalation until policy imposes limits on it, Santos views negotiations 
as the most cost-effective way of trying to end the long-running conflict. The present 
negotiations also offer recognition that the FARC articulates genuine grievances that are a 
source of Colombia’s instability, even if since the mid-1990’s they have deployed them for 
cynical, self-serving purposes. The belief that grievance mitigation offers the key to conflict 
resolution is in line with the ideas of some Colmil officers who since the 1960s have espoused 
a state-building approach to COIN. On the other hand, Uribe’s position is in sync with more 
conservative sections of the Colmil who feel that they have dominated their enemy tactically 
and operationally, and fear a stab in the back if the Havana peace process succeeds. This is for 
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two reasons. First, that Santos ‘will sign away at the peace table a victory they have won in the 
field.’42 Secondly, that former insurgent leaders will be allowed to sit in Congress and dictate 
policy, as happened after the demobilization of the M-19 and EPL in 1990. That said, while 
the Colmil shares attitudes about war and peace generic to most military organizations, it also 
has a fractured tradition, the product of its different, often contrasting, understandings of the 
nature of war and of the Colombian conflict in particular.  
Colombian martial traditions and the instrumentality of force  
 
Since the mid-1950s, Colombian military thought about the instrumentality of force has 
separated into two perspectives. The first author to analyse the rudiments of this dichotomy 
was Pierre Gilhodes, who examined the Colmil’s role in politics following the civil war known 
as La Violencia between the Liberal and Conservative parties that raged from 1948 until 
resolved by political compromise in 1958. The end of la Violencia was not the end of conflict 
in Colombia, however, the civil war spun off new insurgent groups un-reconciled to the 
Liberal/Conservative compromise, including the FARC, the ELN and M19. Gilhodes observed 
that a part of the Colmil had come to believe that Colombia remained at war after 1958, which 
required a total victory over such groups and the political organizations that allegedly supported 
them.43 It was a view that took hold in other Western militaries in the same period, as political 
movements produced insurgencies across Latin America and elsewhere. In contemporary 
parlance, this attitude translated into ‘enemy centric’ COIN with an emphasis on decapitating 
the subversive leadership and treating those who supported them as irredeemable social 
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(eds.), Pasado y Presente de la Violencia en Colombia (Bogotá: Fondo Editorial CEREC, 1986), p.332. 
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elements, not ‘biddable’ populations to be won over. This view reached its apogee in Latin 
America during the ‘dirty war’ in the southern cone in the 1970s.44  
A second faction in the military, according to Gilhodes, viewed insurgency as the product 
of unresolved socio-economic grievances,45 whose focus translates into what is currently 
referred to as ‘population-centric COIN’. In Latin America, and in particular in the Andean 
countries, this outlook had its origins in the Kennedy administration’s Alliance for Progress 
which sought to gain popular support via economic and social development programs in great 
part executed by local militaries, which were exhorted to assume a state-building role. 46 This 
chapter argues that these two military traditions continue to be represented in the Colmil and 
in many ways have determined the attitude of the military toward the current peace talks taking 
place in Havana since November 2012.  
One of the faces of the tradition can be labelled Korean or Intellectual, and is supported by 
a set of officers – and recently civilian MoD officials, who believe that the military instrument 
in its ‘conventional’ understanding has limitations in efficiently confronting insurgency. This 
requires the military to apply special techniques and adopt political skills. As the name 
suggests, the origin of the Korean tradition can be traced to the Colombian Battalion’s 
experience in the Korea War under the umbrella of the US Army. Essentially, it relates to a key 
group of officers who remained in active service upon their return home in 1953 and were soon 
deployed to address the growing unrest of La Violencia.47 As will be analysed in Chapter 4, it 
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was due to their proximity to the United States that these officers soon became the main conduit 
for the Colombian military’s adoption of counter-insurgency in the early 1960s, which 
understood it as a special category of warfare influenced by the tenets of French guerre 
revolutionnaire theory. As M.L.R. Smith has noted, the ‘intellectual attempt to carve out 
insurgency as a separate category of warfare can be traced to the French experience in 
Indochina’, in particular the introspections of Colonel Roger Trinquier who argued that 
‘Western powers were facing a qualitatively new type of war that required fresh methods and 
doctrines.’48 The ‘Koreans; were from the outset inclined to these ideas as they were in tune 
with their understanding of the character of Colombia’s conflict and in particular about the 
nature of the multiple guerrilla groups that had arisen from La Violencia.  
The ‘Koreans’ also received the label of ‘Intellectuals’, as many officers, like General 
Álvaro Valencia Tovar, who was promoted to Army CoS in the early 1970s, had an affinity for 
humanities and social sciences, and hence, were keener to embrace the state-building and the 
hearts and minds narrative that underpinned ‘population-centric’ counter insurgency during the 
1960s.49 Furthermore, because the ‘Koreans’’ approach recognized the social and political 
underpinnings of insurgency, they have been more open, at least in theory, to negotiation as a 
war termination strategy. For them force should be employed selectively as one of several tools 
to manipulate the incentives of the rural population that support the insurgency and persuade 
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them to return to legality. The role of the Colmil was to engage in state-building, with various 
aims, including making their presence felt in remote territories where rebel groups germinated, 
and bring essential services to improve the lives of the population by addressing their legitimate 
grievances, hence separating them from the insurgents. In this sense, and as it will be discussed 
in Chapter 2, the state-building narrative reinforced the sense that the military had a civilising 
mission, that is, it could help re-educate, rehabilitate or reintegrate a backward population that 
was easily indoctrinated by communist agents. 
The ‘Korean’ demand for non-combat roles via state-building has been a traditional source 
of civil-military tension that has stymied effective strategy formulation, as this thesis will argue 
later. One main reason is that the adoption of the state-building narrative has resulted in a high 
degree of politicization of the armed forces leading to a propensity to clash with its civilian 
masters and consider intervening in politics. This is not an original nor unique phenomenon to 
Colombia. Already by the mid-1960s, for example, US officials were warning that the 
profusion of counter-insurgency methods in the third world, like Civic Action, could lead to 
increased military Bonapartism.50 In the Colombian case, civilians, on the one hand, have been 
suspicious of what they consider inappropriate military intervention into the policy-making 
realm, whilst on the other, the military complains that political priorities are not those that 
would attenuate the country’s endemic violence, and furthermore that the civilian 
government’s administrative incompetence are the main reasons that gave rise to insurgent 
challenges in the countryside. As an army operational manual observed in 1979, ‘inattention 
from official organisations to solve different issues and needs of the rural population, are 
ingredients of dissent that subversive groups take advantage.[…] From this follows that 
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counter-insurgency operations require military, political, economic and social actions.’51  The 
rudiments of these tensions between civilians and soldiers were succinctly put by an officer 
who requested anonymity during an interview in 1985: 
If we ask that they [the politicians] purchase airplanes, ships and guns for us, that is understandable 
and they give us millions. But if we ask for resources to invest in the violent regions it is considered 
that we are going to substitute ourselves for the guerrilla or the political parties, and that, maybe, if 
the military resolves the problem we are going to appear like a viable political option, and that is 
detrimental to them […] It is going to be difficult to find a solution to our social and political 
problems while we don’t reach the conclusion that this war is not only about shooting. There will 
have to be a few shots and they will have to be very accurate, but the rest is eminently political. 
Some of my fellow officers believe that “what is political, let it be arranged by the politicians.” But 
politicians also have limitations. 52 
 
A second group of officers see themselves as an apolitical force who views war, internal or 
external, as their technical-professional niche. This school can be labelled ‘Traditionalist’ or 
‘Prusso-German,’ as it traces its origins to Colombian military professionalization between 
1907 and 1930 under Chilean and German influence. However, like the majority of the Colmil 
since the early 1960s, these officers were also mentored in the United States, and in fact, a few 
of them were also Korea veterans. Nonetheless, as a group, they have not considered their 
mission as a distinct category of warfare, as do the Koreans. For advocates of the 
‘Traditionalists’ or Prusso-German school, politicians should stay out of military affairs until 
the army delivers victory.53 Needless to say, these Prusso-Germans have more in common with 
von Moltke than Clausewitz in their politics and their view that military victory has to be swift 
and conclusive. However, contrary to von Moltke’s thinking on the adaptive nature of strategy, 
Traditionalists have been focused on defining fixed precepts and general principles for military 
action.54 This mind-set, as will be explained in the following section, has created serious 
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problems at the level of strategy formulation. In particular, it has mired the clear definition of 
the goals that the armed instrument is supposed to achieve. Rather, the military mission boils 
down to a rather vague requirement to uphold order with tactical means that left the military 
with a free hand to achieve ‘victory’ due to the lack of proper political guidance.55  
The one thing that these two Colombian military traditions hold in common, which has 
ensured a degree of inner consistency in Colombian military thought across the years, is 
mistrust of civilians. As this thesis will argue throughout, this is a product of several intertwined 
factors: the absence of clear political guidance; the lack of a strategy-making process;  the 
discontinuity in government posture towards the insurgents which oscillates between 
belligerence and compromise; and finally the requirement to adhere to civil rule of law 
protocols which, the military feels, both unduly ties their hands in the conduct of operations 
and puts them at risk of prosecution should they overstep some invisible boundary as defined 
by the courts.   
The military solution – Can an insurgency be defeated in the battlefield? 
 
The ‘Traditionalist’ section of the military, with its more customary understanding of strategy 
as grand tactics, had for long dreamed of a decisive battle in the war against FARC—a Dien 
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Bien Phu à la Colombienne where the Colmil could result victorious.56 As an army General 
explained in the early 1990s: ‘we need a conclusive military success, to get the insurgents to 
kneel down and from that position negotiate.’57 However, there has been a lack of clarity in 
defining what is to be regarded as conclusive, short of unconditional surrender. During the 20th 
century two influential experiences for the Colmil, and in particular for the ‘Traditionalists’, 
encouraged the view that insurgencies could be defeated in the battlefield. The most clear-cut 
experience was the defeat of the Maoist Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) in 1990, which 
broke the myth that the guerrillas could not be defeated. Founded in 1967 after the splinter of 
the pro-Chinese bloc from the Colombian Communist Party, the 2000 strong EPL was active 
in a small geographic area in the North East of the country, between the departments of 
Cordoba and Antioquia. In that area, a dedicated Colmil Mobile Brigade was able to manoeuvre 
autonomously with a combination of surprise, mass and actionable intelligence fashioned from 
a willing civilian cooperation. The ensuing heavy damage inflicted upon the guerrilla group 
accelerated the leadership’s decision to sue for peace.58  
In the late 1990s a more refined view of conflict termination developed when President 
Pastrana’s peace negotiations stalled at the moment that his process of military modernisation 
started to produce tangible operational results. In an interview in late 2001, the Chief of the 
Armed Forces, General Fernando Tapias laid out the understanding of the instrumentality of 
force as a way to force FARC into negotiations, rather than produce decisive victory. The 
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object, explained General Tapias is ‘obviously not killing 30,000 guerrillas. What it is about is 
to weaken them militarily until they see in negotiations the best way out of the conflict. The 
Guerrilla must understand that it cannot take power by force.’59 
The key point is that Traditionalists have faulted the politicians for lacking the will to 
pursue the war against the FARC to military victory.60 Escalation of insurgent violence 
permitted governments throughout much of the 20th century to declare ‘states of emergency’, 
allowing them to rule by decree, empower the military, and constrain individual liberties for 
prolonged periods to re-establish public order. But, the new 1991 constitution limits the 
executive’s recourse to ‘states of emergency’ to a maximum of 6 months with oversight from 
a supreme Constitutional Court with the power to overrule the executive’s special powers. 
Criticisms of these provisions by ‘Traditionalists’ were voiced publicly by General Juan 
Salcedo Lora, Inspector General of the Army in the mid-1990s:  
The military has the capacity to combat and defeat its enemies and to control extensive 
areas, the population included. But the new constitutional arrangements and so many 
mechanisms alien to military operations, become in the long run an obstacle. So many civil 
rights spread through the country - that look more like landmines - all the new writs, 
prosecutors, ombudsmen, observers, biased verification commissions and the innovative 
presence of international oversight affect the conduct of military operations.61   
 
‘States of emergency’ were seen by the Traditionalists as civilian acquiescence to the 
prospect of a military solution short of a formal recognition of a state of war. This was 
particularly the case in the period 1978-82, when to face the growing threat of the M-19 urban 
guerrilla, the government of President Julio Cesar Turbay signed a decree introducing heavy 
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handed security measures. One of the measures allowed the military to intern anyone under 
suspicion of conducting subversive activities and court martial them, which resulted in the 
arrest of the entire leadership of the group.  However, the declaration of a general amnesty as 
a prelude to peace talks by his successor, President Belisario Betancur, resulted in the 
suspension of these measures which deeply upset the Traditionalists. Ever since that first failed 
peace process with the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar, a short-lived coalition of the 
FARC, ELN and M-19 during the talks, many officers have concluded that the war is winnable 
if the politicians give them a free hand and give up the idea of negotiations. In 1984, President 
Betancur fired his Minister or Defence, General Fernando Landazábal for his continued public 
opposition to the peace process. ‘The country should get used to listening to its 
generals,’ conveyed Landazábal.62  Evidently, his opinions were not well received by the 
political elite who considered the General broke the non-deliberative spirit of the Colmil which 
expedited his removal. But the important continuity, is that similarly to the anxieties voiced by 
soldiers today apropos the demobilisation terms negotiated in Havana with FARC, Landazábal 
in 1982, feared the government would cede too much in its offers of amnesty to the 
insurgencies. The assessment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at the time, would, 
with no doubt make perfect sense today to the ‘Traditionalists’ of Colmil: 
Military distrust of the guerrilla’s motives runs deep and could spark a serious rift between the 
government and the Armed Forces if the amnesty concedes too much to the insurgents without 
adequate reciprocity. The leadership of the Armed Forces claims the guerrillas are not negotiating 
in good faith but are simply bargaining for time to rebuild their forces. Moreover, they are 
suspicious of the FARC-EP’s late blooming interest in peace talks. Although Landazábal has said 
the Armed Forces would not be an obstacle to peace, he continued to press the military’s demand 
for a surrendering of arms and the exclusion of certain crimes from the amnesty. Military leaders 
have resigned themselves to the inevitability of some form of amnesty, and in the end, they may 
well slightly modify their position […].63 
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A more recent case in point that illustrates the Colmil’s discontent with the civilian 
leadership consideration of open-ended negotiations as a war termination policy, was the firing 
in 1997 of the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Harold Bedoya. He publicly criticized 
President Ernesto Samper’s decision to demilitarise a county in return for releasing a group of 
POWs as a prelude to initiate peace talks. Like Landazábal before him, General Bedoya was 
accused of insubordination after calling Samper ‘unreliable’ for putting ‘national security at 
risk’. Bedoya’s removal sparked an unprecedented public protest of over 200 field grade 
officers who demanded that he disobey the president’s decision.64 
After less than a week in office, Uribe also declared a state of emergency (estado de 
conmoción interior), which he used to pass a decree to create ‘Zones of Rehabilitation and 
Consolidation’ in areas with high insurgent activity. This established direct military rule in 
those zones, annulled the need for search warrants, permitted the use of massive detentions, 
and allowed the use of curfews and other repressive measures of population control. It also 
established an intelligence gathering network amongst the population (red de cooperantes).65 
The main measures of the decree only remained active for a few months, as the Constitutional 
Court declared them illegal on the grounds that the military did not have police powers. 66 It 
was also indiscriminate, in that it allowed the military to round up ordinary citizens without 
proof of guerrilla contact. 67 Nonetheless, the decree served to seriously destabilize the FARC. 
In the Montes de María in the Caribbean coast, for example, the draconian measures served to 
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set the context for the later military decimation of one of FARC’s most accomplished fronts.68  
Martin Caballero, the leader of the 37th front, recounted in his log the effects the emergency 
measures had on his organization: 
Total economic blockade in the urban centres, counties, roads and highways the 24 hours. They 
have prosecuted the majority of friends, sympathizers, collaborators and non-collaborators. Many 
didn’t hold the pressure and ended up handing out information, and many have emigrated to other 
cities or to Venezuela, leaving us weakened and with no food. Nobody to deliver a pound of rice, 
the latter has generated an internal crisis where an ear of corn or a cow becomes military objective 
[...] we have spent weeks without tasting sugar, coffee, and we eat dry rice once a month. When 
things are good, one or two daily soups of corn, when yucca arrives we party [...] There are cadres 
that don’t assume responsibility and units want to eat well, ignore security measures and are 
showered by enemy fire. 69 
 
Given the demoralizing effects of the punitive measures the ‘Zones of Consolidation’ began 
to have on the insurgent structure, it is likely that Uribe would have been pleased to continue 
them, if not for the negative ruling of the Court. As he stated in his memoirs, he had, since the 
beginning of his term, ‘decided to corral all the criminals and especially their leaders’ and use 
the military to ‘convince as many base guerrillas as possible to surrender their weapons’.70 The 
expedited criminalisation of FARC insurgents and its supporting militias was a decisive first 
coup against the group. No wonder, that an initial hindrance to Uribe’s stated goals was the 
court’s ruling that giving police powers to the military was illegal.71  
Appealing to the Prusso-German tradition, Uribe was at least rhetorically, willing to 
pursue the war against the insurgency to its logical military end – in other words the destruction 
of the FARC. The government aimed initially at cutting off the FARC from the main urban 
centres and regaining security in the most densely populated areas to push the insurgency back 
to its base area in the jungle. The job of the military was facilitated by the fact that Uribe 
effectively assumed his role of commander-in-chief and offered sufficient political will and 
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resources for the execution of an offensive. As a US Military Group officer recalled in 2010: 
‘Uribe was the only president who eventually realized that the FARC isn’t that competent. He 
kicked the military in the ass. It’s as if he said: “You’ve got popular backing, political support, 
and equipment – what are you waiting for?”’72 Another US observer, who witnessed Uribe’s 
draconian leadership style recounts in the following passage his relationship with the Colmil’s 
senior officers in the early days of his presidency: 
President Uribe summoned his military commanders for what is known in military 
parlance as a ‘come to Jesus’ meeting, and told them in no uncertain terms that it was 
time to get out from behind their desks and into the field with their troops –where they 
belonged. In addition, the distractions of costly education and training junkets to the 
United States and elsewhere would henceforth be curtailed. He also admonished 
military commanders to do their jobs or resign. Commander of the Armed Forces 
General Jorge Enrique Moral Rangel underscored Uribe’s goals and stated that the new 
mission of the armed forces would be to ‘prevent, rather than react to the attacks by the 
guerrillas against the Colombian population and the regional and local government 
infrastructure.73 
 
Two key operations at the beginning of Uribe’s presidency would set the tone of the 
military posture during the rest of his mandate, especially in terms of influencing the definition 
of success in the conflict in uncompromising terms. One was Operación Orión in October 
2002, the other, Operación Libertad 1 in the first half of 2003.  Orión was entirely an urban 
operation that took place in Medellin. The objective was to regain control of the deprived favela 
like Comuna 13, where not only the FARC but also the Castroist Ejercito de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN) had gained ascendancy and competed for crime rackets with the paramilitaries 
and drug mafias. The first show of force in Medellin was important for Uribe as it was his own 
constituency, and given the legacy of severe insecurity in the city since the days of Pablo 
Escobar, any success in reducing the levels of violence could have an immediate political 
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impact.74 The operation was executed by the army’s 4th Brigade, commanded by General Mario 
Montoya, an advocate of the military solution and the President’s favourite, and who in 2006 
was promoted to Army CoS. General Montoya would eventually push the military to a limit to 
deliver in the battlefield, with self-defeating effects.  
Orión succeeded in eliminating the insurgents’ hold over the city’s periphery and 
effectively reduced the levels of violence. However, it did so at high cost. Recent judicial 
inquiries have found it was executed with extreme degrees of brutality, with excessive force, 
including extra-judicial killings and disappearances.75 Also, there have been increasing 
allegations of collusion with paramilitary groups associated with the drug mafias, who after the 
operation signed a de facto non-aggression pact.76 In fact, the claims of collusion also served 
to expedite the government’s decision to force the demobilization of the allegedly 30,000 
strong confederation of paramilitary groups, known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC). These groups were a growing liability for Uribe who was, and still is, accused of having 
links with them. The demobilization of the AUC, however, serves to illustrate how the Uribe 
administration viewed the end of the illegal armed groups, short of their defeat by force. The 
government could, in his view, engage in negotiations but where the only terms for discussion 
should be the conditions for the decommissioning of units and weapons, possible judicial 
concessions, but nothing with regards to the discussion of political rights or possible reforms 
to the status-quo.  
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For its part, Operacion Libertad 1 consisted in the saturation by four army brigades of 
the mountains that surround Bogotá, and where the FARC elite mobile units had gained since 
1997 control of the corridors that from the capital lead to the south-eastern lowlands The 
principal effort came from the deployment of the 4000 strong elite rapid deployment force 
(Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido - FUDRA) with its own air support assets to force the retreat of 
the insurgents back to the lowlands, bringing back a sense of security to the almost besieged 
capital. For the Colombian military, Libertad 1 would serve as a model for future military 
planning, looking to replicate its operational and tactical enhancements. Also, renewed US 
assistance, including the agreement to the use of counter-narcotic assets for offensive military 
action, served to shape the idea of a decisive campaign in the FARC’s heartland.77 The military 
success of Operacion Libertad 1 marked the promotion in November 2003 of its commander, 
General Reinaldo Castellanos, to Army CoS to replace General Carlos Alberto Ospina, who 
became Chief of the Armed Forces. These two ‘Traditionalists’ would use their immediate 
experiences in the planning and implementation of Plan Patriota, which was the military 
component of the government’s DSP and which aimed to place the effort in the south eastern 
jungles with the elite FUDRA and the novel Joint Task Force ‘Omega’ as leading elements. 
While the wording of the DSP made clear that the counter-insurgency campaign would 
be one of attrition, the expectations of Plan Patriota were extremely high. It foresaw that the 
saturation of the area and a high operational tempo would deliver decisive results before the 
end of Uribe’s first term in 2006. However, after two years, FARC’s infrastructure had 
sustained the worst that the government threw at them, including the loss of extensive numbers 
of crucial mid-ranking guerrillas, and the overall loss of 1/3 of its manpower. As Douglas Porch 
asserted at the time, it was clear that the Traditionalist’s effort had ‘soon passed Clausewitz 
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culminating point of victory’.78 But, to what extent did Uribe consider it was realistic to defeat 
FARC military during his first administration? Reminiscing about his presidency in 2012, he 
maintained that he had always believed that ‘a classical “military victory” over such a big, 
strong and diffuse number of delinquents was not possible even if we trebled our forces.’79 
However, a closer look at his leadership during his tenure shows that he possessed had a clear 
determination to defeat FARC in what he calls in his memoirs ‘classic’ terms.  
In December 2006, President Uribe authorised several operational changes to Plan 
Patriota, and committed additional resources and manpower to clear the territory. In the press 
release of the speech he gave on that occasion, he used the word ‘victory’ at least 9 times. Such 
was the emphasis on the word that it led to the unofficial denomination of the reformed scheme 
as Plan Victoria, in which he demanded his military commanders kill or capture the guerrilla 
leadership in order to succeed.80 Indeed, from all the above, it can be argued that the President 
showcased a crude understanding of the meaning of success, reducing it to the decimation of 
the guerrilla ranks and the decapitation of the leadership. As Sergio Jaramillo, his former Vice-
minister of Defence concluded: ‘Uribe little understands the limits of military power, or the 
operational weakness of the army and the police, but instead strives for operational results that 
will translate into strategic success.’81  
The pressure for obtaining ‘visible’ military successes grew higher with Uribe’s re-
election in 2006. The promotion of General Montoya to Army CoS seemed to be the right 
choice for the President, given his credentials as an aggressive and result-driven officer. 
However, after the initial advances of Plan Patriota, the insurgency anticipated the 
government’s plan and responded by changing its methods -relying more on the use of 
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terrorism- operating in smaller and more elusive groups, and secreted in civilian clothes among 
the population. It no longer offered bloated, company-sized military units that offered pitched 
battle. Despite the changing strategic setting, Montoya’s demand for operational results led 
him to view guerrilla kills as the most elemental metric of success. The pressure for results in 
terms of the destruction of the enemy had unexpected and calamitous effects, as it was source 
of what would become the most serious case of human rights violations committed by the 
Colmil in its history: the ‘false positives’ scandal. Several units began to engage in the unlawful 
practice of inflating their body counts. It is calculated that almost 4000 innocent civilians were 
murdered by rogue units of the Colmil between 2005 and 2008. Most of the victims were 
unemployed young men from deprived urban areas that were offered false work opportunities 
by undercover soldiers, who later murdered them and passed them off as ‘neutralised’ 
guerrillas.82 The level of pressure for operational results can be confirmed in the affidavit of a 
former field officer to the Inspector General, who handled the process. He affirms that a 
Brigade commander in 2006 declared that ‘the war is being measured in litres of blood’, and 
that consequently ‘any commander who does not have results in kills per month will be 
sanctioned accordingly and that will reflect in his military record.’ The denouncing officer also 
recalled a general directive from Army headquarters to battalion commanders that stated that 
‘no enemy casualties or battles in ninety days will cause the commander’s expulsion from the 
Army for his negligence or operational failure’.83 
On the other hand, the pursuit for ‘visible’ military successes during Uribe’s second 
term also included the promotion of new structures and capabilities. For his new Minister of 
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Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, success became a question of finding the right degree of resource 
optimisation. Moreover, as the US embassy in Bogotá related to the State Department 
‘President Uribe regularly stressed to the Minister that the government only had forty-three 
months to achieve its goals’. Thus, the focus of the more technical-minded Santos was on 
acquiring means that could have an ‘immediate impact in the war against the insurgency’.84 
The strategic focus would remain the killing or capturing of High Value Targets (HVTs), 
especially the politico-military leaders of the 7 man Secretariat, but also mid-ranking Front and 
Company commanders to fracture command and control and foment enemy demoralisation. 
The strategic logic, of the Colombian MoD in this sense, was that the ability to decapitate the 
organization and strike the most inaccessible insurgent camps could accelerate the surrender of 
the FARC.   
To introduce the new effort, Santos improved inter-service cooperation, and eventually 
shifted the weight of the offensive to the Air Force, Police Commandos and Army Special 
Forces. The negative backlash the ‘false positives’ case had on the Army’s legitimacy left the 
bulk of its regular units limited to area control operations. In this sense, the MoD pushed the 
military to adopt a Combatant Command Structure and centralized intelligence to further the 
action of the Joint Task Forces that became the muscle of the Colmil. Likewise, the Minister 
aimed at elevating the role of the Joint Special Operations Command which was inaugurated 
in 2007 with US assistance, and placed it under an Air Force General Officer who had 
significant means at his disposal in terms of actionable intelligence and air power.85 In this 
respect, another key technical enhancement that Uribe highlights as ‘a breaking point in the 
fight against the terrorists,’ was no other than the ‘authorisation by the Bush government to sell 
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intelligent bombs to Colombia. GPS guided munitions, and other advanced guiding systems 
enabled to improve the precision of our attacks in great measure.’86  
In short, these newly acquired capabilities allowed Uribe to become the first president 
in Colombian history able to successfully strike the previously untouched FARC leadership. 
The scheme had its first success after the bombing of the insurgent deputy commander’s 
encampment in Ecuadorean territory in April 2008. And while during the rest of Uribe’s tenure 
no other FARC commanders were killed, the effectiveness of the bombing operations against 
insurgent base areas removed the enemy of their most able military commanders and escalated 
the numbers of personnel surrenders. However, the decisive results expected from the 
application of superior technical force, following the Prusso-German tradition, were not 
attained. The insurgent response to the campaign limited its impact as a method of sheer 
destruction of the enemy. It encouraged further atomisation of the surviving units which 
retreated deeper into the jungles and mountains, and forced the leaders to seek refuge in 
Venezuela. Although failing to defeat the FARC, Uribe left the Presidency having substantially 
reduced the levels of violence in the country as well as the threat the insurgency had posed to 
the survival of the state in the year 2002.  
For its part, the strategic potential of the bombing offensive has been recognised by the 
current Santos administration. However, the modification of the uncompromising terms with 
which to measure success has allowed the current government to use of the strikes as a tool of 
coercive bargaining. A key factor of the bombing offensive at the outset was that it shattered 
what FARC scholars refer to as the insurgency’s ‘camp culture’, which since the 1960s has 
allowed them to support long periods without military confrontation and has become the 
essence of their collective, soviet lifestyle. Strategically, ‘camp culture’ also guaranteed them 
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command posts for the control of the peripheral population enclaves.87 In this sense, precision 
bombing has been an effective tool to communicate to the insurgents that they are not safe 
anymore. Indeed, according to statistics of the MoD, between 2008 and 2011 alone, 7,650 
guerrilla surrenders took place.88 Following Schelling, it can be ascertained that the current 
administration has, thus, realized the value of its ‘power to hurt’ to influence the FARC’s latest 
decision to negotiate the end of the conflict.  
From this perspective it can be argued that Santos helped advance a more refined 
political understanding of the utility of the military instrument and its limits as a tool of ‘vicious 
bargaining’89 also visible in the way he has framed the ongoing peace negotiations with the 
FARC.  President Santos’ decision to negotiate marked a rupture with the confidence that 
existed during Uribe’s administration that the military could simply be used to compel the 
FARC to accept terms of surrender. Via the lens of strategic theory, a possible explanation is 
that Santos understood that in the Colombian conflict, force has limitations and can only offer 
marginal military gains. Therefore, a negotiated settlement appears the most cost-effective 
means to solve it. He has also decided to sustain the military offensive while the negotiations 
take place, to communicate to the FARC that the will to continue the fight still exists, and 
hence, that the costs of continuing the armed insurgency will outweigh any conceivable 
benefits. In recognising the utility of the military instrument in these terms, he also sends a 
message to the Colmil, with a guarantee that negotiating does not mean relinquishing the 
contest of military strength. Santos has unambiguously stated that the sole reason why FARC 
has accepted to peace talks is because of the sustained military pressure.  
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However, it is difficult for the President to shape positively the perceptions of the 
military, particularly of those close to the Prusso-German tradition with regards to the benefits 
of the peace process. Particularly, it is a contentious issue for the military that, to initiate the 
talks, Santos has not only offered FARC belligerent status but has agreed to negotiate with 
them over divisive political issues. The FARC has, exploited this point for its own benefit by 
arguing that these negotiations are between equal parties, and moreover that they are far from 
defeated despite a decade of consistent military pressure. As Pablo Catatumbo, one of FARC 
delegates in Havana has asserted: ‘the reason behind these dialogues, for the search of another 
solution to the conflict, is because there have been no victors or vanquished.’90 That appears to 
be a gratuitous insult to the Colmil which believes it is on the cusp of victory against its most 
tenacious enemy. 
The State–building narrative – grievance reduction as the solution to violence? 
 
Having experienced a ‘conventional’ war in Asia, upon their return to Colombia the ‘Koreans’ 
insisted that the best approach to face the nascent communist insurgencies had to be 
fundamentally different. Before one could determine the value of force, one had first to define 
what the conflict was all about.  In this sense, a main dilemma for the Colombians has 
traditionally been the reconciliation of the domestic notion of rule of law with the need to use 
the military instrument to greatest effect. Beyond the tendency to categorise conflicts as 
‘irregular’, or ‘unconventional’ to argue in favour of the application of novel and ingenious 
methods,91 the Colmil is further challenged in defining the role of force in Colombia’s conflict 
by the common belief that internal security or public order missions, and in this latest period, 
counter-terrorism, cannot be considered as war per se.   
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Several politicians and officers of all grades in Colombia have considered the different 
insurgencies that have appeared in Colombia since World War II as the product of genuine 
socio-economic grievances. Hence, force has been considered to be of limited utility to solve 
the problem. This belief has pushed soldiers to advocate the need to acquire non-combat roles 
as a core military competence. President Betancur’s first Minister of Defense, General 
Fernando Landazábal, who despite his strong militarist stance against the insurgency, as a 
Korea veteran, also ascribed to many of its precepts commented: ‘the participation of the army 
in the restoration of public order breaks the limits of simple military action and expands, not 
only to indispensable collaboration, but also to the realization of government plans.’92 
Undeniably, this line of thought was present in the debates surrounding the character of recent 
policy initiatives like Plan Colombia and later the Territorial Consolidation phase of Uribe’s 
DSP since 2003.  
In its early days, Plan Colombia was compared by President Andres Pastrana to a ‘Marshall 
Plan for the coca growing regions of Putumayo and Caquetá’, designed to remedy the economic 
and social ills that in his view were the root causes of violence and pushed the peasants into 
the drug trade. The assumption was that economic and infrastructure development would 
improve the lives of the peasantry and effectively inoculate them against guerrilla appeals.93 In 
a monograph of the US Army War College, the foremost representative of the Korean tradition, 
retired General Alvaro Valencia Tovar wrote that Plan Colombia was a valuable tool for the 
ends of ‘enlightened government’. In his opinion, social ills were exploited by the guerrilla to 
entice tens of thousands of campesinos into the drug trade. To persuade them to return to a 
traditional but improved life would require a significant national development programme in 
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which the military would play a pivotal role to ensure success and reassert the state’s 
legitimacy. 94  
 However, in the end, the assumptions that prevailed in the configuration of Plan Colombia 
were different to the state-building rhetoric. The plan came to view counter-narcotics as a 
security problem rather than a question of economic and social progress. This resulted in 70 
per cent of the appropriations of the programme going to military and security activities, 
according to the US Government Accountability office.95 The economic and social 
development component of the programme was overshadowed by the assumption that the 
centre of gravity of the conflict was to be found in the forceful disruption of the estimated 
US$6.5billion represented in the cocaine trade. The end of US policy was not the reduction of 
grievances, following the Korean tradition, nor the disruption of the military muscle of FARC 
as understood by the ‘Traditionalists’. This was made evident in Plan Colombia’s concept of 
operations, which explained: ‘The immense profits generated by the drug trade continue to fuel 
lawless, corruption and internal conflict.’96 This analysis of the situation, required the US to 
‘support Colombia to reduce the production, processing and distribution of illicit drugs,’ 
through ‘training, procurement, and distribution of equipment, and the design and building of 
infrastructure to enhance Colombian counter-narcotics capabilities.’ SOUTHCOM’s concept 
concluded that the US ‘will not support Colombian counter-insurgency efforts. We will 
however provide support for security directly related to counter-narcotics efforts.’97 
Did the Colmil really believe that the solution to the conflict resided in the effective 
management of the drug problem? Whilst representatives of both traditions may have had 
                                                          
94Álvaro Valencia Tovar, ‘A view from Bogotá’, in Gabriel Marcella (ed.) PLAN COLOMBIA: Some Differing 
Perspectives, (Carlisle Barracks PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), pp.23-24.  
95 See: Government Accountability Office, PLAN COLOMBIA: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
Security Has Improved. GAO-09-71, (October 2008). 
96 ‘USSOUTHCOM Operation Order for Plan Colombia’, Secret Cable, Excised Copy, 5 December 2000. 




misgivings about the main strategic assumptions of the plan and how it misconstrued the centre 
of gravity of the conflict, they showcased a more pragmatic approach toward the aid package. 
This was particularly the case for the ‘Traditionalists’. Ultimately, the Plan became a main 
source of funding for a much needed process of modernisation that led to the acquisition of 
essential capabilities in terms of organization, air mobility, intelligence, and firepower and 
personnel professionalization. Despite the fact that the concept posed serious challenges to 
commanders, who could not use American sponsored capabilities directly against the FARC, 
the qualitative improvement in joint operations and the possibility of integration of various 
combat units, which for Colombian commanders was novel, convinced the most traditionalist 
elements about the benefits of the aid. For example, the Plan sponsored the creation of Joint 
Task Force South (JTF-S), composed of three Brigades and an Intelligence battalion, which 
served as a model for future force structure reforms, and the introduction of units like the rapid 
deployment force (FUDRA) and JTF Omega, which would combine mobility, special forces 
and air assets to pack a punch against the FARC during the Uribe government. Curiously, the 
first commander of JTF-S was General Mario Montoya. While the General was praised by the 
US for going after drug production at its source, destroying coca fields, chemical precursor 
sites and laboratories, he was eager to use his units to provide security by going after the 
insurgents.98 For ‘Traditionalists’, like him, the situation would drastically change with 9/11. 
After that date the ‘artificial distinction between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency,’99 
as former US Drug Czar, General Barry McCaffrey, called it, was lifted and Washington began 
to allow the government in Bogotá to use the military assets of Plan Colombia to target the 
FARC.  
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A key point about the drug trade is that it not only escalated the conflict from the 1980s, 
it also confused the discussion over its causes and the most effective way to handle it. In 
opposition to the ‘legitimate grievances’ school of thought favoured by the ‘Koreans’, the view 
that violence caused Colombian social ills, and not vice versa, gathered momentum from the 
late 1990s. The conclusion was that Colombia had a security problem, not an economic or 
social one. This understanding, as Porch maintains, underpinned Uribe’s approach to the 
conflict, under the belief that the ending of violence via military means would fix the social 
problem, as it would establish the basis for economic development. 100 However, for planners 
in the president’s cabinet at the outset of his administration in 2002, it became clear that the 
counter-insurgency policy would require some sort of stabilization and reconstruction 
programmes to fill the governance vacuum left by the retreat of the FARC once the military 
effort advanced, reviving ideas of the ‘Korean’ tradition.  
Indeed, the state-building narrative was an important theme for one of the key drafters 
of the DSP, MoD advisor and later vice-minister, Sergio Jaramillo, a senior civil servant who 
had studied philology and classical languages at Oxford, Cambridge and Heidelberg and who 
was familiar with the works of Sir Robert Thompson.  Following COIN theory, Jaramillo opted 
for the classic ‘oil spot’ approach. He instituted the Malayan Emergency ‘traffic-light system’ 
which defined the status of the areas to be pacified: insurgent-dominated red areas, yellow areas 
in transition, and green in stabilised areas.101 He also established a division of labour between 
the military and the police.102 One feature of Jaramillo’s territorial control approach was to 
assuage grievances in the recovered areas by providing previously non-existent services in the 
less populated periphery where FARC thrived.  In short, Jaramillo believed that Colombia’s 
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security problems stemmed directly from the historical absence of effective government in 
peripheral areas which the DSP and its territorial control effort known as Consolidación 
(Consolidation) aimed to supply.103 ‘More than facing an enemy’, he explained, ‘what you are 
actually doing is trying to re-establish the rule of law. You want to win the battle of governance; 
you want to show that you are the legitimate authority.’104 So, in short, five years before the 
rise to orthodoxy of COIN doctrine’s tactical concepts in Iraq, Colombian officials were 
already framing the campaign against the FARC according to COIN’s basic tenets. At the time, 
US Embassy officials in Bogotá declared the DSP to be a promising step forward that clearly 
‘proposed a “clear-hold strategy” with the Colombian FUDRA (Rapid Reaction Forces) as the 
leading element.’ This, they argued, demonstrated that ‘Uribe’s team and the GOC [had] 
experience with strategic thought and organization […] much in common with USG 
thinking.’105   
In this respect, the goal of the DSP consolidation effort was to effectively compete with 
the FARC in critical zones, to showcase the government as a better alternative in terms of the 
supply of basic goods and services. On the face of it, the underpinning of the policy was nothing 
more than the 1960s population-centric COIN mantra favoured by the ‘Koreans’, revamped 
with the latest inter-agency international ‘best practices’. It placed the onus on the military to 
make contact with a periphery, where it was the only institution to have some rapport with the 
population apart from the drug mafias, FARC and certain missionary orders of the Catholic 
Church.106 
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However, the state-building approach of Uribe faced strong challenges, in particular in 
La Macarena area between the departments of Meta and Caquetá in south-east Colombia. With 
an area of 11,300 km2 and almost 50,000 inhabitants, La Macarena has been, since the late 
1960s, the most important FARC strong-hold where 30 per cent of the population derives its 
livelihoods from the coca trade and admits ties with the insurgency. The financial and physical 
protection coca-growing peasants receive from FARC make them resistant to the basic ‘hearts 
and minds’ discourse of the state. 107  Particularly, because the region’s remoteness from 
national and international markets and the lack of alternative lucrative crops that could offer 
significant profit, have created dependency on FARC that market their produce. La Macarena 
is also a difficult candidate for state reclamation given the fact that the consolidation 
programme - financed heavily by international donors, and in particular by USAID – takes the 
form of a basic welfare scheme which puts its sustainability at risk.108  Finally, the improvement 
in security in the most densely populated areas of the country has led politicians to reduce the 
relative importance of investing in the periphery, despite the argument of the followers of the 
‘Korean’ tradition that only by stabilising it and dealing with the local grievances there is the 
only way to solve the root causes of the conflict. But why would politicians concern themselves 
with prioritizing public resources for isolated areas while they have to focus on the needs of 
their constituencies in the growing urban areas? Moreover, the political will to continue with 
state-building has faded with the advance of the offensive against the FARC, especially given 
the effect of the targeted killing programme which has reduced the insurgents’ capability to 
operate at large, and which has been considered to be a more cost-effective means to improve 
security.109  
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Ultimately, the limits of state-building efforts in the peripheral areas where there is an 
historic insurgent presence have been in some way recognised by the Santos government as a 
reason for initiating peace negotiations with FARC in Havana since 2012. The President has 
named the steward of Consolidación, former vice-minister Jaramillo as one of his chief 
negotiators with FARC.  In a conference at Harvard University in March 2014, Jaramillo 
explained that success in the peace process will allow the government to engage in state-
building by other means rather than COIN: 
In essence [the peace process] is about putting in place a new and inclusive model for building 
and strengthening the Institutions in the regions. The Colombian State has attempted all sorts 
of programmes to bring development to the remote regions. Without denying their successes, I 
believe the centralist model, in which civil servants land like Martians among the communities 
to “bring the State”, ran out of steam. I have made part of those efforts and I know their merits 
and limitations. And, I am convinced that in that way the State will “arrive” nowhere in a 
sustained fashion and with sufficient strength.110   
 
 In essence, the Santos administration is attempt to convince the FARC to demobilise 
and enter the political process offers a blunt recognition that the insurgency is a valid political 
actor with legitimacy and leverage. The reasoning, then, is that in the state-building challenge 
there are environments in which the technocratic COIN ‘government-in-a-box’ approach 
exhibits limitations. The solution lately is to attempt to solve the socio-economic grievances 
by cooperating, instead of competing, with the FARC to achieve what Jaramillo has termed 
‘territorial peace’111.  This is the case with two of the six points that comprise the peace agenda, 
and to which both parties have signed up in the past year. For example, agreeing on issues of 
rural development and political rights, the government has agreed to allow a disarmed FARC 
to work in its constituencies through the promotion of ‘peasant reservation zones’ to come up 
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with alternatives to the drug trade and to facilitate the process of manual eradication of coca 
leafs.112   
It is not possible at present to answer with full certainty how the Colmil will assimilate 
the agreements the government has reached with the insurgency up to now, not only from the 
perspective of the Prusso-German tradition but also from those close to the ‘Korean’ tradition. 
Whilst the latter recognises that the grievance reduction discourse is valid, that does not 
necessarily mean they agree these social issues should be dealt with in cooperation with the 
adversary. Rather, for the ‘Koreans’ it should be the state through its formal institutions the 
sole responsible actor in the management of those social issues in order to consolidate its 
legitimacy and ultimately solve the conflict. From this perspective, to grant to the FARC that 
social grievances exist and accord to work together in its resolution has been considered by 
some officers as a self-defeatist act. 113  Given the legacy of frustration that has existed in the 
Korean tradition with regard to the politician’s historic reluctance to see through a state-
building endeavour, it is possible that the peace process, no matter its outcome, will continue 
to stir up the general ‘stab-in-the back’ notion that has agitated civil-military relations in 
Colombia since the 1960s. 
Conclusion: An absence of strategic consensus in Colmil thinking? 
Historically, the lack of consensus about the nature of the conflict, about the role the military 
should play and what it is intended to achieve, lead to the configuration of a ‘stab in the back’ 
notion that has stymied the process of strategic formulation in Colombia. ‘Traditionalists’ have 
considered the civilian leadership to lack the will to pursue the fight to its logical military end 
and compel the enemy by force, and have accused them of allowing themselves to be 
                                                          
112  See:  ‘First Joint Report of the dialogue table between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army, FARC,’ (21 June 2013). 
113 Fernando Landazábal, El Precio de la Paz, (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta, 1985), p.280. 
82 
 
intimidated into starting peace talks by the FARC.114 ‘Koreans’, for their part, also have 
disregarded the politicians as negligent, unwilling to address the social causes of the conflict 
via effective state-building. As General Landazábal stated, perhaps simplistically, ‘It is not that 
the army has not been able to win; it is that the political class has not been able to govern.’115 
The subsequent chapters of the thesis endeavour to explain in depth how this mentality evolved 
since La Violencia and assess its influence in Colmil strategic thinking. 
To a certain extent, as this chapter has argued, President Uribe’s leadership temporarily 
soothed these historical frustrations, because his style and rhetoric appealed to both martial 
traditions. On the one hand, he successfully took on the role of commander-in-chief and pushed 
the military to deliver in the battlefield as part of his DSP, while on the other, the promotion of 
state-building to fill the governance vacuum left by the retreat of the FARC echoed the desires 
of the ‘Korean’ narrative. But despite the fact that during the first decade of the 21st century a 
greater assertion of political control over the military instrument and increased civil-military 
dialogue, which reduced the Colmil’s operational autonomy, this did not translate into a 
strategic consensus over the ends to be sought. This chronic problem in Colombian military 
thinking, reminds us of Clausewitz , who stated that ‘No one starts a war -or rather, no one in 
his senses ought to do so- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by 
that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is political purpose; the latter is its 
operational objective.’116   
To analyse the origin and evolution of the problems at level of strategic formulation in 
the country in a systematic fashion it is first necessary to chart the themes that configure the 
Colombian military’s value system.  This is the aim of the following chapter, which intends to 
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dissect the main features that underpin the strategic tradition of the Colmil and identify those 






























THE BASIS OF THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY’S STRATEGIC TRADITION 
 
The oscillatory nature of the Comil’s judgement about the character of the conflict and the 
instrumentality of the armed instrument, discussed in the previous chapter, is a defining feature 
of the evolution of its thinking. These tensions are important for the purpose of this chapter in 
particular as it will endeavour to construct the underpinnings of the strategic tradition of the 
Colombian military. It aims at discerning the factors that underpin the motivational patterns 
and assumptions that have influenced, throughout the years, the oscillatory thinking of the 
armed forces. In other words, this chapter will analyse the foundations of the value-system that 
has determined the Colmil’s strategic thinking process. This process has had a bearing on the 
definition of the military’s goals, on the views about the means to achieve them, and 
consequently, on the judgements about the utility of force in the conflict.1   
The essential aspects of the oscillations in Colombian military thinking, as they reveal 
themselves at the surface, can be presented schematically as Figure 2 depicts.  On the one hand, 
there were those soldiers who came to believe the defeat of the insurgencies could be carried 
out solely by military means. For them ‘war is war’, and that is what Colombia was, and still 
is, facing. Thus, the effective use of the armed instrument that is operationally proficient and 
technically superior can lead to the culmination of tactical successes, ultimately serving the 
war’s object.  This is a view that is still visible in the military mind, as in the words of the Chief 
of the Armed Forces between 2010 and 2013, General Alejandro Navas: ‘to achieve peace war 
has to be won, and war is won in the battlefield after breaking the enemy’s will to 
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fight.’2General Navas, who very probably read his Clausewitz, knows that ‘victory normally 
results from the superiority of one side; from a greater aggregate of physical and psychological 
strength’ to defeat the enemy.3  However, the Prussian philosopher also made it clear that wars 
are never so straightforward. This explains why in war military prowess, conjoined with 
superior technical abilities and manpower do not necessarily guarantee the attainment of the 
political object, a point which another part of the Colombian military would seem to agree 
with.  
 
Figure 2: Oscillations in Colombian Military Thinking 
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Some Colombian senior officers, past and present, would retort to General Navas that 
the ‘destruction of the enemy is not the only means to obtain the political object’, as war can 
be waged for other objectives,4 which, in their opinion, may not be achieved through the sole 
application of force. Indeed, some soldiers have seen the conflict as more than a war, and thus 
consider that armed force has its limits.5 An assertion that gained prominence from the 1960s, 
with the view that counter-insurgency amounted to a separate category of war, lead soldiers to 
argue that the military must extend its’ scope of action and consider other tools beyond the use 
of force.’6 The main implication of that reason was that the armed instrument should be just 
one of the means in a holistic state-building effort.  
To examine the influences that have shaped these varied judgements, views and 
behaviour of the Colombian military, a key step is to construct its strategic tradition. In essence, 
evaluating how the value-system of an actor influences its decision-making process is one of 
the prime elements of strategic analysis. It was Clausewitz who noted that, ‘absolute, so-called 
mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations’, but rather that, ‘war deals 
with living and moral factors’, thus never being absolute or certain.7 In this sense, as Schelling 
indicated, strategic analysis can be divided into two lines: the study of just the calculative, more 
rational and conscious side of an actors’ behaviour, or, a focus on all of its complexity, 
including the conscious rational calculations, as well as the unconscious and motivational 
aspects that shape his behaviour.8 Acknowledging this latter aspect implies that the actor’s 
motivational core is essential in the configuration of his image of reality, and moves him 
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towards the definition of ends, hence influencing the way he selects the means for achieving 
them.9 
With this in mind, the following chapter will aim to disentangle some key themes that 
have configured the value-system of the Colombian military and have been significant in the 
development of its strategic tradition. The themes that have been selected do not represent an 
exact and complete picture of the assumptions and motivations that have influenced military 
thought in the country. In no way can they be considered exclusive factors. They are simply 
interpretative tools which aid in understanding the complexity of the subject of study and take 
into account the uniqueness of the historical and political context in which it evolved.  The 
themes can be listed under five headings, as follows: the question of military autonomy and the 
relationship to the civilian government; the military’s analysis of the nature and causes of the 
conflict; the concepts of colonisation and state-building in the military’s tradition; the impact 
of Catholicism in shaping the notion of a civilising mission and a rationalist framework of 
analysis; and finally, the characterisation by the military of the relationship with the United 
States. 
Military Autonomy versus Political Control 
 
A guiding theme of civil-military relations in Colombia since the end of La Violencia had been 
the explicit acceptance by politicians and soldiers that the military had the right to maintain an 
autonomous sphere free of political interference. In practice, such autonomy meant that 
Colombian governments washed their hands of the management of the internal conflict and 
delegated the task to the military. It was only in August 2002, when a 20,000 strong FARC 
army threatened the survival of the Colombian state that the longstanding civil-military 
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contract was broken by President Uribe, who attempted to assume effective political control 
over the military as a tool in a planned state action against the insurgency.  
The autonomy of the Colombian military was officially recognised in 1958, right after the 
end of the short-lived dictatorship of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. The first government of 
the National Front sought to secure the de-politicisation of the armed forces as a guarantee of 
a swift transition to civilian rule. To achieve it, Liberal President Alberto Lleras Camargo, in a 
speech to the General Staff in Bogotá, conceded institutional autonomy to the military in return 
for political neutrality. In his speech, he set the parameters of what would from then on become 
a dogma in the relations of the military and the politicians: the ‘Lleras Doctrine.’  The President 
insisted that the Colombian military should not be a ‘deliberative body’, but that it should rather 
be an apolitical force concerned only with the technical aspects of the profession. ‘Politics is 
the art of controversy par excellence, the military that of discipline,’ he proclaimed. The reward 
for non-intervention in the political debate was the promise by the government that ‘politicians 
will not decide in any manner how to manage the Armed Forces, in its technical functions, in 
its regulations, its personnel.’ 10 Evidently, such a statement was set against the background of 
Samuel Huntington’s model of civil-military relations, and its chief assertion that high levels 
of military professionalism, were conducive to political subordination and apolitical attitudes.11  
In practical terms, President Lleras Camargo’s statement of principles served its main 
purpose as it assured a safe passage to civilian rule, and additionally, also served to neutralise 
the bipartisan nature of La Violencia by removing the military from the confrontation between 
the parties. Henceforth, Liberals could rest assured a Conservative government would not use 
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the military against them again. Likewise, the arrangement offered an extra guarantee to the 
liberal guerrillas and communist self-defence forces to demobilise under the government’s 
offers of amnesty, by removing any justification for the resort to armed force.12  Nonetheless, 
the political circumstances, which had given rise to the doctrine, soon changed.  The military 
was not confined to the barracks to theorise about ‘conventional war,’ the defence of national 
sovereignty and the preparation for international operations like Korea or Suez, something 
many officers would have desired, viewing it as their professional niche. Instead the military 
was brought in again by the politicians to deal with the persistent problem of banditry, 
generated by groups that refused to demobilise, and face the fears of expanding communist 
insurgency inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution.13   
The ‘Lleras Doctrine’ was to remain in place for more than four decades, and, its 
permanence gave rise to weak political guidance of a military that had by constitutional 
mandate, being tasked to deal with the conflict. Nevertheless, from the 1960s, some periods 
saw an effective synchronisation between government aims and military objectives, and 
smooth relations between the Colmil leadership and the politicians. In fact, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 4 that was exactly the case with President Lleras Camargo and his chiefs of staff, 
which facilitated the adaptation of the military instrument to adopt counter-insurgency as 
sponsored by the Kennedy administration. However, the change in political priorities, based 
on the dynamics of the internal conflict by the end of the decade, including the proliferation of 
new smaller insurgencies like the M-19, and the change in behaviour of the two main ones (the 
FARC and the ELN) which moved to a defensive phase; meant at times that the politicians 
came to view the insurgency problem merely as a security nuisance.  If the insurgencies were 
not more than a mere challenge for law and order that did not threaten the survival of the 
                                                          




political order, civilian leaders had no reservations in delegating the management of public 
order to the military. Nonetheless, as commentators have pointed out, the problematic aspect 
of delegating the mission to the military under the parameters of the civil-military arrangement 
and its precept of military autonomy was that the design and coordination of policy for handling 
the insurgency problem was to become excessively militarised.14 The lack of political guidance 
would also be problematic as the Colmil would harbour a different appreciation of the insurgent 
threat, which in its opinion when minimised by the politicians served the different insurgent 
groups own revolutionary agenda whilst impeding the application of efficient measures to 
counter them.  
Indeed, in the long run, misiones de orden público (public order missions) as the 
autonomous sphere of the military, under the tenets of the ‘Lleras Doctrine’ turned into a 
politics-free space.  This meant that soldiers were, at least on paper, to be left alone in a vacuum, 
to act in accordance to their professional knowledge, to control and manipulate the armed 
instrument in order to compel the illegal groups to their will.  The problem with this notion, is 
that it produced a strategic disconnect separating the political dimension of the conflict from 
the operational level.  
Viewing Colombia’s political instability as a question to be addressed through military-
technique left an indelible imprint on its strategic tradition, particularly on those officers, 
associated to the ‘Prusso-German’ school, who became overzealous about the utility of armed 
force. Moreover, some of them have argued that the concept of public order was nothing more 
than a euphemism for war.15 As it can be seen schematically in Figure 2, part of the Colombian 
military associated to the ‘Prusso-German’ school, has tended to believe that the country is at 
war. The war has throughout the years with different terms like ‘revolutionary war’; ‘irregular  
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war’; ‘anti-subversive war’; ‘low-intensity war’ or even ‘drug war’, but nonetheless for this 
section of the Colmil it is the same phenomenon.16  Hence, it can be argued that this section of 
the Colmil has considered feasible to use force as the principal means to defeat the nation’s 
internal enemies, and found space to push their views, especially during periods of escalating 
violence. The natural reflex of these soldiers has been to employ the military instrument in a 
way that brings maximum force against identifiable targets. But as they are aware, insurgents 
normally do not offer pitched battle, rather resort to hit and run tactics, and to survive hide 
amongst, and, utilise the population to fight the government. In that context, it is not surprising 
that against such an ‘illegitimate’ and ‘cowardly’ enemy the Colmil have demanded to act 
unconstrained by jus ad bellum. 17 
In this context, poor political guidance, it can be argued, impacted negatively the 
formulation of strategy because it complicated the establishment of clear, attainable, goals and 
consequently left the military unhindered to give shape its objectives and the level of the effort 
required to achieve them. This deficiency, according to Douglas Porch, led to a dogma of armed 
force as the means to achieve an elusive victory. 18 No wonder, that with the armed instrument 
going unchecked, the conflict has at times taken the form of what Michael Howard calls bellum 
Romanum or guerre mortelle, were armed force has been used unrestrained.19 The resort to an 
excessive and indiscriminate use of force was extremely common during the early Violencia, 
as will be analysed in Chapter 3, when it was justified under the idea that the Liberal guerrillas 
and their collaborators were enemies that had to be exterminated. More recently, the resort to 
a no-holds-barred approach was particularly the case since the mid-1970s, in response to the 
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escalation of violence by the ELN and the M-19’s urban campaigns, which included the 
widespread use of terrorist tactics to attempt to generate a major political instability and push 
the government to a negotiating table.20  
When the conflict against the myriad insurgent groups escalated since La Violencia, various 
governments had to recognise that the perturbation of public order was such that it was 
necessary to establish ‘states of emergency’. In such contexts, politicians have offered the 
military special powers – including judicial competences, reduced their accountability and 
pressed them to obtain results.  Such powers allowed the military to obtain tactical successes 
against the majority of groups reducing their capabilities to operate. But reduction in violence 
levels normally meant a swift end to the states of legal exception, and with a recovered sense 
of ‘normalcy,’ some politicians, like Alfonso Lopez in 1974, President Belisario Betancur in 
1982 or Virgilio Barco in 1988, have called for the opening of negotiations with the 
insurgencies to solve the conflict and attempt to incorporate them into the political process. 
Such decisions to remove the powers originally given to the military by ‘states of emergency’ 
or ordering ‘cease-fires’ as preludes to negotiations,  rather than sustaining an offensive against 
the insurgents have shaped the notion in sections of the Colmil that politicians obstruct their 
work.21 Not surprisingly, Generals in press and books as well as associations of veterans have 
publicly denounced that politicians have favoured partisan or personal agendas instead of a 
national commitment to defeat the insurgents, and that in that manner they have intervened in 
the military´s autonomous operational sphere breaking the ‘Lleras Doctrine.’22  In this respect, 
one can summarise, that the escalation of violence by the insurgents has deeply altered many 
officers of the Colmil, who have believed the politicians instead of committing to counter the 
                                                          
20 The reasons for, and consequences of, the Colmil’s lack of restraints of since the 1970s will be discussed in a 
later subsection of this chapter (Catholicism and the Civilising mission). 
21 Landazábal, El Precio de la Paz, pp.256 -257. 
22 Ibid,. See also: Lora, ‘Aspectos Psicológicos,’pp.32-33. 
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threat by supporting them with the means and will to do so, fall to the adversary’s trap of 
starting peace talks. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, since the experience with the first joint peace process 
with the FARC and the M-19 in 1982, talks have been considered by the Colmil merely as a 
feature of the communist insurgencies strategies, to be used to regain strength and mobilise the 
non-violent political aspects of their struggle. In this sense, soldiers have been overly sensitive 
with the lack political resolve to push for verifiable cease-fires or to force weapon 
decommissioning, as well as with the lenience in the offering amnesties for captured guerrilla 
personnel. In short the Colmil has considered these sort of political concessions only serve the 
insurgencies end goals. The antipathies towards the politicians in this respect in the strategic 
tradition of the military were spelled out in 1982 by then Minister of Defence, General 
Fernando Landazábal: 
In an eloquent recognition of her inefficiency, the political class lures the subversives with offers 
of amnesty, and that is why she plays willingly with the State of Siege. It is her who declares it, in 
the first place, when the situation threatens to get out of control, and offers the armed establishment 
better possibilities to stop and combat those who have taken arms against her. She [the political 
class] is the one, who in a given moment, suspends the state of emergency, makes the civil courts 
decide about the fortune of those already captured and court martialled, allowing them to 
reincorporate to the subversion, mocking the military tribunals and disowning the results of 
operations in which soldiers and police have lost their lives [...] The military victories obtained by 
the armed forces are numerous and decisive. It was precisely the conviction of the subversion of 
their impossibility of obtaining victory in the battlefield that moved it to consider talks as the more 
promising means to approach power, uncovering the responsibility of the political class that 
accepted the talks.23   
   
Another problem brought about by the operational autonomy of the military in the conduct 
of the so called ‘public order mission’, is that there has been no clear definition of what are its 
limits. For example, US Army General John R. Galvin -who as a Captain in the mid-1950s 
served as one of the first advisers to the Colombian Lanceros school (the equivalent to the US 
Ranger school) and experienced the first counter-insurgency campaigns of the Colmil, 
explained in his memoirs:  
                                                          
23 Fernando Landazábal, El Precio de la Paz, pp.256 -257. 
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The military campaign to supress La Violencia was then called “Orden Publico.” The six brigades 
of the army were spread across the country with enormous but vague mission of keeping public 
order – seeing to it that the local government was able to function, roads were open, and  business 
were uninterrupted. We referred to the guerrillas as bandoleros –bandits who took advantage of a 
weak governmental structure and a tepid economy. We wondered if there was an atmosphere of 
lawlessness that supported violence.24 
 
In this context,  the definition of the Colmil role in the conduct of ‘public order’  became a 
predicament for many officers associated with the Korean school of thought, who supported 
the view that Colombia’s conflict is more than a war, and so, have made an alternative judgment 
about the utility of force as it can be seen in Figure 2. For many soldiers, ‘public order’ was 
not a clear political goal to be achieved by efficient military technique, and hence, considered 
the use of force as an insufficient means to deal with the Colombian conflict. One of these 
officers was General Álvaro Valencia Tovar, Army CoS in the early 1970s, who believed the 
military since the 1950s had simply began to assume a repressive function with regard to public 
order missions, under an ingrained belief that rural rebellion and political subversion could 
only be dealt with by force.  Accordingly, officers following his line of thought argued that the 
military was not analysing the character of the conflict in which it was finding itself involved 
and was thus unable to define a more adequate approach in line with the uniqueness of the 
Colombian context and the socio-economic conditions in which it was rooted.  Arguments like 
those pressed by Valencia Tovar, particularly during the ascendancy of population-centric 
counter-insurgency theory since the early 1960s promoted the view that the Colmil should 
focus its action on applying different means apart from reliance on force alone.  
Moreover, given the vagueness of the ‘public order mission’, Colombian officers close to 
the ‘Korean’ school were resentful of the lack of political direction in the conflict. Valencia 
Tovar, for example, with a touch of sarcasm, expressed the feeling that the government had not 
been serious enough in shaping policy to tackle endemic violence: ‘This is a country of four-
                                                          




year terms: every President intends to break with the past; he comes in to wallow the country 
with his scheme for salvation; he designs new policies, if that is how improvisations can be 
called. [...] In part, the absence of policy has been replaced by the military establishment.’25 
The obvious conclusion drawn by these officers has been that political negligence has 
demanded that they fill the strategic gap and shape policy themselves to address the root causes 
of the conflict. This notion was put forward by General Landazábal in the early 1980s: 
[...] it is the military, given the knowledge they have of the country and its internal situation, the 
one who has proposed to the government the plans that need to be applied for re-establishing public 
order. If that collaboration is seen with resentful eyes by the political establishment; and they let 
themselves be pulled by jealousy to settle rivalries with the defenders of their realm, the conflict is 
prolonged for years and years and the growth of subversion is incentivised.26    
 
  Inevitably, such interpretation of the character of the conflict invited a high degree of 
involvement in the political process, principally through the assumption of a clear-cut position 
with regard to its role in the formulation and execution of state-building policy.  RAND analyst 
Richard Maullin, who observed the Colombian case in the early 1970s, summed up this 
situation by noting that as soon as ‘national political conflict is militarised, the 
professionalisation of the armed forces helps promote its involvement in partisan political 
matters, the requirements for mobilising the resources of the state against its internal enemies 
thrust the armed forces to the centre of policy making.’27 Military autonomy combined with a 
high degree of politicisation in the context of population centric counter-insurgency, 
consequently led to the carving out of strategies that reduced dependence on force as the key 
instrument in the conflict and rather to focus on non-military aspects.  In the opinion of some 
officers, instability had been allowed to escalate by the quarrels and ineptitude of the politicians 
who failed to perform structural social and economic reforms needed to effectively deal with 
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26 Fernando Landazábal, El Desafío, p.45. 




the causes of violence. Hence, if public order was to be understood as a violence-free Colombia, 
then other means beyond force should be utilised to achieve that goal. This is not a dilemma 
exclusive to Colombia. Analysing the British army, Hew Strachan asserts that this is a curse 
for soldiers in a counter-insurgency role, which forces them to fuse the divide between civil 
government and military technique; inevitably, the political skills or functions they acquire as 
professional necessity politicises them.28  
The military’s misgivings over the lack of adequate political guidance and their 
increased antipathy towards the politicians have had a distinctive influence on the configuration 
of the Colombian strategic tradition. It has provided its distinct schools of thought with a shared 
theme in terms of their suspicions towards the political establishment (as depicted in Figure 2). 
Moreover, such a view has almost constituted itself as a stab in the back notion for the conduct 
of civil-military relations in the country. In this respect, it is necessary to re-emphasise a point 
made in the previous chapter, which is that despite differential appreciations about the means 
to utilise and define goals and objectives, there is within the Colmil a common antipathy 
towards the political establishment that provides a degree of inner consistency over the long-
term. This manifests itself in a common belief that despite the meddling of politicians in their 
autonomous operational field, the military is the main institution capable of offering a solution 
to Colombia’s conflict. 
The Causes of Violence 
 
One of the main consequences of the Colombian military’s autonomous decision-making 
sphere, the product of the ‘Lleras Doctrine,’ was to turn the soldiers into interpreters of the 
nature of the conflict and advocates of particular solutions. The different analysis the military 
made throughout the years about the causes of violence influenced its strategic formulation, 
                                                          
28 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.174. 
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determining its views about the political goals to achieve, as well as judgements about the 
instrumentality of armed force. A statement by General Fernando Landazábal, Colombia’s 
Defence Minister in 1982, exhibited the conceptual muddle within the military in characterising 
the causes of unceasing violence: 
The essence of the conflict has probably not been understood [...] The Colombian case is 
different, aggression is internal, the threat lures in her own fields and cities, the pests of 
underdevelopment corrode coexistence and hence conflict assumes the character of a different 
war, not less cruel not less intense than that initiated by a traditional invader.29  
 
The conceptual puzzle was even more evident at the moment of identifying the 
aggressor. As Landazábal stated elsewhere: ‘poverty is the raison d’être of the insurgency, but 
Communism is the main cause’.30 Landazábal was an interesting figure, whose career 
progressed in parallel with the debates that settled the dichotomy in Colombian military 
thought. In his mind, the distinct facets of the tradition seemed to coexist, hence portraying 
contradicting postures with regard to the use and utility of the military instrument. He 
recognised the functionality of military force for defeating the communist guerrillas -
consequently opposing negotiations with the insurgents- whilst, simultaneously, declaring 
force as incapable on its own of dealing with the conflict’s core causes. An overview of how 
these two distinct perspectives about the character of the conflict evolved can help to clarify a 
crucial influence on the behaviour of the Colombian military.   
When Landazábal was an artillery major at the beginning of the 1960s, the Colombian 
military began to elaborate a ‘theory for the deactivation of the causes of violence’31. This 
concept parted from the premise that the pacification effort developed since the early 1950s 
                                                          
29 Landazábal, El Desafío, p.44. 
30 Fernando Landazábal, Estrategia de la subversión y su desarrollo en América Latina, (Bogotá: Editorial Pax, 
1969), p.97. 
31 According to ‘Korean’ officers the theory served as the basis for the development of Plan Lazo, the Colmil’s 
counterinsurgency plan between 1962 and 1965, which will be explained in Chapter 4. In an interview in 1992 by 
professor Leal, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa explained the lineaments of the theory and how it served to shape 
the Colmil’s early plans. See: Leal, El Oficio, p.81. For another description of the theory see particularly Valencia 
Tovar, Testimonio, pp.300-320. 
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was only focusing on combat operations with no strategic framework. Consequently, staking 
out a diagnosis of the causes of the conflict in which the Colmil’s General Staff found itself, 
would offer the rudiments for future planning.  Fundamentally, field grade officers argued that 
solely by focusing on Acción Militar (Military Action), they were only attacking the 
consequences of violence, not the causes. In that sense, force by itself was incapable of 
delivering strategic results. For a handful of these officers, including Landazábal, and who 
formed the first generation of the ‘Korean’ school of thought, this implied the need to 
reformulate the general role of the Army. The implications of this line of thought meant, for 
one part, the establishment of a political stance regarding the military’s role in the conflict, and 
also,  vis-à-vis  Colombian society, based on an assumption that the inherent limitations of the 
instrumentality of force demanded the military assume non-military tasks to achieve the ends 
sought.  As General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, Army CoS in 1961 and later War Minister declared: 
[…] the true mission of the Army, in an underdeveloped country like ours, does not involve 
exclusively the limited concept of defence of national sovereignty and national institutions. By 
extension of these, the mission also includes the search for the Nations’ progress for the benefit 
of all Colombians. This can only be achieved through an authentic link between the Army and 
the People, not for the maintenance of a regressive and static state of affairs but for the conquest 
of a brighter future [...] the Armed Forces cannot continue to be indifferent in front of the pain 
and misery of its compatriots whilst having the conscience and the knowledge that it is possible 
to remedy such and unjust situation.32 
 
The adoption by the military of a new political aim, and with it, of a civilising mission, 
would look to fill the gap left by what was diagnosed to be the civilian government’s 
inefficiency in dealing with the conflict. The Colmil would set themselves to improve the well-
being of the Colombian peasantry and formulate initiatives leading to economic development 
which would address the material causes of violence. In short, these assumptions would serve 
to underpin strategic formulation during the decade, defining the political object and the means 
                                                          
32 Alberto Ruiz Novoa, El gran desafío. (Bogotá: Editorial Tercer Mundo, 1965), p. 33. 
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to achieve it.  But what factors influenced the military’s formulation of the theory of the causes 
of violence?  
A significant source that influenced military planning during the early sixties were the 
findings of the ‘Commission for the Study of the Causes of Violence’ initially set up by the 
Military Junta in 1958, to inquire into the origins and effects of La Violencia and establish the 
basis for a national policy to deal with it. The Commission was composed of a team of two 
senior Army officers accompanied by personalities of varied backgrounds, including renowned 
conservative and liberal politicians. The Commission even included Marxist sociologists and 
Catholic priests who believed that violence was a product of the defects of Colombia’s social 
and political structure. By formulating the concept of prevailing socio-economic ‘structural 
factors’ as the underlying cause of the conflict, its participants came to determine that the 
Armed Forces could not provide a military solution to the problem alone.  
The findings of the Commission were put together in a two volume study titled ‘La 
violencia en Colombia: Estudio de un proceso social’ (Violence in Colombia: Study of a Social 
Process), authored by a priest and two sociologists that were part of the team.  The study 
appealed to the Colmil leadership, and its recommendations served as parameters for the 
definition of a new strategic basis during the early 1960s, as will be later discussed in Chapter 
4.   The crucial point to highlight here is that the Commission findings spoke directly to the 
‘Korean’ school. Its arguments about the limitations of force in counter-insurgency were 
compelling, and offered a comprehensible diagnosis of the material conditions that generated 
violence. It encouraged them to understand that their action was conditioned by a social 
situation, arguing that it was in accordance to it that it had to ultimately develop new methods. 
In this sense, it was also explicit in affirming that ‘force is only one part of the solution, and 
when it is applied, planning of military action has to be accompanied by a social treatment plan 
that gives the affected area continued solutions. It is important that the great efforts made [by 
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the military] to recover its prestige amongst the masses, fits in a coordinated programme at the 
national level.’33 In essence, the Commission’s findings led the military command to assume 
that its strategy should be focused on addressing the causes of violence, and not the violence 
itself which were defined as the consequence of a broader social problem.  
Nonetheless, the ‘Koreans’ meddling in the debate about the social and economic 
causes of violence, and the redefinition of the mission to openly adopt the participation in non-
military roles, seriously strained the already difficult civilian-military relations in the country. 
Some politicians were overly sensitive about the Command’s new ideas, as they came to 
believe that the whole argument of dealing with causes rather than effects vindicated leftist 
violence and promoted partisanship in the ranks. ‘The problem in this country,’ a conservative 
Senator declared in 1963, ‘is that the military starts studying sociology and politics and then 
they start conspiring. Then they turn into politicians.’34 Hence, as discussed in Chapter 1, in 
the view of some civilians, as is currently the case of the followers of former President Uribe, 
the Colmil’s  internal role should be limited to the conduct of operations for the maintenance 
of public order by combating the armed groups, dismantling them by force and bringing them 
to justice. Likewise, the Prusso-German school of the military, concurring with this view, has 
asserted a different approach towards the functionality of force to that of the Koreans. It was a 
tension which served further to delineate the two strategic perspectives of the military.  
In the context of the expansion of the Cold War into Latin America, the fears of 
communist encroachment in the country intensified. ‘War has now begun within our own 
borders. Dangers of communism to National Security are so grave like those of classic warfare. 
[...] Definitely, the destruction of the nation, of the fatherland and of all its permanent essences, 
are the objectives of this mortal enemy,’ declared Colonel Osiris Villegas, an influential 
                                                          
33 Germán Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals Borda and Eduardo Umaña, La Violencia en Colombia: Estudio de un 
Proceso Social, (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962), p.424. 
34 Quoted in Leal Buitrago, El Oficio, p. 20. 
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Argentinian military thinker during the mid-sixties, whose work was widely studied in 
Colombia, and even published in official Comil publications.35After the insurrection that 
proceeded the events of 9 April 1948, the contention that all the liberal bandoleros and the 
peasant self-defence groups that rebelled against conservative rule answered to international 
communist interests, served to define Colombian violence as just another theatre of the war 
against the red menace.36  Later, with the Cuban revolution, the exacerbation of the notion of 
Communism as the main cause of the country’s predicaments was highlighted and utilised to 
explain the nature of the conflict during and define the characteristics and motivations of the 
enemy. Eventually, the consolidation during the second part of the 1960s of overtly defined 
Marxist-Leninist insurgencies, the FARC and the ELN mainly, who ever since have 
endeavoured to overthrow the government, gave weight to a mono-causal view of Colombia’s 
conflict. 
However, anti-communism had, for a long time, been part of the Colombian military’s 
ideological worldview. The military mind had received enough dosages of anti-communism to 
characterise guerrilla challenges in those terms, and to define how and where to apply force. 
Anti-communism did not germinate in their front line experience in Korea as it has been argued 
by several authors.37 In fact, it was a visible feature as early as 1927 when the military began 
to get involved with internal security missions.  At that time, the Minister of War defended the 
internal deployment of the Army to repress labour uprisings and popular agitation under the 
premise that ‘the impetuous and demolishing wave of Soviet Russia’s revolutionary ideas have 
hit the Colombian beachhead, threatening with destruction and ruin, by spreading the seeds of 
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communism.’38 Over the next few decades, the Army was used by both liberal and conservative 
governments as a tool to suppress labour unrest by force, under the pretext of its subversive 
nature.39  
Most importantly, the entrenched notions of anti-communism also added arguments to 
the doubts about the linkage between socio-economic factors and conflict, and enhanced the 
view that it could be effectively tackled through military means. ‘The very elimination of 
criminal or communist anti-social elements appears to have produced a certain rehabilitative 
effect per se, and it cannot be demonstrated with certainty that all areas with miserable 
economic and social conditions are necessarily violence-prone,’ affirmed a report by the US 
military mission in the summer of 1964.40 Later, in the early 1970s, the arrival of the National 
Security Doctrine (NSD) in Colombia served to give the ‘internal enemy’ concept a more solid 
ideological structure, which conditioned the assessments about the capacity of the military 
instrument. The NSD amounted a combination of counter-insurgency ideas promoted by the 
US since the 1950s with geopolitical analyzes dating from the 1930s.  The doctrine 
underpinned the rationale of the military regimes of the Southern Cone use of force, by 
considering insurgents as agents of international communism that posed an existential threat to 
the security of their respective countries.41 
Indeed, during the 1970s, anti-communism played a key influential role in shaping the 
mind-set of sections of the military during the revival of guerrilla movements in the region, 
including the consolidation of the M-19, an urban insurgency that based its operations in 
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Bogotá. Focusing on terror tactics, the group seemed to represent a direct threat to the political 
centre.42 The tenets of the NSD enhanced the belief that Colombia was the target of well-
orchestrated communist aggression, an impression that increased after the success of the 
Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 and its influence on the Colombian insurgent 
movements. As evidenced in General Landazábal’s words:  
The expansive route of international communism will continue to see in her [Colombia] a 
formidable pivot to continue the strategy for the domination of the continent [...] with the 
existence in our territory of armed guerrilla groups, that play strategy with Nicaragua and Cuba 
in the same plane of international revolution, they open our eyes, to see and think that it would 
not be strange that the next blazing focus of the conflict will be located in the Colombian Andes. 
May heaven forgive our auguries, but strategy and tactics have their principles and norms.43 
During this period, the belief of the Prusso-German school, that force could be used 
effectively to defeat the armed structures that supported communist insurgency gained 
visibility. Its approval ran parallel to the consolidation of the military regimes of the Southern 
Cone, whose actions against subversion and guerrilla activity was seen as a way forward by 
many in Colombia. In this sense, the complete removal of the communist threat would require 
complementing it with other coercive instruments.  Anti-subversive war would necessitate an 
expansion of the battlefield to include the civilian realm. This meant that the military should 
obtain sufficient legal powers to deal with those suspected of supporting the insurgents and of 
transmitting communist ideology. An enhanced operational capability, including a 
strengthened intelligence apparatus would allow the military to persecute the enemy in its 
civilian hideouts, who would, then, be judged and sentenced or simply disappeared. There was 
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no unanimity within the Colmil that such an undertaking would guarantee a political victory 
over the insurgency. Colombian soldiers, during the height of the NSD, would still flirt with 
the notions of the socio-economic causes of violence with the purpose of defining the political 
ends of their strategy.44  Eventually, the different opinions about the causes of violence in 
Colombia matured to coexist within the military mind. That coexistence generated tensions in 
the judgements about the bearing of the military instrument, and functioned as a distinctive 
element in the Colombian military strategic tradition. 
‘Guns and Mattocks’ – the Colmil and state-building 
 
As has been emphasised already, a distinguishing feature in the development of the Colombian 
military tradition has been the proposal of varied approaches for the utilisation of military 
resources to confront the internal conflict. In this context, the view that the military should 
assume a state-building role, utilising other means apart from force to achieve a violence-free 
Colombia has evolved into a strong motif since the early 1950s. Given the strength of such a 
view, it is important to dissect the main concepts that structured it in order to be able to generate 
a more complete picture of the evolution of the strategic tradition.   
In fact, the fixation of a military sector with the development of strategies that have 
emphasised taking on state-building responsibilities can be traced to the inception of the 
modern Colombian military in the first decade of the 20th century. Historians suggest that the 
independence of Panamá from Colombia, in the aftermath of the War of the Thousand Days, 
made the government overly sensitive about the possibilities of secessionism, and thus, 
proposed that the newly created National Army should aid in the construction of the nation by 
colonising the vast amount of land that was beyond the control of Bogotá.45  A similar argument 
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is made by Frederick Nunn, who explains that for Colombian politicians of the time, a 
professional military – following a European model- would not only put an end to an era of 
martial improvisation that had contributed to the country’s violent 19th century, but would be 
a definite step for the consolidation of the nation under the ascendancy of the conservative 
movement of the Regeneration.46 Nunn explains that this theme was by the mid-20th century 
shaped by military ideas circulating in Latin America, influenced by French Marshall Lyautey 
for example, about the need to assume a social role that was considered necessary for the 
advancement of what they judged were the retrograde societies and economies of the 
borderlands.47 The use of the military as tool of national consolidation in those terms, has 
transcended in time. As discussed in the previous chapter, it was a central theme in the design 
of the counter-insurgency programmes of the 1960s and, with certain caveats, was present in 
Plan Colombia; later underpinned ‘Consolidation’, the stabilisation programme of President 
Uribe’s Security and Defence policy; and is palpable in the current narrative of Territorial 
Peace advanced by President Santos’ leading peace negotiator with FARC, Sergio Jaramillo. 
Undoubtedly, up to the late 1980s, the Colombian military was the sole national 
institution, apart from the Catholic Church,48 that provided any meaningful state presence in 
the vastness of Colombia’s southern tropical forests and jungles that amounts to almost half of 
its 1,200 million km². The framework of the modern Colombian state was, since its foundation 
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in 1886, modelled on the centralised political administration of the French departmental 
system.  
 
Figure 3 Distribution of 'National Territories' ca.1959 
 
 
Source: Own creation. 
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Conversely, the peripheral territories, especially those that lay beyond the Andes 
Cordillera in the eastern plains towards the Orinoco basin and those to the south towards the 
jungles of the Amazonian basin, remained unexplored, scarcely inhabited and outside the 
modernising effort of Bogotá’s central government. These areas were assigned the general title 
of ‘National Territories’, which were to remain under pre-republican modes of direct rule as 
commissariats or intendancies (see Figure 3) up to 1991.49 During a greater part of the 20th 
century, the administration of the farthest and most complex of these territories was delegated 
to the military, which had to take on civilian responsibilities and which in time performed a 
colonisation role.50 
It was primarily in the Amazonian basin, which was considered a contested area 
threatened by predatory neighbours and where the Colombian state presence was weak, that 
the military was initially deployed in colonising missions. For example, the increased presence 
of Peruvian rubber producers in Colombia’s southernmost extreme triggered a quick war 
between both countries in 1932. To protect their business interests, rubber impresarios 
influenced the government in Lima to annex the Colombian Amazonian port city of Leticia. 
As part of the war effort against Peru, the Colmil opened roads, installed advanced posts and 
even inaugurated villages as a means to consolidate a jungle frontier of more than 1,000 
kilometres along the Putumayo and Amazon rivers.51  Once the League of Nations intervened 
to negotiate an end to the war and restore the international borders, returning Leticia to 
Colombia, military colonisation activities began to lose their predominance. Colmil 
commanders shifted their priorities as a result of increased prestige and the boost in defence 
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spending after the Amazonian war. An enhanced professional ethos led to a focus on the 
technical preparation for ‘conventional’ warfare during the second part of the 1930s, under 
tutelage of German instructors and advisors.52 As a US Navy intelligence report of the period 
put it, it defined the Colombian military’s ‘adherence to European conceptions of army 
training, strategy, and tactics.’53  
However, the reformist Liberal governments that came to power in the second half of 
the 1930s proposed an agenda of state modernisation that would collide with the military’s new 
‘conventional’ priorities. Liberal politicians foresaw the reactivation of the colonisation role of 
the military in the periphery as a way to integrate these areas socially and economically to the 
nation. The army, they argued, had social utility, and hence should not be taken as a tool to 
achieve military ends in case of war, but should be used as a tool that could aid in times of 
peace the ends of the reformist Liberal government, as President Alfonso Lopez elucidated:    
The conformation of the country gives the army another mission that has not been thoroughly 
completed, not because of lack of will, but because the civilian government has not oriented it 
towards it: the domination and conquest of territories, that being within our borders have not 
been reduced to the jurisdiction of authority, being distant and uninhabited […] A Nation that 
has three quarters of its territory with no contact with its culture, offers the army a new field of 
activity that has not been exploited for collective benefit.54 
In effect, segments of officer corps agreed with the political postures of President Lopez 
and his emphasis on the need for the military to have a more pronounced role in the construction 
of the nation.  Some officers developed a contempt of garrison life and with an army that 
seemed to have become redundant after the Peruvian war, conversely projecting an idyllic view 
of the Amazonian territories. ‘No other place in Colombia where the fatherland feels more 
present and alive [...] in our banks of the Amazon outposts of military colonisers, hoist our flag 
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like a thin Colombian link,’ recalled Valencia Tovar.55 Rather than military technique, the 
principal role for soldiers whilst undertaking the colonising mission was that of public 
administration. The early experience with colonisation in the Amazon left a deep mark on 
Colmil thinking and behaviour, especially after La Violencia, when guerrilla groups began to 
exploit the vastness of the uncontrolled periphery, which drew, once again,  the attention of 
many soldiers to longstanding ideas about state-building as the means to solve the conflict. 
However, as Valencia Tovar recalls, President Lopez’s (twice President of Colombia, 
from 1934-38 and later in 1942-44) advocacy of the need for the military to retake state-
building was actually ‘disastrous and indisposed the army commanders greatly’, as ‘his 
intention of turning a military that he believed vegetated like dead weight in the barracks into 
an instrument of progress, was taken as an insult by the officers who began talking about 
changing weapons for mattocks.’56 The President’s agenda during his second term only served 
to increase the growing hostility of certain military commanders who believed the liberal 
administration aimed at reducing the importance of the Army  because of its alleged sympathies 
with the former ruling Conservative party, and hence, intended to affect its capabilities and 
resources and to ostracise them in the jungles.  In this tense environment, a rogue group of 
Army Colonels even attempted an improvised coup d'état against Lopez’s government in June 
1944.  The failed uprising surfaced many of the tensions within the officer corps with regards 
to the national mission of the military. Divisions became clear amongst those that seconded the 
liberal party’s modernisation rhetoric, and those who exposed a professionalised or Prussian 
outlook. Whilst the former were not hostile to expanding the role of the military to state-
building tasks, the latter promoted their newly acquired Prussian ethos with a focus on 
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technique and the preparation for inter-state war and the maintenance of public order, confining 
themselves to their given constitutional duties.  
After the arrival of the Rojas Pinilla regime in 1953, as a reaction to the Conservative 
government’s sectarianism and the growing violence, the Colmil revived the state-building 
narrative in the belief that it would put an end to the conflict and improve living conditions. It 
reasoned, that La Violencia had a socio-economic origin, and hence that through a programme 
of colonisation in the uninhabited periphery the issue of inequitable land distribution could be 
resolved and the creation of conditions for economic development could be achieved without 
resorting to communist style policies. Rojas’ agenda was influenced by the doctrine of 
desarrollismo, which promoted substantial levels of military intervention to advance policies 
of development and industrialisation, which at the time were fashionable in Venezuela, 
Argentina or Brazil.57  This went in parallel to the diffusion throughout the region of the 
‘dependency school’ of economics, elaborated by Raúl Prebish, director of the UNECLAC  
(United Nations  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), that influenced 
the conceptualization of military and civilian leaders about state directed action, and drove the 
ideological debate surrounding economic development in the continent58  The resurgence of 
the state-building discourse under Rojas outlived his military government, despite the lack of 
any substantial implementation of the development agenda. Shortly after the restoration of 
democracy in 1958, military state-building became an essential strategic concept for those 
officers of the Korea generation who would advocate population-centric counter-insurgency at 
the turn of the decade. The link between counter-insurgency thinking and the concepts of 
military state-building in Colombia during the early 1960s, as presented in the previous chapter, 
was underpinned in President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, which considered that Latin 
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American militaries were central agents in accelerating the transit of their countries to 
modernity by assisting in the implementation of economic development initiatives in areas 
facing guerrilla warfare.59 Chapter 4 will analyse in detail how this state-building theme 
evolved in Colmil thinking during the beginning of the 1960s and became a source of tension 
in the formulation of strategy.  
The emphasis on state-building in Colmil thought has also been a consequence of the 
reaction by insurgents to the application of force against their base areas since the early 1950s.  
Military pressure normally forced the rebels to seek sanctuary deep in the periphery where 
government presence was either weak or non-existent. As will be explained in subsequent 
chapters, the Villarica campaign against the communist armed groups and their civilian base, 
initiated by General Rojas in 1954 in the central Andes close to Bogota, led them to respond to 
the military offensive by relocating deep in the cordillera in departments of Tolima and Cauca, 
where they founded the enclaves of Marquetalia and El Pato. The first enclave fell in mid-
1964, and the second in the spring of 1965. The offensive of the Colmil led to a further 
relocation of the guerrilla forces and the civilian population that supported them towards the 
jungle fringes in the south eastern territory of Meta. In the Colombian equivalent of Mao’s 
Long March, peasant columns of hundreds of families, protected by mobile guerrillas under 
the command of Manuel Marulanda ‘Tirofijo’, arrived in an uncontrolled area of the Ariari 
River where they pitched camp, replenished their armies, and joined with other communists 
groups to create the FARC in 1966.60 The key point is that the insurgents’ response to the 
Colmil’s initial campaigns inevitably led to a recognition of the limits of military force in the 
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conflict by officers close to the Korean tradition, who proposed different courses of action to 
compensate for their limited capacity to obtain victory through the destruction of the 
adversary’s forces. 
The FARC historically prospered in these remote areas where the Colombian authorities 
have had a historically weak or non-existent presence. There, the insurgency advanced its own 
process of armed colonisation, creating shadow state structures through the political, social and 
economic organisation of the peasantry that arrived in search for new arable land, escaping 
urban poverty or simply displaced by violence.61  An expansion of Colombia’s agrarian frontier 
during the 1970s and 80s triggered constant peasant colonisation processes deeper into ‘virgin 
jungles’ in the national territories of Caquetá and Vaupes. These late processes of peasant 
colonisation were the consequence of pressure exerted by cattle ranchers and large landowners 
who established industrial commercial farms and bought out their land legally, or who 
sometimes simply took over through coercive means. Another essential factor from the late 
1970s was the arrival of the cocaine trade, which also increased the pressure for new land in 
the jungles and tropical forests of the south east.  In these recently colonised areas, a process 
of peasant organisation by the FARC ensued, which secured them with new sources of income 
by taxing coca cultivation.  
This context offered the Colmil with new elements of analysis to reinforce the concept of 
state-building as part of its strategic formulation to counter-insurgency. In other words, to 
counter the FARC’s own colonisation project, the military maintained its interest in 
colonisation and state-building in the periphery as grounding of its later strategic formulation. 
The previous chapter showed, for example, how during the 1990s counter-narcotics initiatives, 
like the US backed ‘Plan Colombia’, were welcomed by Colmil officers as means to 
                                                          




consolidate their presence in the peripheral areas and challenge the FARC’s control of the local 
population.62  These ideas made particular sense to those officers that had been brought up 
under the aegis of the Koreans. Following the tenets of counter-insurgency thinking, by the 
turn of the 1980s, senior officers would still promote the techniques of population –centric 
counter-insurgency they had come in touch during their formative years, like: Civic Action, 
Psychological Action and Communal Action. These tactics had the objective of curtailing the 
growth of insurgent sources of power by counter mobilising the peasantry through socio-
economic development initiatives with the purpose of integrating them into the nation. 
However, the problem was that these methods were conceived under the rationalist framework 
that characterised counter-insurgency theory as promoted since the 1960s, which meant that it 
was considered as a formula applicable to all contingencies.63 The Colombian military mind 
was receptive to this line of thinking due to its profession of faith in an enlightened vision of 
man, as will be argued in the next theme.    
Catholicism and the civilising mission 
 
The modern Colombian military was created under the auspices of the triumphant conservative 
government after the War of a Thousand days from 1899 to 1902 which proposed the 
amalgamation of the triumphant conservative army with the defeated liberals into a nonpartisan 
organisation. On the one hand, the creation of a truly national and professional army could, 
fundamentally, serve to prevent another civil war. Because in the words of a Colombian 
military historian, it could put an end to ‘those days in which the landowner made himself a 
brigadier general, made his major-domo and foremen into a staff armed his peons with muskets 
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or machetes and issued pronunciamientos.’64 To accomplish this goal, the formation of a 
professional officer corps would be required, and so the government hired in 1907 a Chilean 
Military Mission to establish and run the Escuela Militar de Cadetes (Military Cadet School) 
under its received Prussian influence.  
On the face of it, if the professionalisation of the Colmil aimed at placing it above the 
sectarian questions that had led the political parties to war eight times during the 19th century; 
the real mission translated until the outbreak of La Violencia in the defence of the constitutional 
order structured under the values of the Conservative ascendancy and the commitment to the 
defence of Roman Catholicism as the religion of the nation.65 This ‘religious issue’, had since 
the independence of Colombia, been one of the main points of contention between the two 
parties, with the Conservatives finally imposing their position after their military victory in 
1902.66 Until the drafting of a new Constitution in 1991, which effectively removed the 
pervasive influence of the Catholic Church and promoted the establishment of a secular and 
plural society, the Colmil adhered institutionally to the promotion of the Christian tradition as 
the defining value of the Colombian nation, even if individual officers might have professed 
different views about the religious question. 67 In this sense, Catholicism played an important 
role in forming the military’s ideological core of motivations, and since 1948 with the 
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intensification of violence and the political polarisation brought by the Cold War, it became 
deeply influential in the definition of objectives and the selection of means employed to counter 
the armed groups that began to proliferate.  
The Catholic dimension in the military’s thinking became increasingly discernible in 
the early 1950s with the escalation of La Violencia. The brutality of the undeclared civil war 
between the political parties generated a sense that Colombia was in need of a moral 
regeneration, before it fell in an abyss and in the hands of Communism. On these terms, the 
military government that emerged in June 1953 under General Rojas Pinilla began to promote 
a populist palingenetic rhetoric that demanded the creation of a ‘Christian and Bolivarian 
State.’ In essence, as David Bushnell, put it, the Christian side of the General’s political 
discourse was far from clear and simply amounted to a close collaboration between the Church 
and the military run state68; eventually understood as the carrying out of social deeds to in some 
way improve the living conditions of the rural population affected by the conflagration. It was 
only after the fall of the Rojas regime that the military took steps beyond mere rhetoric and 
began to pursue a plan of action to confront violence deeply influenced by concepts drawn 
from Catholic sources. The plans drawn out would ultimately take the form of a civilising 
mission for the military.  Catholic thinking in the military during the early stages of the Cold 
War, especially under French influence, transposed concepts drawn from its 19th and early 20th 
centuries’ colonial experiences in Africa and Asia, with the profession of faith in an enlightened 
vision of man as a rational being and in the idea of progress as a universal value to be exported 
to guide rebellious indigenous populations.69 As William Rosenau suggests, the mission 
civilatrice as drawn by the French, found an obvious parallel with modernisation theory as 
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developed by US economists. As will be discussed in later chapters, these ideas shaped the 
Alliance for Progress and the general approach to counter-insurgency during the 1960s in Latin 
America and South East Asia.70 The rationalist framework in which these concepts operated 
led to the belief that they were indeed formulas of universal applicability conducive to the 
progress to modernity of undeveloped countries. Hence, it generated a preoccupation with the 
design and application of a method and technique able to surmount particular circumstances.71  
One of the principal Catholic influences for Colombian military planners after the late 
1950s were the observations of a French Dominican priest, Louis-Joseph Lebret who in the 
early 1940s had founded the ‘Economy and Humanism’ movement advocating the need to ‘put 
back the economy at the service of man’. The initiation of economic development across the 
third world would allow the resolution of the social contradictions generated by capitalism and 
avoid the expansion of communism. Lebret visited Colombia in 1956, which he recognised as 
another case of correlation between unequal economic development and rebellious violence. 
Consequentially, he proposed that the military should perform civil and socioeconomic duties. 
Following Lebret’s recommendations, Army CoS General Alberto Ruiz Novoa in 1962 
expressed the view that, ‘the defence against communism does not essentially reside in the 
force of arms; it rests in the elimination of social inequality following the democratic and 
Christian norms that are found in the encyclicals.’72 During a time of religious revival, amid 
the Second Vatican Council which in part drew inspiration from Lebret’s work, the 
appreciation of the concept of economic and material progress as a universal remedy for 
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communism gained important weight within the military, especially for those like Ruiz Novoa 
who promoted the notion of the material causes of violence. It enhanced in them the belief that 
pursuing military enterprises, which combined force with social deeds would enlighten the 
Colombian peasantry and liberate it from Communism. ‘Humanity is facing an inexorable 
dilemma: Christ or Marx. From our future actions it will depend if the people of Colombia opts 
for the formulae of Christ and rejects the monstrous scam of the sombre and messianic 
philosopher,’ Ruiz Novoa explained.73 In such a context, the use of the military instrument in 
a civilising enterprise placing emphasis on the utilisation of other means rather than force to 
confront the nascent insurgencies, found a strong ideological basis for the development of 
strategy during the first half of 1960s.  
However, by the 1970s, with the height of the NSD as a new canon for conducting 
counter-insurgency, the Catholic element in military thinking took another turn. It expanded in 
opposition to the ‘hearts and minds’ approach of the proponents of Civic Action during the 
climatic years of The Alliance for Progress. First, there was a determination for more 
autonomous and energetic action from the military instrument, given the fears of a potential 
abandonment from the US, as it had done, in the opinion of many soldiers, with Vietnam and 
Iran.74 These fears, following the arguments of Michael McClintock, were evidently 
incentivised by what many of them considered to be the Carter’s administration ‘human rights 
pontification’ that resulted in a decision to curtail military aid.75  As McClintock also argues, 
the vacuum produced by the diminishing of overt advisory and material requirement by US 
assistance was filled by Argentina, Israel and France.76 Second, following from this previous 
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point, Latin American militaries began to view themselves as the last bastion of Christian 
civilisation in face of what they considered was the moral decay of the West and the advance 
of Marxism Leninism, which had even ‘contaminated’ the Catholic church with the advent of 
liberation theology.77 But as Douglas Porch has shown, this brutal dimension of ‘civilising’ 
thinking in Latin American counter-insurgency can be traced to the early 1960s, with the influx 
to Argentina of French veterans, many of them radicalized anti-communists that had 
participated in the Organisation de l’armée secrète, and who worked as military advisers 
helping to outline the doctrines of Southern Cone military regimes which used these teachings 
to confront the growth of the new urban insurgencies like the Montoneros or Tupamaros. 
Considering ‘subversives’ as irredeemable enemies, for soldiers the conduct of counter-
insurgency took the form of a total war that validated the use of brutal force.78  It became a 
struggle between good and evil in which military action should not have limitations in 
removing the sources of the threat, even if it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe given 
the supposed pervasiveness of communism within the civilian population.79 The 
systematisation of these ideas in the Southern Cone were conducive to Operación Condor, that 
possessed a strongly internationalist dimension and led to close military collaboration across 
the continent.80  
These ideas took hold in the Colmil, mainly as a result of the intensification of the 
conflict from the mid-1970s, which led officers to encourage the adoption of many of the 
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precepts of NSD to face what they considered to be an imminent threat to the survival of the 
state by these internal enemies. The military leadership’s petitions were duly accepted by Julio 
Cesar Turbay, president from 1978 to 1982, who decreed one of the most severe states of 
emergency’s in the history of the conflict. Turbay’s administration put in place a ‘National 
Security Statute’ which systematised the requests of the military to enable them to repress the 
‘subversives’ with all means at their disposal, and, nip the international communist conspiracy 
that guided them in the bud. But let us see in more detail how these effects of the NSD, that is 
the reading of subversion and insurgency as a conspiracy against Western civilization and 
ideals, shaped the Colmil’s judgements about the use of force.   
A first point to make is that Colmil officers from the mid-1970s based themselves on 
their southern peers, and even justified their decision to remove civilian government and 
establish military rule. They would consider this to be the last resort to prevent the triumph of 
the insurgents and to protect ‘civilisation’. ‘In many nations the military assumed power against 
their constitutional mandates and political traditions, in order to protect them’ wrote General 
Landazábal in 1982.81 However, the Colombians did not get close to intervening in politics in 
the same fashion and create a ‘National Security State’, despite how vocal and politicised some 
officers became. Civil-military tensions, were nonetheless, acute during the unpopular 
Government of Liberal Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1970-74).82 In fact, the President had feared 
a coup d’état against him directed by Army CoS General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, who had been 
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very critical of the president’s policy towards the ELN in the aftermath of Operacion Anorí in 
1973.83 The Colmil leadership has generally argued that the government of Lopez Michelsen 
robbed them of a definite military victory against the ELN, as the political decision not to offer 
the military the resources to consolidate the area of influence of that insurgency, after the armed 
resistance of the guerrillas had been reduced in the Anorí area, had in their view allowed the 
enemy to relocate and gather new strength. 84 When the ELN began to mount an urban terrorism 
campaign, which included an exponential rise in cases of kidnappings and retaliatory attacks 
against high-ranking officers that had participated in Operación Anorí, the Colmil’s patience 
with Lopez Michelsen began to break.85 Eventually, in a strong public letter addressed to the 
president, the military leadership (33 high ranking generals and admirals) articulated their 
discontent with the state of national security, demanding that the administration take immediate 
action to confront the rise in crime and terrorist activity According to the interpretation of US 
officials, the Colmil’s declaration ‘implied that if the government proved unwilling or 
incapable of preserving the peace, the armed forces would.’86 Cornered by the Colmil’s brass, 
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ELN,’ in, Glenda Martínez (ed.), Hablan los generales, pp.145-171; Porch, Counterinsurgency, p.238. 
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Accessed via: DNSA. 
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Lopez Michelsen allowed them to map out the emergency measures that seven months later, 
President Turbay would officially adopt in the form of the ‘National Security Statute.’ 87  
The second point, hence, is that at least operationally Colmil officers would discover in 
the experience, of say the Argentinian or Brazilian militaries, answers to confront the escalating 
urban violence of the M-19 and the ELN in the late 1970s. To preserve the nation from 
communism, the set of tactics and procedures promoted by NSD were to be articulated in the 
said ‘National Security Statute’ that demanded, almost in Ludendorff’s terms, to place all the 
existing moral, physical and material forces at the service of the war.88 This line of thinking 
paved the way for the more brutal side of the civilising mission, where the removal of the threat 
by force was seen as expedient to secure the survival of the Christian way of life, in opposition 
to the attempts of the early 1960s to assimilate those contaminated by communism by 
manipulating their structures of incentives through a mixture of coercion and social deeds. And 
as it occurred in the Southern Cone, the implicit commitment to a dogma of the value of armed 
force as the only useful tool to protect civilisation, eventually served to open the chapter of the 
‘dirty war’, with the utilisation of all the instruments of power available at the disposal of the 
military – legal and illegal – to exterminate the enemy. One of these instruments was an 
enhanced intelligence gathering apparatus acting in counter-subversion role with no adequate 
constraints or legal accountability.89 Military force was to operate without constraints, 
facilitating the institutionalisation of torture, collective punishments and the proliferation of 
paramilitary forces. In Colombia, it included an expansion of the Colmil’s prerogatives in the 
implementation of martial law between 1978 and 1982, which allowed them to detain anyone 
suspect of subversive activities. But chiefly, under the totalising influence of the NSD, the 
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military sustained the need to facilitate national mobilisation and pressed for laws that allowed 
using the civilian population to contribute for the ‘reestablishment of public order’.  By the 
turn of the 1970s, General Landazábal asserted: ‘Our proposal has to be clear, simple, and 
widely known, to work shoulder to shoulder with those in civilian clothes to achieve their 
security, the continuous progress of the nation, and the establishment of peace.’90  Whilst the 
existence of self-defence groups, to be controlled and supervised by the Colmil, was authorised 
by law since 1965, it was only with the NSD that it took major effect, when the government 
began to allow their proliferation to serve as proxies for the military.91 But as expected, these 
groups were to be forced to their logical military end of removing the communist threat by 
force. The self-defence groups (referred to as paramilitaries since the 1980s when they became 
autonomous organizations financed by drug traffickers) began to be used as means to collect 
intelligence, to conduct military operations, but also as force multipliers, in the form of death-
squads with the purpose of ‘cleaning up’ anyone suspected of being a communist or an 
insurgent collaborator.92   
Indeed, distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants became challenging 
for the Colmil as a result of the influence of the NSD. This was particularly the case in the mid-
1980s, in the aftermath of Betancur’s peace negotiations because with the acquiescence of the 
government, the FARC and the Communist Party were allowed to create a legal political 
platform to participate in local and national elections.  Known as the Union Patriotica (Patriotic 
Union), the group became the target of a systematic campaign of annihilation, after the peace 
process backfired, which concluded with the murder of over 3,000 people between 1986 and 
1990 in the hands of the paramilitary death-squads who connived with sections of the Colmil.93  
                                                          






The fact is that for many in the military, these ‘unarmed subversives’ were as dangerous as 
their armed confréres in the guerrillas, as they worked together in the advancement of a 
revolutionary strategy that combined all means of struggle, violent and non-violent – the 
Colombian version of Vietnamese Dau tranh.94  As the Minister of Defence declared in 1988, 
‘subversive groups act openly in national politics when they find it convenient, and when it 
does not, and they go into hiding under the indifferent eye of the Colombian people.’95  
The havoc generated by the paramilitary groups, and the fact that many began to ally 
themselves with the growing drug mafias, led the Colombian government to proscribe them in 
1988. For many in the Colmil, this was considered a step backward, which was influenced 
amongst other things by a ‘Human-rights agenda’ that had been usurped by insurgent 
supporters on the political left to weaken its operational capacity, and reduce the government’s 
resolve to deal effectively with the insurgent problem.96  For example, when the FARC 
escalated its offensive in the mid-1990s, the Chief of the Armed Forces Harold Bedoya, in a 
speech built on the communist conspiracy narrative that grew with the NSD, explained the need 
to re-establish these groups:  
[…]Colombian narco-terrorists have been able to transform from accused to accusers. In 
the past they were able to evade the military justice that was applied against them with 
rigour, and presently they pretend to weaken the military by appropriating the banner of 
Human Rights and hangout to dry the soldiers that have defended the State and society with 
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valour […] If legitimate individual self-defence is founded in natural law, with more reason 
there is a right to collective defence; even though narco-subversives and their coryphaeus 
criticise it. Because of this it would be convenient that the legislative branch considers the 
possibility of re-establishing in the Constitution national militias. They are the most 
democratic expression of the political community, as they are organisations that come from 
society itself for the purpose of its own defence, and their member do not lose their civilian 
nature and become collaborators of the military forces.97 
 
Clearly, from what has been discussed, it is possible to conclude that the civilising 
dimension in the military’s thinking has been a powerful influence in moulding the Colmil’s 
understanding of the nature of the conflict as well as its judgements about the value of the use 
of force.  But this influence was not homogenous and shaped the development of the two 
divergent views about the utilisation of the military instrument. It played a crucial role in the 
analysis of those officers who promoted other means than violence for the achievement of 
victory over communism, but also in shaping the totalising mind-set of those who judged that 
unconstrained physical force was the sole instrument able to defeat an existential threat. This 
latter vision, evidenced in the statements of General Bedoya during the 1990s, for example, 
spawned from the conspiracy rhetoric that gained momentum with the NSD.  Finally, the 
civilising mission also helps to explain the consolidation of a rationalist framework of analysis 
for the military.  This permits an explanation for the appeal of inflexible doctrines and the 
fixation with operational solutions in the context of the ascendancy of counter-insurgency 
thinking since the early 1960s as will be analysed in later chapters.  
A long engagement with limited objectives - The Colombian military relationship with 
the US  
A longstanding historical relationship with the US has heavily influenced Colombia’s strategic 
outlook and its responsiveness to continued military assistance. Indeed, it is necessary to 
recognise that the association between the countries goes far beyond Plan Colombia. ‘The 
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Colombian army has been the United States’ staunchest ally, I mean the staunchest. There’s 
practically been a direct line of communication between the Colombian and the US Army,’ 
claimed General Landazábal in the early 1990s.98 Such a view may well encapsulate what 
Douglas Porch and Christopher Muller defined as the ‘Colombian military’s emotional 
dependence on US support’ during the five decade long engagement in counter-insurgency. 99 
The growth of a shared view within the Colmil that the US has been their main ally in the 
conflict was produced in part by the historic tension between soldiers and politicians, which 
reinforced, particularly with the escalation of violence since the 1970s, the notion that it had 
been abandoned by the government in the fight against the nation’s insurgent enemies. The 
Colmil’s characterisation of the relationship with the US in terms of a vital alliance, has 
undoubtedly placed Washington as an essential actor in its structure of incentives for its 
definition of ends and selection of means. Washington has been viewed as a basis of political 
will and resources for pursuing specific courses of action by the Colmil, at times against the 
wishes of their civilian masters.100  
In this regard, the relationship between the Colombians and the US highlights the 
importance of interdependency in strategic formulation. In planning a course of action, it is not 
only necessary to consider the behaviour of the adversary. Depending on the circumstances, if 
more actors are involved, it will be necessary also to take into account the interests and 
behaviour of allies in order to advance one’s goals effectively. This poses challenges because 
there might be discrepancies between the priorities of an actor and those of his allies.  But 
clearly, to trace and analyse the development of US military policy in Colombia exhaustively 
goes far beyond the goal of this research. The intention here is to give a brief general 
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background of the longstanding relationship. This will allow the identification of key themes 
for a more considered assessment of US influence on Colombian military strategy in the period 
studied in later chapters.  
In 1939, the Colombians welcomed for the first time US military advisors and 
instructors to the War Department and the Military School, to replace the German military 
mission that had been active since the beginning of the decade. Ever since, their presence in 
the country became a permanent feature. Initially, with the objective of securing the Panama 
Canal and preventing further German encroachment in the looming world war, the US 
concluded that Colombia could not be neglected and assumed an active policy of military 
assistance that promptly lured the Colombians to its side.101  Up to the late 1950s, US defence 
policy towards Colombia was based on the precepts of hemispheric defence, which emphasised 
the strengthening of the ‘conventional’ capabilities of the military and modernisation under 
American military parameters of organisation, training and doctrine.102 Again, the US was 
focused on protecting the Panama Canal, this time against possible diversionary attacks from 
the Soviet Union, a mission for which they trusted the Colombians could assist. 
For its part, the Colombian army’s participation in the Korean War helped to strengthen 
the close relationship, and paved the way for the consolidation of a ‘Military Assistance 
Program’ that secured a constant flow of resources during the 1950s. Moreover, Colombian 
participation in the war activated the direct line of communication between both militaries, 
cherished especially by General Landazábal. Effectively, with the escalation of La Violencia, 
the returning Korea war veterans began to utilise their contacts with the US not only to expedite 
assistance in terms of material, training and planning, but also as political support for their 
strategies vis-à-vis the Colombian government. Assistance by the US military in training had, 
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by the end of the decade, assisted the Colombians fairly well in professionalising its cadres. 
According to a report of the British embassy in Bogotá relating a visit of the itinerant military 
attaché to the Escuela Militar and other service schools in the spring of 1959, ‘the organisation 
of studies both military and academic, and of practical military training, drawn up by the 
American mission, seemed excellent.’103 
As will be analysed in detail in Chapter 4, the priorities of the US towards Latin 
America soon changed with the advent of the Cuban revolution. Washington then concluded 
that the region would not be a target in a conventional war, but rather that it would fall victim 
to subversion.  This meant a change in the nature of military cooperation and furthered the 
transition from hemispheric defence to counter-insurgency, a process that although securing 
the increase in aid, would also generate serious tensions within the Colmil in its process of 
strategic formulation during the following years.  In essence, the reformulation of US strategic 
priorities across time towards Latin America and Colombia in particular, and the subsequent 
change in shape and magnitude of defence and security aid had a decided influence on the 
Colombian military’s definition of ends and the selection of means in the conflict.   
Since the early 1960s, the US offered aid to improve coordination and planning, 
intelligence gathering, communications mobility and other operational capabilities of the 
military. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) were dispatched to instruct and advise the 
Colombians, while many officers and NCOs were sent to US training facilities, in particular 
the School of the Americas at the Panama Canal Zone.104 The training and the prompt 
availability of technically advanced capabilities in the early stages of the conflict clearly 
improved the operational proficiency against the insurgents, and were to produce a definite 
effect in the strategic analysis of the military during the remainder of the decade. In particular, 
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the more kinetic minded sections of the Colmil were prone to appraise technical prowess as the 
means to prevail in the conflict, whilst for others the shift to counter-insurgency was understood 
as a broader political endeavour, beyond the adaptation of the armed instrument to a new modus 
operandi. In this respect, a key US influence for the Colmil was the rise of modernisation theory 
via the Alliance for Progress.  The officers of the ‘Korean’ school concluded that the conflict 
had social and economic causes, and hence were eager, not only to transform the Colombian 
military into a modern fighting force following the emerging techniques of ‘special warfare’, 
but also to perform national development tasks as a means to defeat the insurgents.105 But as 
soon as the political context that gave rise to the Alliance for Progress faded at the end of the 
decade, there were no more incentives for assuming a military state-building endeavour, even 
if it was still considered by the ‘Korean’ school to be the correct strategic course of action.  
Having said this, a crucial point to keep in mind is that the objectives of the US in 
Colombia at the height of the Kennedy years with the growing fears of communist revolution 
taking place in the country, were still of a limited nature. In a speech at Fort Bragg in June 
1961, which was considered at the time to be a statement of official policy, the President’s 
advisor on the subject, Walt Rostow, made clear that although the US was prepared to offer 
considerable help, the main burden of fighting would have to be borne by those ‘on the spot’, 
the indigenous force of the threatened country. Whilst, for analysts, this evidenced an incipient 
dilemma, particularly for places like Vietnam in terms of keeping the burden of the fighting 
upon indigenous forces and meeting the threat of external communist intervention by other 
powers, in places like Colombia, the strategic situation seemed more favourable. Chiefly, the 
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military and security forces were considered of good quality and the political institutions solid 
enough which meant that the Colombians could, in principle, handle the problem themselves.106  
During the 1970s, the emergence of the NSD recommended a framework for the 
conduct of counter-insurgency that inevitably downgraded the state-building narrative for 
diverse reasons as has been discussed. Precisely, the NSD marked the shift from a population-
centric to an enemy-centric approach.107 In this respect, given Washington’s desire to maintain 
its level of influence in the country and avoid competition from other powers as suppliers of 
aid, the US continued to offer foundational military training to the Colombians, which still 
served as the essential operational base for its application.108 But by then, the extent of the US 
military assistance to Colombia responded to Washington’s own strategic goals in the region, 
which were in essence limited to those stated at the onset of the 1960s. As Jeffrey Michaels has 
argued, the nature of US counter-insurgency assistance would remain remarkably similar 
through the end of the Cold War, and during the 1970s. In his opinion, the so called ‘Nixon 
Doctrine’ which was formulated at the time was in essence the continuity of the policy priorities 
of the US over the previous decade, which was, ‘playing mostly small-scale indirect advisory 
and assistance role in dozens of countries faced with a “subversive insurgent” threat’.109 
The prevention of communist takeover in Colombia would not require the ultimate 
defeat of the insurgency. Rather, the goal would be to stabilise the country which set the 
reasonable limit of the effort to basic training, provision of material and military academic 
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exchanges. As the embassy in Bogotá reminded DoS officials at the time, the agreed objectives 
in the country, as contained in the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) for the years 
1968-1974, discarded the objective of ‘elimination of the insurgency during the timeframe’ as 
its main policy goal, and, shifted to the ‘reduction of the insurgency to levels which permit 
accelerated democratic political, social and economic development.’110 The limitation of the 
objectives by the country team was due to two factors: first, that the Colmil was considered 
capable of containing the problem, and could at times inflict damage on the guerrillas; 
secondly, that the several guerrilla groups could still inflict damage at places and areas of their 
own choosing where the security forces presence was weak, but that could not take over the 
country or pose a serious threat to the government. In short, by the turn of the decade, 
Washington was certain that the continued assistance during the 1960s had achieved its purpose 
as the CASP apprised: 
The Colombians are satisfied that their present tactical military concepts are effective 
and are moving toward eliminating the guerrilla threat. The insurgency threat is 
manageable and gives little evidence of having the potential to increase markedly. The 
possibility that Cuba will attempt to increase greatly its material assistance to 
Colombian guerrillas with sea and air shipments or introducing of personnel is believed 
minimal.111 
 
Indeed, even at the height of the Cold War, or the ‘drug war’ in the mid-1990s and even 
in the wake of the 9/11 ‘Global War on Terror’ mantra, the FARC insurgency has not been 
recognised by Washington as an existential national security threat. In short, through the 
decades, different US administrations have made it clear that Colombians are the ones who 
have to assume primary responsibility for the financing and maintenance of their own security. 
This was the basic assumption of Kennedy’s counter-insurgency policy, as stated by Rostow 
in 1961, and transcended in time, to influence the formulation of Plan Colombia in 1999. Given 
                                                          
110 US Embassy to DoS, ‘ Notes on Current Internal Security Situation in Colombia’, 29 October 1968, RG 59, 




the political context and the unique circumstances of the conflict, the only policy option for 
Washington towards Colombia has been, using contemporary parlance, ‘small footprint’ advice 
and training teams. Whereas the US army entered into a wide-ranging engagement with the 
Afghan National Army, the US did not have to build up a new indigenous force in Colombia. 
The objective of US assistance in Colombia over the past 15 years was, as it was framed during 
the transition to counter-insurgency in the 1960s, focused on improving clear-cut operational 
deficiencies of an established and functional military force capable of bearing the brunt of the 
responsibility.112 As the US Southern Command concluded, the assistance simply aimed for 
the Colombians to better shape ‘their operating environment to conduct decisive joint 
operations by virtue of improved training and modernisation’.113 
Conclusion: Themes in the development of Colmil thinking 
  
This chapter has aimed to set out the foundations of the strategic tradition of the Colmil. It 
attempted to analyse the principal components of its value-system, to explore how they have 
manifested themselves over the years, and how they consolidated the military’s thought. The 
themes analysed have been central in shaping the Colombian’s motivational and ideological 
core. In this sense, they have been fundamental in determining the definition of the ends and 
the selection of means to achieve them with Colmil’s strategic planning. 
However, it is important to note that the influence exerted by these different elements 
has not been uniform throughout time. The importance of each theme has varied, as well as the 
interaction between them, depending on changing circumstances in the history of the conflict. 
Some of these factors could be, for example, the escalation or de-escalation of insurgent 
activity, the changing political demands from part of the civilian government or the pressures 
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and incentives coming from abroad. The attempt to characterise the defining elements in 
Colmil thought has also allowed the identification of the tensions produced in the process of 
their strategic formulation. Noteworthy are the frictions in military planning produced by the 
evolution of differing, not to say contradicting, views with regard to the utilisation of the armed 
instrument. With these points in mind, the themes which have been developed in this chapter 
will serve as the main analytical platform on which to base the evaluation of the way the 









LA VIOLENCIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY STRATEGIC TRADITION, 
1948-1958 
 
So far the thesis has focused on dissecting the main elements that constitute the Colmil’s 
strategic tradition. In other words, it has explored the themes that have informed the military’s 
distinct understandings of the nature of the conflict, its differing attitudes toward civilian 
authority and varied judgments about the instrumentality of force. The analysis will now 
address the evolution of the military’s thought through different stages of the internal conflict 
and assess the bearing these influences have had across time. The following chapter will focus 
on the experience of the Colmil during the early stages of La Violencia, the name given to the 
undeclared war between the Liberal and Conservative parties that raged from 1948 until 
resolved by political compromise in 1958 and which left more than 200,000 dead. The general 
aim is to explore the evolution of various debates about the instrumentality of force that arose 
as a result of Colmil experience at this stage of the conflict and analyse the influence they 
would have on the delineation of the differing strategic perspectives vis-à-vis the emergence of 
communist insurgencies during the 1960s. 
The official starting date of La Violencia is commonly considered to be 9 April 1948, 
the day when the Liberal opposition leader and presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was 
murdered in broad daylight in Bogotá’s High Street. A populist and social agitator who 
represented the left-wing of his party, Gaitán had become a symbol for the rising working class 
and appeared to be shoo-in for the next presidential election.1 His murder sparked an abortive 
revolution against Conservative rule which left the capital semi-destroyed and resulted in 
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thousands of casualties. The insurrection that followed the murder of the opposition leader 
marked the intensification of a violent confrontation between the Liberal and Conservative 
parties which had been running since 1946, when the conservatives returned to presidency and 
installed a minority government that began to systematically repress liberal supporters. The 
situation was particularly difficult in areas were the Liberals had majority, as the ‘winner-take-
all’ logic of the political system produced a forceful competition at the local level for the 
retention and distribution of power. As former Liberal President Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo 
reflected, the assumption that it was ‘the legitimate right of the victor in the political battle to 
make of the public administration a sort of booty of war, and carrying the system to its 
extremes, to prevent the defeated party from recovering its position led to open battle.’ 2 
On 9 April the government of President Mariano Ospina hung by a thread as the liberal 
leaning metropolitan police joined the rioters who threatened to seize the presidential palace 
and depose him. The insurrection in Bogotá was only beaten off after the intervention of the 
army, with tanks cordoning the palace and the prompt arrival of reinforcements, which allowed 
the imposition of martial law in the city.  Military steadfastness at the wake of the insurrection 
allowed President Ospina to apply far-reaching emergency decrees that included the suspension 
of parliamentary bodies at the national and local level, press censorship, prohibition of all 
public gatherings and the placement of more 200 municipalities under direct military rule, 
granting soldiers full powers to court martial any crime against the state.  These emergency 
measures were to be maintained until 1958. The 9 April insurrection also expanded to other 
parts of the country, as immediately after the murder of Gaitán, supporters of the Liberal leader 
took control of radio stations and transmitted confused messages across the country announcing 
the fall of the Conservative government. As a result, Juntas Revolucionarias (revolutionary 
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boards) were installed in various, pre-eminently Liberal, towns, some of them holding out 
against the army and pro-conservative armed groups for as long as a month.3  Many of the 
insurrectionists who were able to eventually flee the military’s counter-offensive of the spring 
of 1948 in the regions where the Liberals had great ascendancy, particularly in Los Llanos 
orientales (eastern-plains) and Tolima department in the central cordillera, would form the first 
nuclei of guerrilla groups which began to organise and expand with the objective of 
overthrowing the Conservative regime of Laureano Gómez during the early 1950s.4  
After the Ospina government regained control of the volatile situation in the capital, the 
violence began to spread in heavily politically disputed areas in the countryside, with Liberal 
guerrillas frequently attacking conservative armed groups and vice-versa, including burning of 
villages and crops or staging exemplary massacres. The escalating violence notwithstanding, 
presidential elections were planned for November 1949. Conservative death-squads using 
terrorist tactics, attempted in key swing-departments to literally cleanse electoral districts of 
liberal voters.5 Given the complicated security situation, the Liberal party declared that free 
elections were not guaranteed and decided to abstain from presenting a candidate, a move that 
assured the continuation of conservative rule for another term. The decision of the opposition 
party to boycott the elections, according to historian Marco Palacios, marked the start of what 
can be termed the second stage of La Violencia, the closest the country came to a full-fledged 
civil war. The conflict began to escalate when the authoritarian Conservative party leader, 
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Laureano Gómez, assumed the presidency, in response to which the liberal guerrillas expanded 
and began an armed campaign to remove him from power.6  
Gómez, who ruled from August 1950 until his fall in June 1953, returned from exile in 
Spain where he had escaped after the 9 April revolution in time for the elections. An admirer 
of Francisco Franco, he continuously mirrored Colombia’s conflict with the Spanish civil war. 
With a staunch anti-communist discourse, he claimed that the Liberal party resembled the 
Spanish Republicans, who were promoting a communist inspired revolution in Colombia that 
threatened the existence of Christian civilisation. In his view, this required the Conservative 
party to advance a counter-revolution through the inauguration of an authoritarian Catholic 
corporatist regime, similar to that of Franco or Oliveira Salazar’s in Portugal.7 In this context, 
Liberal leaders became militantly unwilling to accept the presidential election results and 
declared Gómez’s mandate illegitimate. However, they were at odds as to how to remove the 
conservatives from power.8 While moderate party leaders pushed for further abstention and 
civic protest, more militant ones felt that the only outlet of their frustrations was to support the 
organisation of the guerrillas to challenge the Gómez government by force. When Gómez took 
office there were already 10,000 guerrillas in the field, a number that would rise nationally to 
an estimated 20,000 by the end of 1952.9 While there was no official stance by Liberal party 
leaders in Bogotá in support of the guerrillas, there was certainly no disposition to disavow 
armed action against the government given the authoritarian nature of Gómez’s political 
project, explains Palacios.10   
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At the onset of his administration, and despite his belligerent discourse which presented 
violence in terms of a confrontation for survival against the Liberals, Gómez did not declare 
war on the opposition party or the guerrillas that acted in their name. In fact, the administration 
simply criminalised the guerrillas, considering them mere ‘bandits’ that had to be dealt with 
accordingly. Consequently, Gómez forced the most militant Liberal leaders to exile, and in 
particular those who advocated strong-arm tactics, while the rest attempted an accommodation 
with his regime. If anything, the most explicit statement by the Gómez administration about its 
intentions to utilise force as the main tool to deal with any increased liberal armed opposition 
came via his Minister of Justice who declared that ‘the democratic institutions, the authority of 
the President, and the essential elements of order and stability of the State would be defended 
by fire and sword.’11 In general, while the argument of the communist threat offered a clear 
rationale for the government’s logic to have the military intervene, this did not translate into 
clear aims about what the administration wanted to achieve with the use of force. Under 
Gómez’s Spanish civil war analogy, which converted the liberal armed opposition into an 
existential threat, was his aim to deliver a crushing blow on the enemy as Franco had done? Or 
were his aims more limited, and in this sense, he simply aimed to compel the Liberals and its 
armed supporters to cease violence and accept the status-quo?   
The criminalisation of the guerrillas, with the purpose of reducing the character of the 
threat and give a sense of political normality, engendered serious problems at the level of 
strategic formulation in the conflict. The Gómez administration’s parlance was vague and 
confusing because parallel to the definition of the Colmil’s function as an internal policing 
body under the vague notion of ‘public order maintenance’, the pugnacious discourse which 
defined La Violencia in terms of a war of survival meant that there was no clear definition of 
the goals to be achieved with the armed instrument. This was problematic for the Colmil 
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because from a strategic perspective, by not having a clear political purpose, the use of force, 
even if proficiently applied, would not serve to achieve anything at all.    
After the fall of Laureano Gómez’s regime, the Colmil argued that the lack of adequate 
political conduct of the armed instrument during his tenure was at the heart of the coup.  As 
Richard Maullin, a RAND analyst writing on Colombian military politics in the 1970s, 
explained, the Colmil’s consent to Rojas taking over the Presidency was explained in part by 
the escalation of hostilities in the first half of 1953. This episode, argued Maullin, marked a 
shift in the understanding of the Colmil’s role in the civil war.12 It was in particular the officers 
who were returning from Korea who began to consider the military should stop its attempt to 
forcefully suppress the armed opposition to the government by acting as a belligerent, but rather 
that the Colmil should become an arbiter in the Conservative – Liberal feuding.13 However, as 
the chapter will argue, a view that the Gómez administration was mishandling the conflict and 
that force was being applied indiscriminately, was at the source of more nuanced reactions by 
other officers who considered that a limited modification of the objectives to be sought by the 
military, as well of the level of effort required to put an end to the conflict could bring success.  
The first section of this chapter, which deals with the politics of the Colmil between 
1948 and 1953, will explain the origin of these tensions in more detail.  What is palpable is that 
the concern over the poor guidance of the Colmil appeared in the context of the growing 
intractability of the conflict in the region of the eastern-plains.  Known in Spanish as Los Llanos 
orientales, this region of more than 150,000 km² that stretches from the piedmont of the eastern 
cordillera to the frontier with Venezuela was the major centre of hostilities during the Gómez 
administration, as it was the base of the most well organised liberal insurgency that opposed 
his rule. After three years of continuous efforts to crush the guerrillas, the military effort did 
                                                          




not produce any tangible results, violence intensified in other more densely populated areas of 
the country. This gave rise to growing anxieties over Gómez leadership within the Colmil.   
However, as will be discussed in the second section of the chapter, the misgivings over political 
control over the armed instrument served to justify later attempts to change the Colmil 
approach to one less based on force, and hence, marked the beginning of the debate over the 
value of armed force that since La Violencia has shaped the Colmil strategic tradition.   
As a result of the intractability of the conflict with the guerrillas and the ensuing 
political polarisation in June 1953, disaffected members of Gómez’s cabinet and officers of the 
Colmil General Staff successfully conspired to depose the President. On June 13, Chief of the 
Armed Forces General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed the presidency with almost universal 
acclaim and called for the end of the ‘fratricidal violence’ via a ‘subordination of narrow 
political interests to the higher ideals of national union and reconciliation.’14 The third section 
of the chapter will explore the initial policy formulation of the Rojas regime to put a closure to 
La Violencia. It will analyse how aspects of the pacification effort via a National Reconciliation 
Plan, which favoured less coercive means, impacted on Colmil thinking, even if at the end his 
effort failed to put an end to the conflict.  
Those who supported the arrival of General Rojas to power believed that his role as 
arbiter would last only until 7 August 1954, when free elections would take place as initially 
promised. That proved unrealistic. After less than a year in power, Rojas attempted to 
consolidate his rule thanks to the growing popular kudos he gained by the improvement in 
security conditions with the early success of his reconciliation plan.15 So, he began to pursue 
his own political agenda which aimed at creating a ‘Government of the Armed Forces’, with a 
peculiar nationalistic ideology drawn from the figure of Simón Bólivar. To legitimise it, he 
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utilised the Constitutional Assembly which Gómez had created to proceed with his corporatist 
reform, maintaining many of the ideological aspects of the deposed President’s agenda.16 
Rojas’ political project was an experiment of military populism, resembling ‘Peronismo’ in 
Argentina that ended with the alienation of the civilian politicians that brought him to power, 
and generated opposition within the sectors of the Colmil who had assumed that military rule 
would end once  law and order ad been re-established.  Opposition also intensified as he 
eventually increased the measures of the state-of–emergency, including a more restrictive press 
censorship decree and the proscription of communism, a move that even Laureano Gómez had 
not taken, and which translated in the repression of all forms of left wing activism.17 This 
marked the beginning of the rupture with the political parties and particularly with the Liberal 
party, which had played an instrumental role in legitimising the coup, and which served as an 
intermediary between the regime and the guerrillas to de-escalate violence, as a gesture to 
advance toward the reestablishment of democracy. Nonetheless, Rojas promptly accused the 
Liberals of being ‘intellectual guerrillas promoting soviet infiltration’ when  armed groups 
began to regroup in the country side, and university students began protesting and organising 
riots with a great deal of low level violence across the three major cities of Colombia.18 
Part of the growing discontent of the Colmil with the General Supremo, as Rojas began 
calling himself since early 1955, was to a great extent related to the mismanagement of the 
rehabilitation effort, which was understood as a lack of commitment to the execution of a state-
building strategy.  When the General announced his unilateral decision to extend his mandate 
until 1962, his continuity in power became unsustainable.  By the end of 1956, he had lost the 
confidence of the Colmil’s chiefs who began to conspire against him. Rojas was promptly sent 
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into exile by a Military Junta in January 1957, which ultimately opened the door to a transition 
to civilian rule. Paradoxically, by bringing together the opposition to his regime, Rojas paved 
the way for the establishment of a power sharing agreement between conservatives and liberals 
known as the National Front, which in the end served to put an end to the conflict.  
The politics of the Colmil in the aftermath of 9 April 1948 – the road to General 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s military coup 
 
Since the events of 9 April, the conservatives had been encouraging the army General Staff to 
make the Colmil the main bulwark of the government, mainly by stressing the cause of anti-
communism which was not alien to their ideological core. The ruling party had been advancing 
the claim that the murder of Gaitán and the subsequent insurrection was a product of an 
international communist conspiracy with two purposes. Firstly, to sabotage the inauguration of 
the Ninth Pan-American conference in which the Organization of American States (OAS) was 
officially formed, and secondly, to generate enough chaos to bring down the Conservative 
government. The original official position was then echoed by one of the most important 
foreign delegates to the Bogotá conference, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who 
declared emphatically that the insurrection was ‘manifestly Communist, and that the Ninth 
Conference should continue since the contrary would mean giving in to communism in the 
battle for Latin America’.19 Soon after the situation in Bogotá was stabilised, a thorough 
investigation conducted by Scotland Yard hired by President Ospina, proved that the murder 
of Gaitán was a private affair.20 As a result, the Department of State changed its position and 
concluded that the revolt was not communist inspired. In fact, the roots of the 9 April revolt 
were to be found in the context of the Conservative-Liberal strife, US officials concluded. 
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Nonetheless they stressed that local ‘Reds’ had taken advantage of the chaos produced by the 
popular revolt to pursue their agenda. 21 It was in the context of the growing Cold War divide, 
with mounting anxieties over the Soviet Union’s potential to encroach upon Latin America, 
that the Colmil commanders committed to the protection of the Conservative government and 
the need to repress by force any subversive manifestations against it at the wake of the 9 April 
revolt.  
Despite the official enquiry’s findings on Gaitán’s murder and the 9 April revolt, which 
President Ospina hoped would de-escalate the conflict, rightist militants particularly those 
close to Conservative leader Laureano Gómez’s corporatist wing, kept looking for a political 
motivation behind the events. They incessantly fixed the blame on a communist plot directed 
by the Liberal party to overthrow the government.22 Indeed, this mainstream Conservative 
interpretation of La Violencia as another theatre of the nascent East-West confrontation 
included a tenuous attempt by Gómez and his supporters to equate Colombian liberalism with 
the threat of communism. The argument would shape the future administration’s behaviour 
toward the opposition party, paving the way for increased repression. The goal was to force the 
members of the Liberal party to submit to the Gomez regime’s will and consolidate the 
corporatist agenda. In a press conference José María Bernal, War Minister, presented the 
official position that justified the use of the Colmil against the Liberals that challenged 
conservative rule, hence, clearly defining the nature of the enemy: 
International communism attacks the free world by adjusting to the conditions of every country, 
adopting the most adequate denomination to accomplish its purposes. In the case of Colombia, 
at least in appearance, it operates at will under the banner of liberalism. Its members serve the 
interests of Soviet Russia, financing armed guerrilla groups to overthrow the legitimate 
government.23  
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The argument that communism acted in accordance with the Liberal party against the 
traditional Colombian way of life, served the Gómez government in its early days in attempting 
to create a climate which guaranteed Colmil’s loyalty to his reactionary political goals. 
Gómez’s intentions in this regard were made plain during his inauguration, when he promised 
to strengthen the military’s position as reward for its unremitting defence of Conservative rule 
since 1946.24 He stated on that occasion that ‘the salvation of traditional culture, and the fact 
that our nation does not weep under a communist tyranny is owed to the loyalty and decision 
of the Armed Forces. As reward for such gesture, the people must make sure that its army has 
the adequate technical means to insure its thorough efficacy.’25 President Gómez’s appeal to 
the Colmil motivational core via the rhetoric of anti-communism was one of the ways in which 
he attempted to secure its loyalty, as there was a clear recognition by the administration that 
the consolidation of Conservative rule would depend on the power to repress growing internal 
armed opposition.  Other measures taken by Gómez to secure Colmil loyalty included, for 
example, the initiation of organisational reforms to promote enhanced government control and 
coordination of the military; and, finally, an attempt to gain rapport with the ranks by 
committing to overhaul the Colmil’s capabilities. The rest of this sub-section will address 
Gómez’s political moves, and it will assess how they affected the military’s understanding of 
the conflict and of the employment of the armed instrument.  Ultimately, it will elucidate how 
despite these actions, Gómez’s conduct of the conflict augmented the political disaffection of 
the Colmil with his rule and opened the door to General Rojas’s coup.   
In the first place, the President was putting effort into cultivating the favour of the 
military chiefs despite the fact that his authority was, in principle, guaranteed due to the 
established Colmil tradition of non-interference in politics. Taking no risks, though, the 
                                                          




treatment of officers with personal and family connections with the Liberal party took on the 
aspect of a mild purge in the first year of the administration. While a few senior officers with 
liberal sympathies remained in active duty during Gómez’s mandate, those who showed 
conservative inclinations were evidently favoured by the government.26 Up to mid-1952, 
Gómez demonstrated a high degree of control over the Colmil, which slowly began to fracture 
as a result of the escalation of the conflict. With no military solution in hand against the rebels, 
the disenchantment of the commanders with the President’s leadership grew. The debate soon 
surfaced within sections of the Conservative party and echoed by the Colmil commanders over 
the need to prepare the ground for a negotiated solution, which Gómez was however not willing 
to accept.27 The President eventually lost the confidence of his conservative allies and of the 
Chiefs of Staff of the Colmil who conspired to remove him from the presidency.  
Nonetheless, at the onset of Gómez’s administration, elements of the brutal side of the 
civilising mission theme, as outlined in Chapter 1, help to explain the initial firmness of a 
section of the Colmil’s leadership in accepting the President’s rationale for the use of force.  
Ingrained anti-communism, heightened by the early Cold War tensions, led military chiefs to 
consider that they were undeniably in charge of the defence of western civilisation against local 
agents of an international conspiracy. These enemies posed an existential threat and had to be 
subdued by all necessary means. This perception gained even more ground in Colmil thinking 
from late 1951, as a result of several factors. First, as a result of the increased activity of the 
guerrilla army of Los Llanos. This group, it was believed, had the organisation and capability 
to take control of the region as it had strong support among with the local population. Also it 
was considered well-armed in comparison to the other groups in the country. In addition, the 
group maintained extensive connections in neighbouring Venezuela from where it was 
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receiving material support.28 Moreover, it had a well-developed project to materialise a Liberal 
revolution in the region and from there to expand the movement nationally.  Hence, a second 
factor explaining the loyalty of the Colmil was the expansion of the rebellion against Gómez 
to other areas of the country. Early in 1952 the government calculated that there where guerrilla 
groups of Liberal origin operating in all but 4 of the 15 departments.29  The extension of the 
problem that year led War Minister Bernal to publicly recognise that the existence of a state of 
civil war, and thus, called for the initiation of ‘a holy crusade for peace to wipe out the scourge 
of communism’.30  In mid-July 1952, after/following the largest single loss of the army when 
196 soldiers and two officers died in an ambush in Los Llanos, Bernal stated: 
The Communist hordes, or guerrillas or bands of vandals - as they are often called – only 
understand the language of violence [...] the campaign to end this movement, which attacks 
public peace, will be carried on relentlessly until Colombian territory is rid of those who oppose 
order and prosperity.31   
In this context, the object of the military instrument appeared to be twofold; to destroy 
the guerrilla groups, and to force the population that offered support to the rebels to submit to 
the will of the government, transmitting a clear message about the costs of continued resistance.  
To achieve the latter goal, the government promoted the use of exemplary punitive force, which 
as Huw Bennett explains, can be characterised as a rapid and harsh response to a rebellion by 
punishing the general population in order to dissuade others from rebelling.32 The Colmil in 
Los Llanos was already extensively using different sorts of drastic measures in the aftermath 
of 9 April to attempt to restore law and order. Initially, given the insufficiency in personnel, 
local commanders were ordered to collaborate with a ruthless auxiliary force of Conservative 
militants known as Chulavita, which was deployed by local authorities to terrorise the 
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population suspected of liberal tendencies.33 Yet, there was a reluctance to restrain the excesses 
of this force given that it was not under the Colmil chain of command. The actions of the 
auxiliaries, and the way the Colmil’s association with them affected many officers’ attitude 
towards La Violencia, will be analysed more thoroughly in the next sub-section. 
On the other hand, other initial measures had included the drawing up of population 
census, rationing and blockades, as well as the issue of a ‘warning to all citizens’ decrees that 
considered a bandit anyone who resisted capture, violated a curfew, or carried firearms without 
proper registration. It authorised summary execution wherever considered appropriate by the 
officer in command.34 When analysing the works of influential local military thinkers of the 
era, like Colonel Gustavo Sierra, the use of exemplary force during Gómez tenure clearly bears 
evident similarities with the British ‘small wars’ tradition of the late 19th century, despite the 
lack of direct references to it.  For example, Sierra’s idea that the use of punitive measures 
against the population that supported the rebels would force the guerrillas to fight in the open, 
where they could eventually be destroyed, was already voiced by Charles Calwell in 1896.  If 
the military goal, according to Sierra, was to ‘annihilate and destroy the leaders and groups of 
bandits’, achieving it required to isolate the guerrillas from their base of support: 
In the hostile zones where the population stubbornly resists the plans of the army, it is 
necessary to take drastic measures in administrative and military terms. It is convenient 
to isolate the focos of fighting bandits from the rest of the population, and avoid by all 
means that the latter offer them any support. In this way, the annihilation of the bandits 
can be achieved promptly in the savannahs.35 
However, rather than achieving quick results, repressive measures against the 
population seemed to play against the Colmil. Additionally, the continued resort to punitive 
measures during the campaign seemed to respond more to a desire to retaliate than to seek the 
achievement of military goals. This much is evident, as the level of repression augmented 
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significantly as a result of the army’s tactical setbacks of 1952. As the report of the 
‘Commission of the study of Violence’ recounted in the early 1960s, for example, Colmil 
commanders in the eastern-plains retaliated to the ambush of July 1952 by summarily executing 
hundreds of the prisoners in captivity without any form of trial, and by establishing ‘free zones’ 
where anyone who was spotted was to be shot without warning.36 Correspondingly, there was 
an increase in what has been referred to as Gómez’s ‘scorched-earth’ policy. The Colmil began 
to demand, through the dropping of airborne leaflets, the evacuation of the areas that were 
defined as ‘free zones.’ Resistance from the locals to evacuate was swiftly answered by the 
invasion of the areas by combined units of army and auxiliaries, which burnt villages, crops 
and livestock, displacing thousands who had to head to Bogotá or Villavicencio, the provincial 
capital, or as far as Venezuela.37 Exemplary force not only failed to achieve any tangible 
military ends. It rather served to increase the population’s will to resist the Gómez regime and 
of the guerrillas to fight the Colmil. In short, given the character of La Violencia, the use of 
exemplary force proved self-defeating. It also was a determining influence on the Colmil’s 
disaffection with Gómez’s leadership and the call for a new approach to solve the conflict.38  
But, are there other factors that help to explain the Colmil’s resort to this sort of 
violence?  A closer look shows that the Colmil’s excessive severity amid the escalation of the 
conflict during1952 can be explained, to some extent, by the frustrations generated by the lack 
of concrete results in the effort to engage the guerrillas in battle, the inability to control the 
territory which facilitated the guerrilla’s hit and run operations, and by an overreaction to 
tactical setbacks produced by this type of modus operandi. For officers in the field, ‘scorched-
earth’ expeditions served to punish the population for their tacit support for the rebels.  In other 
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words, the resort to exemplary force via punitive expeditions in the field was part of the 
dissatisfaction with the government’s inability to match military ends to required means. The 
fact that the Gómez administration declared it could manage the threat of a well organised 
insurgency in a massive area like the eastern-plains with just two army battalions and a few air 
groups proved utterly impractical, which led the Colmil command to consider the necessity to 
utilise drastic means in an  extreme interpretation of Kriegsraison.39 On the other hand, the use 
of exemplary force generated evident problems in military discipline for Gómez, which by 
mid-1953 became source of anxiety within the ranks that ultimately facilitated his overthrow. 
General Puyana explains in detail the thinking of some officers and the excess in the use of 
force committed by the Colmil in the area during the early 1950s, and which deserve to be 
quoted extensively to illustrate the context: 
The Army was losing its prestige and ascendant over the population due to absurd 
political measures[…] The Commander of the Army Detachment in Villavicencio, of 
proven political sectarism, attempted to convince his junior officers that to achieve the 
pacification of the region the a “Tactica de la Cuadricula” [literally Grid Tactic] should 
be applied. This tactic consisted in making a grid map of the area of operations, and for 
every soldier killed, five inhabitants of the respective grid where the incident happened. 
This wreck less measure was never applied, but demonstrated how many chiefs of the 
period thought. […]It was publicised that prisoners were dropped from air force planes. 
Captain Alberto Ruiz told me that once his patrol was awaiting an airdrop, but when 
the soldiers went to pick up the supposed supplies what the airplane had dropped what 
they found were disfigured bodies. […] The abuses of the army were constantly 
commented [among the ranks]. We were horrified to know that to confirm successful 
operations, commanding officers demanded that the soldiers gathered mutilated body 
parts of the enemy as proof of their ‘triumphs’.40 
During the early days of La Violencia there was only one registered case of military 
insubordination in reaction to the government’s handling of the campaign, when Air Force 
Captain Alfredo Silva, commander of the air group in Los Llanos failed in his attempt to take 
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control of the local airbase in late 1949, from which the punitive actions were being 
coordinated. His improvised action only succeeded in handing some stores of small arms and 
ammunition to liberal rebels.41 A more common situation during his tenure was for Liberal 
leaning officers, and to a greater degree NCOs, who were barred from service after the arrival 
of Gómez, to join the nascent Liberal guerrillas, playing an important role in the transfer of 
military know-how and materiel which aided the development of the insurgency.42    
More generally, as will be discussed in the next sub-section, the military demands of 
the Gómez administration during his first two years in power generated profound tensions, 
especially for junior officers who had to deal with the coordination and execution of the 
scorched-earth policy. But these anxieties did not lead to an actual break in military discipline. 
Tensions were either socialised within the ranks or voiced ex post facto in the effort to configure 
a narrative advocating a change in the military approach, reviewing the understanding of the 
role of force, to deal with the after effects of La Violencia and the growing fear of communist 
insurgency.43   
Besides the attempt to control the military command and appeal to its motivational core 
– via anti-communism and the civilising mission-, a second facet of Gómez military policy was 
the attempt to pursue various organisational reforms to increase the professional outlook of the 
Colmil.44 This went in line with his idea of increasing the Colmil’s ‘efficiency’, as he had 
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declared in his inauguration speech.45 Of particular importance was the creation of the post of 
Chief of the Armed Forces (Comandante General de las Fuerzas Militares) which, at least on 
paper, improved the coordination and control of the armed forces. Gómez promoted General 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to the position, who had been serving as CoS of the Inter-American 
Defence Board in Washington. General Rojas was not only promoted because of his status as 
the highest ranking officer of the Army, but above all, for his proximity to the ruling party.46 
As Brigade commander in the city of Cali, Rojas had demonstrated his loyalty during the 9 
April revolt with heavy-handed measures, including the incarceration of local Liberal party 
leaders before they moved to depose the town mayor and install a ‘revolutionary junta’, and 
later by supporting his public order operations with the use of pájaro death-squads.47  
The government stipulated that ‘the Commanding General will function under the 
direction and supervision of the Minister of War’ and further attempted to clarify roles and 
functions by stating that ‘the complete management, administration and use of the Armed 
forces will now be in the hands of the Minister of War. The newly created post will handle the 
purely technical, strategic and training affairs pertaining to national defence and the Armed 
Forces.’48 The new organisational set-up recognised the Colmil’s received Prussian intellectual 
tradition, which considered that policy and strategy had definite boundaries. Following this 
view, this school considered that after declaring a state of war and defining the aims to achieve, 
politicians should stay aside while the military delivers victory.  However, this model view of 
the dynamics of military strategy in the context of La Violencia as in any other war, required 
at least the definition of aims that could be translated by the military into achievable 
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objectives.49 As it has been stressed, Gómez did not set out his policy with regards to the 
guerrillas which generated anxieties among his senior officers. From early 1952, this situation 
lay at the source of the many tensions that ultimately concluded with the coup d’état of 13 June 
1953.  
Gómez’s reform of the organisational set-up of the Colmil command clarified the 
instruments for the formulation of strategy. It defined the levels of civil-military dialogue to 
develop a discussion of the ends sought and the means required to achieve them. Despite this 
efforts, his tenure, is nonetheless, considered by the Colmil as one in which the guidance of the 
military was extremely poor.50 Certainly, aspects of the Colmil’s misgivings over the lack of 
political guidance of the military instrument which have, since La Violencia, been a defining 
theme of Colmil thinking, can be traced to this period.  For example, evaluating the conduct of 
the campaign in the eastern-plains between 1951 up to the cessation of hostilities after the coup 
of General Rojas, Colonel Gustavo Sierra concluded that the Government had failed to define 
policy goals to guide the Colmil in the area, which translated into an evident lack of military 
planning. For Sierra, the performance of the military instrument had been ‘sterile’ as the 
campaign had depended on ‘the will of the tactical commanders of Los Llanos to finish-off the 
problem with any means at their reach’.51 In this context, the idea that the tactical units did not 
have adequate guidance nor were offered the required means, also explains the justification in 
resorting to exemplary force in terms of military necessity. General Valencia Tovar illustrates 
the point, recalling that the clichéd instruction to junior commanders in the early 50s was to 
‘act with outmost prudence but with maximum energy and determination.’52 According to him, 
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this vague instruction only served to confuse the actions of junior officers, which terminated 
either in excesses or accusations of dereliction of duty.53   
As strategic theorists have noted, political guidance of the military instrument is not an 
abstract concept. Failure by civilian and military commanders to define accurately the role of 
force can prevent it from achieving appropriate ends, and at worst, may lead to the 
indiscriminate application of violence.54 Under the traditional Colmil Prusso-German outlook 
of strategic formulation, Sierra summarised the point by stating that ‘the policy the Government 
should have resolved to pursue in Los Llanos should have been the basis for the Chiefs-of-Staff 
to base their own,’ and that in the end, the lack of planning had simply ‘translated into a lack 
of support that led to ensuing conflict, more grave than the original.’55  
Finally, the Gómez administration also aimed to incentivise the Colmil by 
strengthening its profile. For this, he increased the military budget by 81per cent between 1950 
and 1952.56  This could be achieved, despite increased violence, because the Colombian 
economy was still growing, thanks to the lifting of international price controls of coffee after 
the Second World War. However, the Colmil still felt extremely under-resourced given the 
operational challenges imposed by the multiplicity of fronts to cover, considering the expansion 
of the guerrilla challenge across the country. As the Chief of the Armed Forces explained to 
the Minister of War, the military was demonstrating a serious lack of preparedness and training, 
as well as deficiencies in equipment and weapons when it came to sustain operations, which 
demonstrated that, in the case of an international war, Colombia ‘would suffer the most 
shameful moment of its history.’57 To complement the administration’s effort, Gómez also 
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looked at the possibility of strengthening the military by building-up defence ties with the US, 
amid the growing Cold War tension. The President had, since his inauguration, looked for a 
rapprochement with Washington as he had for long been recognised by the State Department 
as being overly anti-American, particularly for his early support for the Axis cause during the 
Second World War.58 Through his strong anti-communist stance, Gómez believed that the US 
would consider his regime as an ally in the confrontation with the Soviet Union.  Gómez hoped 
to improve his general political standing in Washington, and as the ambassador related in 
private to Secretary Dean Acheson, have the department overlook his undemocratic measures 
against the members of the Liberal party who had close associations with Washington.59  
President Gómez’s anti-communist sentiment was coupled with his endeavour to please 
Washington when he expressed the wish to send a military contribution to the UN war effort 
in Korea. Colombia was the only Latin American country that made such an offer, and the US 
response was all but immediate. After much diplomatic bickering, Washington finally accepted 
a naval and infantry contribution for political reasons in spite of the strong argument by 
planners at the Pentagon that the Colombian forces were of ‘poor quality’ and that the cost to 
support Colombia to equip, train, and field the units, would exceed any real military dividends. 
As historian Bradley Coleman explains, the eventual decision by the US to sponsor the 
Colombian participation in Korea strengthened Gómez’s position with Colmil who saw it as 
an opportunity to enhance their prestige by fighting alongside modern armies.60 In total 4,200 
soldiers, roughly 28per cent of the total available Colombian Army personnel, served in the 
infantry Batallón Colombia (Colombia Battalion) between 1950 and 1953.61 It is not necessary 
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for the purpose of this thesis to enter into the details of the Colombian participation in that war. 
What is important for the analysis that follows is to focus on the link between the participation 
of the Colmil in Korea and the conduct of La Violencia, in particular on how the Gómez 
administration attempted to use the Colombia Battalion as a bargaining mechanism to obtain 
support for his agenda. Later on, the analysis will aim to explain the significance the Korean 
experience had in eventually shaping the contours of the distinct strategic perspectives of 
Colombian military thought vis-à-vis the evolving conflict at the turn of the 1950s.  
By mid-1952 when the intensity of hostilities in La Violencia reached their peak, the 
Gómez administration began to utilise Colombia’s presence in Korea as a way to gain leverage 
in Washington. One of his intentions was to expedite military aid to improve the combat 
capabilities of the Colmil to continue waging the campaign in Los Llanos.  In this sense, the 
government believed that as the sole Latin American contributor to the war effort in the Korean 
peninsula, it should receive preferential treatment in the bilateral negotiations of the MAP, the 
scheme through which the US government planned to supply grant aid to the region in order to 
collaborate in the hemisphere’s defence against a possible Soviet incursion.62 Colombian 
diplomats in Washington lobbied intensely the State and Defense Departments, with equipment 
requests to fully furnish 13 infantry battalions as part of the MAP. To emphasise his point, the 
Colombian Ambassador ‘stated that the opinion was widely held in Colombia that the United 
States Government had not treated Colombia as well as she deserved, particularly in view of 
her contribution to the United Nations campaign in Korea’.63 Throughout the summer of 1952, 
War Minister Bernal launched a number of declarations which attempted to make an effective 
case for the Colombian need to obtain extensive MAP equipment to be used against the 
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guerrillas. The Minister expressed to US officials, for example, that Colombia’s requirements 
for military equipment was of an urgent character, as only military force could be counted upon 
to  deal with the escalating guerrilla problem. To press the point even further, Colombian 
officials continuously argued that due to the communist character of the adversary  and its 
extreme barbarism, it posed a menace to the security of the Western hemisphere which could 
not be ignored by Washington. The following extract of a memorandum of conversation 
between the Colombian ambassador and General Rojas with officials of the Department of 
Defense illustrates the situation: 
[…] the Ambassador showed a classified cable he had just received from Colombia to General 
Rojas […] the message reported an atrocity incident which had occurred on 6 September 1952 
in which four members of the National Police were brutally slayed by bandit forces. He stated 
that the bodies revealed that the police had been castrated, and that their tongues had been 
pulled out and their eyes removed, as well as other evidence of horrible mutilation. The 
Ambassador went on to point out that this is just one more of many incidents that represent a 
serious menace not only to his government but to the entire Western Hemisphere. He said that 
if immediate aid is not received by his country, that in all probability it would be necessary to 
recall the Colombian troops from Korea in order to cope with the domestic situation. […]He 
felt that the U.S government, by being so dilatory in supplying equipment, was closing its eyes 
to the real issues and that the paltry amount of material involved represented a great deal in 
insuring Hemispheric security and maintaining the prestige of his country, and relatively little 
to the U.S.64    
 
 The point made by the War Minister and the Colombian Embassy in Washington 
during the summer of 1952, that the question of internal security ‘transcended in significance 
its operations in Korea and its preparations to collaborate in Hemispheric Defense,’65 in order 
to obtain equipment was troublesome for US authorities. Corresponding with his superiors, 
Thomas C. Mann who was then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 
clearly expressed that  he ‘would like to turn the Colombians down on their request for all of 
this equipment, since it is pretty obvious that the Colombian Government wants this to 
“maintain internal order” with all that this implies in the present state of Colombian affairs,’  
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no matter if that meant the risk of antagonising the Gómez administration who could go ahead 
with its intention of withdrawing the battalion in Korea. 66  What is necessary to point out here 
is that not only was the Department of State not distressed by Communist activities in Colombia 
at the time, but moreover, it was not convinced by Gómez’s rhetoric about the existential threat 
of liberal-communist subversion in Colombia. For US authorities La Violencia was more a 
conflict between the government and legitimate opposition party which had to be solved by 
other means than force.  Hence, they were more anxious about the intentions of Gómez to 
convert the Colmil into an instrument for the preservation of Conservative rule by exerting 
greater levels of repression and curbing political liberties. As Assistant Secretary Mann 
concluded, ‘while we are prepared to assist them to strengthen itself on the defence of the 
hemisphere, it is not the policy of our Government to furnish armaments to be used against an 
opposing Colombian political party.’67  
To pursue their interests, the US attempted to influence Colmil commanders who felt 
disturbed by Gómez’s idea of ceasing operations in Korea, as that would mean losing the 
opportunity to participate in the tasks of Hemispheric Defense which were seen as an 
opportunity to enhance their professional military skills. US officials sought to ease Colombian 
pressures by furnishing, with no further delay, non-lethal material, particularly transport 
vehicles, and by stressing military technicalities to stress to the diplomats that the equipment 
going to Colombia under the Hemisphere Defence Program was mainly to furnish anti-aircraft 
battalions that were simply of a ‘different category’, and that they were not adaptable to use in 
land warfare against the guerrillas.68 The Gómez administration’s handling of the defence 
procurement negotiations with Washington in 1952 only served to continue straining the 
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political relations with the Colmil, which was exacerbated with the disaffection with the 
conduct of the conflict in Los Llanos, leading to the fracturing of the loyalty of the General 
Staff. General Rojas in a conversation with the Assistant Chief of Staff of the US Army, 
expressed that he would advise the Colombian embassy in Washington to review its proposal 
of withdrawing its Korean contribution. If the government went ahead with such decision, 
explained Rojas, ‘it would severely affect the prestige of the Colmil and his personally, as it 
was by way of his efforts that the contribution was sent in the first place’69. General Rojas 
reassured US officials that ‘it was doubtful that the government could justify such an action on 
the grounds that the guerrilla warfare made it militarily necessary’.70   
The Gómez administration’s desire of using military force against the opposition party 
and armed groups that supported it to secure its corporatist reform agenda was highly 
contentious for the Department of State, Liberal-leaning citizens, but also for many soldiers. 
According to former President Alberto Lleras Camargo who was serving as the first Secretary 
General of the OAS at the time, the logical outcome of the Conservative government’s effort 
to identify liberalism with communism was nothing other than the proscription of his party 
from the country’s public life, which would lead to the instigation of a dictatorship.71 Indeed, 
officers who had family or friendship ties with both political factions felt disturbed at the 
praetorian role the military appeared to be assuming since the murder of Gaitán. Some Colmil 
officers recalled that at onset of the Gómez administration, tensions began to appear as it soon 
became apparent that the President equated fidelity to the state with support for his own 
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reactionary political agenda.72 Richard Maullin, in his RAND report, noted that Gómez’s 
meddling with the Colmil to ensure that leadership at all levels was sympathetic to his goals 
paved the way to the eventual break between the government and the Chiefs of Staff, eventually 
triggering the coup against him in June 1953. Maullin explained:  
The politicisation of the army’s public order mission disturbed many military men who had 
previously been able to draw the line between national interest in that mission and Gómez 
intention to use the military for his partisan ends. Gómez aggressiveness generated tension 
between the values of non- partisan behaviour and acquiescence to the legally president [...] the 
politicization of the army’s domestic mission finally led to a break between the president and 
the armed forces senior leadership. Gómez extreme partisanship contributed importantly to his 
overthrow.73   
 
Antagonism towards the politicisation of the Colmil under the Gómez administration in the 
terms expressed by Maullin, appeared to be more perceptible at the company and field levels, 
that is, the second tier of officers trained entirely in the professional service schools created 
after the military reform of 1907 and who had served both parties loyally, vowing for non-
partisanship. ‘The army could not be allowed to end up allied with one political party due to 
the fact it held power’, explained General Alvaro Valencia Tovar (who at the time was a junior 
Captain serving as an instructor at the Escuela Militar). By the second half of 1952, when the 
military was fully involved in an open-ended effort to exterminate the Liberal guerrillas with 
no clear results in view, the idea that the solution to La Violencia lay in Liberal-Conservative 
reconciliation, not via the application of force in favour of the ruling party, gained ground 
amongst company level officers who were bearing the blunt of the fighting. However, the 
implausible rapprochement between the warring parties, given President Gómez partisanship, 
seemed to pose a complicated political dilemma for Valencia Tovar, and other like-minded 
officers. ‘The growing violence was not a subversive feat that indispensably had to be quelled 
by force’, commented Valencia Tovar, who went on to explain that ‘in the opinion of most 
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young officers, the Army could not continue following the political parties in their demented 
march to catastrophe.’74   
These political susceptibilities, voiced ex post facto by Valencia Tovar in his memoirs, 
might not have been genuine predicaments of the greater part of Colmil junior officers during 
the period when the conflict reached its peak. However, they serve to elucidate the future 
interpretations about the nature and dynamics of La Violencia by officers, who like him, came 
to conform to what is known as the ‘Korean generation’. But military frustrations with the 
Gómez administration’s conduct of the conflict were not circumscribed to junior officers. 
Anxieties were also evident at the senior level, with rumours of conspiracy becoming 
widespread. By March 1952 the CIA was already informing Washington about the possibility 
of a coup in the country led by officers of the General Staff, given an ‘increased [military] 
dissatisfaction with government policy in coping with guerrilla activities.’75 Reportedly, the 
Gómez regime responded by increasing the purge of senior officers whose loyalty was in doubt, 
which opened the way for growing suspicions toward the President. The following extract of 
the CIA report is also illustrative of the effect the lack of tangible success in the conflict against 
the guerrillas was producing within the ranks:  
Despite heavy governmental expenditures for anti-guerrilla action, insurgent strength 
has increased in personnel, organisation and arms, and has seriously lowered the 
prestige of the present administration. The government’s countermeasures can be 
expected to avert any immediate threat, but political instability will continue because 
of increased army dissatisfaction with failure to suppress guerrilla activities. 76 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Gómez had increased capabilities thanks to budgetary 
increases and had augmented the prestige of the Colmil via a successful diplomatic policy that 
brought it close to the US, discomfort with his leadership was becoming palpable. A month 
before Gómez was overthrown by General Rojas, the Chief of the Armed Forces continued 
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giving public reassurances about the Colmil’s commitment to the defence of the government 
and the tradition of non-political interference. In an interview to the New York Times on 15 
May 1953, Rojas expounded the concept that the Colmil was above bipartisanship and as such 
was ‘bound to support the Constitutional Government at any cost’.77 A fortnight later in a 
public speech at the Escuela Militar he reassured the President that ‘the campaigns to divide 
the Armed Forces will be shattered’ and warned his subordinates about the need of ‘not losing 
serenity in the difficult moments the country is going through’.78 Yet, General Rojas non-
partisan reassurances fell with Gómez at the turn of 1952. The President believed the Chief of 
the Armed Forces was actually conspiring with moderate Conservatives, including former 
president Ospina. A pretext arrived in June 13 1953 for Gomez to dismiss General Rojas, which 
triggered a bloodless coup. 79 Very probably, as John Martz asserted, despite the general state 
of dissatisfaction with Gómez’s policy, General Rojas would not have turned against the 
government had he not been forced to do so to save his own career.80  
General Rojas was persuaded to assume power by his chiefs-of-staff and by disaffected 
Conservatives, including key members of the Gómez cabinet.81 In his first address to the nation 
on the eve of the coup, the General emphasised his statement of principles and some of the 
aims he envisioned to pursue in government, announcing that the army would take charge 
temporarily until free elections could take place.82 He also promised that the country would 
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honour its international obligations, including the Colmil’s contribution to Korea, which 
reassured Washington.83 Moreover, he expressed the view that by acting as an arbiter, the 
Colmil could offer an expedite solution to La Violencia and hinted towards the need to improve 
the socio-economic situation of the peasantry to prevent further bloodletting: 
The Armed Forces call on all Colombians of good will to form a crusade that puts the country 
above the parties and puts the common good above the conveniences of castes and groups [...] 
No more bloodshed, no more depredations  in the name of any political party, no more strife 
among the sons of the same immortal Colombia. Peace, Law, Liberty, Justice for all, without 
differentiations or preference for the more or less favoured classes. The country cannot live in 
peace while it has hungry and ill-clothed sons. The Armed Forces will be in power whilst the 
necessary conditions are prepared to hold clean elections, from which there will emerge a 
genuinely democratic system.84 
 
Rojas Pinilla’s coup was greeted favourably and was immediately legitimised by both parties, 
given its initial compromising terms. Even the CIA reported the coup optimistically, stating 
that ‘Rojas Pinilla’s assumption of the Presidency appears to make Colombia’s prospects for 
settling its guerrilla problem, ending the state-of-siege and returning to political normalcy 
brighter than they have been at any time’.85 As it will be discussed in the final section of this 
chapter, the consolidation of a different understanding about the nature of La Violencia that 
began on the eve of Rojas’ coup included the need to reconsider the limits of armed force to 
deal with the liberal guerrillas, reinforcing the view that the conflict had to be settled through 
a political solution. But, to better assess the shift in Colmil thinking during the military regime 
of General Rojas, it is necessary to dedicate the next two sections to the dissection of the 
misgivings over the military’s role in the early days of La Violencia and to the debates over the 
use of force that ensued. 
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 ‘Public order is not War’: Tensions and divisions over the nature and conduct of La 
Violencia in the eastern-plains 
 
As a result of the 9 April revolt, the Colmil found itself executing two main tasks. One was to 
take over responsibility from the police or exert military rule in critical towns, which was 
particularly the case in places where there army was garrisoned and sufficient manpower was 
available. The other, which was a more common practice, was for units at the platoon level to 
be dispersed in expeditionary tasks known as ‘public order commissions’ to the most 
problematic areas, and where there was no permanent military presence.86 However, these units 
had no clear objectives beyond the vague instruction to uphold law and order and collaborate 
with local authorities.87 According to Hew Strachan, peacekeeping or peace enforcement 
operations are on the whole problematic for armies as the object is frequently not clear, the 
operations themselves are under-resourced and driven by short-term goals.88 Certainly, the 
experience of the Colmil’s handling the effects of 9 April and up to the arrival of Laureano 
Gómez, serves to illustrate these general problems. To begin with, once deployed, ‘public order 
commissions’ demonstrated the Colmil’s severe limitations when defining objectives, 
planning, and issuing combat orders, particularly given the fact that command on the ground 
was divided.89 Moreover, authority was dispersed, with junior officers receiving incomplete 
verbal orders to move their platoons far from their bases in response to requirements by the 
local authorities. The tasks of the commissions were too ambiguous and left too much space 
for officers in the field to execute it following their own interpretation of the situation or their 
political judgement. The result was that the conflict was shaped by junior officers, where badly 
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coordinated tactical action defined overall military progress.90 The feeling that the Colmil was 
performing its public order mission, with no plan nor clearly defined purpose, disturbed many 
officers who were at pains to stress that a change of approach to La Violencia was needed. As 
General Valencia Tovar, one of the chief exponents of this line of thought reflected: 
We should ask ourselves, was there strategy at any time [during La Violencia]? The re-
establishment of public order was a mission, and how to achieve it required a clear 
comprehension about what the conflict was about, a methodology, a conduct, a right dosage of 
the means available, and good tactics once the clash became inevitable […] While it is certain 
that the decision about the employment of armed force corresponds to politics, the fact remains 
that it has to be preceded by a profound study. Could the conflict have been dealt with by other 
means rather than force? Did the politicians, who at the onset of the partisan violence opted for 
the use of force, meditate whether it was indispensable to fight? And if they did so, did they 
calculate if the power available could allow the government to impose its will? It does not seem 
so. Most probably, the rush to retain political power and the decision to squash by force any 
source of resistance was taken without knowing if adequate and sufficient means were 
available. 91 
Military anxieties over their mission became more prominent with the escalation of the 
conflict after the election of Laureano Gómez in 1950. The guerrillas moved to the offensive, 
with the manifest goal of overthrowing the government, while the latter was committed to 
repress them by force.  Soon the Colmil found itself engaged in open warfare against the rebels. 
The task of the armed instrument stopped being the maintenance of law and order and became 
the defeat of a declared enemy in battle.92 However, as will be argued, the growing tensions 
over the legitimacy of Gómez’s rule and the confused language of the administration about the 
nature and aims of the conflict, complicated the articulation of the use of force to definite policy 
ends.  
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To better understand the diverse implications the Colmil misgivings with the ‘public order 
mission’ had for the use of the armed instrument during the early 1950s, it is necessary to start 
by looking at the operational experience against the guerrillas in Los Llanos. The conflict in 
this region laid the ground for the future divisions with regards to the military approach to La 
Violencia, and which hence was to be a crucial factor the configuration of the Colmil’s strategic 
tradition. Complex debates about the use force ensued after four years of continued intervention 
with no tangible results, and as it has been noted, ultimately paved the way to the fall of the 
Gómez regime.  
The intra party strife was extremely intense in Los Llanos at the onset of 9 April. The 
conditions in the territory and the restive nature of the population were defined by a British 
observer of the time as ‘predominantly of warlike Indian stock crossed with no less warlike 
Spaniard and occupied for the most part in cattle raising.’93 Further, the region traditionally 
had ties to the Liberal party, and had fomented the formation of two guerrilla groups along clan 
lines. Up to the election of Gómez, the guerrillas were acting autonomously as a self-defence 
force to resist repression from Conservative militias and death-squads, which in most cases 
colluded with the local authorities. In this context, Major Eduardo Román, Battalion 
commander in Villavicencio, the capital of the Intendancy and point of entry to the region from 
Bogotá, had been exercising military rule under the dispositions of President Ospina’s State of 
Siege decree. Román maintained that law and order could be re-established without the need 
for either excessive violence or retaliation from the part of the Colmil, as there was no heavy 
weaponry in the hands of the liberal groups that could threaten the government’s stability at 
the local or regional level. Interviewed at the end of La Violencia, he claimed that by the late 
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1940s  ‘there were no grounds for unleashing cruelty and repression, to throw the local 
population to misery and push them to major rebellion.’94   
Apparently, Major Román who was transferred out of the region after the triumph of 
Gómez and the subsequent intensification of offensive operations, did not consider the Liberal 
guerrillas of the eastern-plains to be subversive in nature. Instead, he viewed them as a 
commonsensical response to the lack of security and the growing repression by the local 
Conservative groups. In his perspective, the object of the Colmil was to guarantee security and 
achieve a degree of normalcy. He therefore did not attempt to crush the rebels and force them 
to disarm, but rather to agree with them on terms to reduce the levels of violence. He ordered 
that the public order commissions under his command attempted to reassure the population that 
the Colmil was being deployed to protect them and not repress them, and hence convince them 
that arming against the government was unnecessary.95 The Colmil could also attempt in this 
context to address local political and social demands by acting as mediators with the authorities 
when necessary. For Major Román, this included the maintenance of channels of 
communication with the rebel leader to show good will, including signing non-aggression pacts 
and offering safe conduct through the region.96  
However, in the context of the escalating inter-party strife, particularly after the election of 
President Gómez in 1950, the conduct of the public order mission in the terms of Major Román 
was plainly unfeasible for two reasons. First, given the fact that the General Staff was resolutely 
committed to the protection of the Conservative government, the role of the Colmil was 
understood as achieving supremacy over a predefined threat posed by an armed insurgency of 
a communist character.97 Second, the order from Bogotá for the army to work in support of the 
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local authorities at the village level in control of the Conservative party, ultimately reduced the 
possibility of any sort of mediation in favour of the Liberal supporting population. In addition, 
the instruction to collaborate with the local power bearers also led the Colmil to collude with 
conservative armed groups that had been organised with the purpose of repressing the rebels 
of 9 April, and which in many towns had replaced the local police forces which had been 
disbanded because of their allegiance to the Liberal party. As mentioned, the Colmil’s 
association with these conservative armed groups was a source of grave tension for officers in 
‘public order commissions’, as they were forced to let them run amok by superior orders.98 But 
how exactly did these tensions evolve to affect the Colmil’s later understanding of their conduct 
of public order missions?  
It is necessary here to trace the origins of the Chulavita auxiliary force. President Ospina 
had begun the formation of these auxiliaries since 1947, recruiting them from Conservative 
strongholds because of the suspicions he held about the National Police being in control of the 
Liberal opposition. The Chulavita was expanded during the presidency of Gómez, and it 
became a de facto politicised police force used profusely to systematically repress the 
population in the areas where the liberal party had ascendancy and where there was known 
presence of guerrilla groups that challenged his rule.99 While by 1951 the totality of the Army’s 
6 Brigades fielded around 15,000 men,100 the Chulavita auxiliaries amounted to at least 20,000 
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men nationally. 101 The expansion of the auxiliaries generated anxieties within the ranks of the 
Colmil, as the ruthless methods they used against the rural population appeared not only brutal 
and wrong from a moral stand point, but counter-productive for the purpose of restabilising the 
rule of law.102 Anxieties were manifest among junior officers in ‘public order commissions’, 
as the dispositions by the General Staff ordered them to collaborate with the Chulavita mainly 
for intelligence collection tasks and in certain instances of lack of personnel to conduct joint 
operations. The following extract from the memoirs of Brigadier General Gabriel Puyana, who 
was a sub-lieutenant during Los Llanos campaign, deserves to be quoted at length to illustrate 
the point:  
One afternoon, at the end of March [1951], I received a message at the outpost from the commander 
of the Detachment to return to Villavicencio to be ready to move and operate for various weeks 
with fifteen men [...] The Colonel then explained over a huge map that the “scum” - that is how he 
defined the guerrilla – had massacred several families in the vicinity of the village of Tamara. My 
orders were to march to there with another 20 men he had obtained from other outposts and make 
contact with the authorities to begin chasing the criminals [...] At first sight I noticed the 20 
individuals that the Colonel gave me were civilians, who, I later found out, were being recruited in 
mass in regions of Boyacá to be incorporated to the army due to their unconditional obedience to 
the ruling party. I disliked having them under my command, but there was nothing I could do [...] 
The Colonel was impatient, and once we were in marching formation he harangued us: “The bandits 
have murdered more than twenty persons in the vicinity of Tamara, and all the people of the region 
are with them and support them. As a result, from now on, burn down every ranch and shoot any 
civilian you cross.” I felt disgusted [...] In general, the people of Los Llanos had appreciated the 
Army, but when these armed militias obtained uniforms and started to patrol with the soldiers, the 
guerrillas started to attack with no distinction. The government’s slogan of “by fire and sword” had 
only served to expand the violence, and many senior officers absurdly imposed the scorched - earth 
policy without comprehending that in this sort of fight nothing could be achieved without the 
support of the population.103  
 
  In short, for those sections of the Colmil who understood the public order mission in terms 
of acting like a neutral force among the warring parties, the demand to collaborate with an 
overtly partisan force to repress the rural population and turning a blind eye to the havoc they 
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generated, would have an important influence on their future strategic outlook. This was 
particularly the case of those officers who were dismayed by what seemed to be the intractable 
character of La Violencia and who in the early 1960s viewed counter-insurgency as novel and 
enlightened methodology that permitted adjustment of the use of force in order to reduce the 
disaffection of the population and to win it over to the government’s side.104 In this respect, for 
many officers, the government policy of promoting Conservative militias had not only served 
to generate a vicious circle of vendettas but, moreover, alienated the army from the population. 
‘After 9 April we had been sent to Los Llanos to put down a fire, the problem was that we were 
acting on behalf of the government that had initiated it with its own partisan politics,’105 
explained army General Joaquin Matallana, who served as a Lieutenant during the Gómez era.  
Matallana would eventually become one of Colombia’s most influential ‘irregular’ soldiers in 
the mid-1960s, and advocated the proliferation of Ranger type Special Forces to confront the 
guerrillas with proficient techniques that could ‘clinically deal with the problem without 
alienating the population’.106 It was in that context that he staunchly criticised the action of the 
Chulavita, as he thought that they ‘made it impossible to convince the people of the eastern 
plains that the military was an impartial force that was not prosecuting them for their political 
ideology. The local’s belief that the government wanted to destroy them led them to defend the 
region militarily in an almost fanatical way.’107  
The reaction to the ruthlessness of the auxiliaries, which in the mind of many officers had 
prevented the effective reestablishment of law and order, reaffirmed the need to emphasise a 
less coercive approach for the management of violence in Colombia. This reassessment of the 
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Colmil public order mission, which surged at the denouement of La Violencia after the 
restoration of democracy in 1958 was influenced in part by the narrative about Major Román’s 
behaviour in the late 1940s, and which turned into something of a myth.   
In short, the account of Major Román’s stance during the period 1948-50 illustrated for 
many what should have been the accurate function of the Colmil in its public order mission.108  
The story of his deeds began to be promoted after the publication in 1959, six years after the 
demobilisation of the Llanos guerrilla, of the memoirs of Eduardo Franco.109 Franco was one 
of the most notable rebel commanders who did not accept the terms of the amnesty of General 
Rojas and who found refuge in Venezuela. ‘Commander’ Franco, had coordinated the 
amalgamation of the self-defence forces of 9 April into a veritable guerrilla army to fight 
Gómez’s regime and eventually developed a revolutionary agenda with the help of pro-Gaitan 
liberals who gave guidance to the movement. At the turn of the 1940s, Franco had had extensive 
contacts with Major Román, and in his memoirs, he considered him an officer with special 
skills and ‘human sense’ whose theories on non-violent pacification parted from a correct 
understanding of the nature of the conflict.110 In particular, he believed that the rebellion of Los 
Llanos had ‘objective causes’, that is, that it arose because there were legitimate grievances 
that had to be dealt with by non-military means.111 Likewise, Franco also made the case that 
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the conflict had been intensified by the use of Conservative violence for political gains, which 
generated an expected armed counter reaction from the liberals. This situation implied that the 
army should not have taken sides, and rather, should have functioned like an arbiter, aiming to 
protect the population and not applying force indiscriminately or ruthlessly.112  
The mythology of Major Eduardo Román’s early experience as basis for the correct conduct 
of the Colmil in public order missions found strong echo during the early 1960s for several 
reasons. One in particular was the attempt to generate consent around the ‘theory for the 
deactivation of the causes of violence’ that began to be developed by the Army General Staff, 
and which would become a defining theme of the Colmil strategic tradition.113The 
underpinnings of the theory were found in various sources that became determinant for the 
configuration of military thought in the period, particularly the conclusions of the ‘Commission 
for the Study of the Causes of Violence.’114  The study of the Commission indicated that the 
Colmil’s actions in the early 1950s led to ‘the distancing of people from the army,’ and 
furthermore, paved the way for ‘the intensification of the confrontation between the people of 
the plain-lands and marked the beginning of the scorched-earth land policy’.115  
Undeniably, for the officers of the ‘Korean generation’ that were promoted to senior 
positions during the 1960s, this narrative served to solidify their commitment to counter-
insurgency thinking, as will be discussed in later chapters. For officers like Valencia Tovar, 
who have viewed Colombia’s conflict since La Violencia as a situation of a different nature 
than war in the Clausewitzian sense, the demands for a review of the use of force parted from 
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the view that ‘the logic of friend-enemy within the country was an abhorrence’116.  This attitude 
was reinforced by the Korea experience, as many veterans felt they had fought a ‘real’ war in 
the Asian peninsula as part of the UN effort against the North Koreans and Chinese, and hence 
Colombian violence was incomparable. Moreover, they believed that the animosity created by 
the parties was fabricated, and so the Colmil as a national institution should not be weighed 
against a section of the population.117  As a result of a growing antipathy towards the politicians 
during the denouement of La Violencia, many officers judged that the parties and their 
patronage system were to blame for the escalation of violence, throwing the Colombian 
peasantry into internecine feuding.118 In this context, the theme of the enlightened side of the 
civilising mission started to emerge in Colmil thought, with the Korean school endorsing an 
idyllic view of the Colombian peasantry as a noble but backward population that had been 
perturbed and corrupted by the parties, and who had to be rehabilitated to prevent further 
violence and reduce the risk of falling prey to communism.119 
In other words, disagreements about the instrumentality of force have, since the early 
1950s, originated from the basic problem of defining what the conflict was all about. Similarly 
to the British government fight against the IRA after 1969, a main dilemma for the Colombian 
security forces in the struggle against a myriad of armed groups that have proliferated in the 
country, has traditionally been the reconciliation of the domestic notion of rule of law, with the 
need to effectively use the military instrument.120  This tension was palpable during the early 
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stages of La Violencia up to the arrival of Laureano Gómez to the presidency, as General 
Valencia explained: 
The army was assuming a repressive function, forgetting that repressive tasks should be preceded 
by preventive ones. More important than re-establishing public order was to prevent its fracture [...] 
we started to prepare for war, and the fracture of public order was not war. [The political conditions] 
determined that what we could intellectually do better to handle the situation was omitted. In this 
diluted and confused conflict, war could not be understood in its classical sense of destroying the 
enemy, rather, in avoiding him becoming one.121  
 
The problems in defining the boundaries of the public order mission was particularly 
evident at the field commander level of the Army. Colonel Gustavo Sierra, who served as chief-
of-operations of a battalion sized unit known as the Destacamento de Los Llanos Orientales, 
which Gómez created to spearhead offensive operations in the area in 1952, explained that the 
government ‘has not been using the appropriate denomination to for the subversive movement, 
this is not just banditry. That was a step that has already been surpassed by the feat of arms.’122 
The recognition that the government was facing a well organised movement seeking to use 
force to attain clearly defined political ends should have served to clarify the role of the Colmil, 
according to officers like Sierra. He went on to define the character, goals and methods of the 
adversary as follows: 
The end goal of the subversive moment is well defined. It seeks to achieve a change of the legitimate 
internal political order by force, and adopts means that allows it to avoid committing to a formal 
war. These are common methods used by Communism in many countries, and in this concrete case 
in the Colombian eastern-plains [...] in the past months Communism has used the tactic of guerrilla 
warfare in the eastern-plains in combination with other elements in a defined and structured way. 
The subversive movement has been ascending, reaching a peak in the second semester of 1952. The 
correct means to repress the subversion have not been applied to date, like the employment of anti-
guerrilla methods, as the circumstances advice.123  
Despite being aligned with the spirit of the Conservative counter-reaction to 9 April which 
Gómez had headed, many senior officers believed the President’s leadership had been 
incoherent and had failed to effectively configure policy ends to guide the actions of the armed 
forces. By the end of 1952 they felt the military campaign had stalled. Even if the guerrilla 
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army of Los Llanos did not count with the necessary capabilities to realistically challenge the 
Colmil, any attempt by the later to defeat them seemed futile due to the extension of the 
territory, the unwavering support the rebels received from the locals, and the inability of the 
government to strengthen an overstretched army, among other reasons. In this respect, senior 
officers interpreted that the lack of guidance amounted to a feeble commitment from the 
Government to achieve a military solution to the conflict which it had appeared to demand in 
the first place.124 This was particularly so as there was no proportion between the extension of 
the area of operations and the commitment of means by the government. ‘The efforts of the 
army have been lost completely, order was not re-established [...] the number of guerrilleros 
augmented considerably because of the lack of decision and planning from our political 
leadership,’ explained Sierra. 125 
It is necessary here to make a small diversion and explain in detail the work of Colonel 
Sierra. After his experience in the eastern-plains, Sierra authored the book Las Guerrillas de 
los Llanos Orientales, which was a combination of a memoir recalling his experience in the 
campaign, with and assessment of what he considered were the fundamental military flaws that 
prevented the Colmil from dealing with the problem. These reflections served as basis to 
promote lessons in the second part of the book to inform the response to the resurgence of 
bandit groups and the perceived threat of communist insurgency after 1955. Similarly to those 
analysts of the Malayan Emergency who misinterpreted Sir Robert Thompson’s book 
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Defeating Communist Insurgency as a factual history of the campaign,126 Colombian authors 
have done with Sierra’s book, quoting him liberally to recount the actions of Colmil in the 
eastern-plains campaign. A closer reading, however, reveals that the narrative is more of a 
generalisation and a repository of lessons learned; hence it has to be treated with care as an 
accurate historic record. For the purposes of this thesis, which focuses on how events have been 
interpreted, in particular by military practitioners in Colombia in an effort to trace the evolution 
of their thought, Sierra’s work is useful for two reasons. First, as it allows us to trace themes 
that informed Colmil behaviour during La Violencia, especially on issues of political guidance 
and the organisation of the armed instrument. Secondly, it aids in contextualising the Colmil’s 
motivational patterns since the late 1950s, which was shaped as reaction to the use of the armed 
instrument during the Gómez administration.  
In this respect, for a sector within the Colmil which did no align with the political 
project of Gómez or his anti-communist discourse to explain the military’ role in La Violencia, 
the lack of political guidance was read as a lack of adequate reasoning over the exact nature of 
the conflict and an inadequate judgement over where the balance between means and ends laid.  
This was in particular the perspective of those officers, like Valencia Tovar or Puyana, who 
understood La Violencia as a situation that required a more refined understanding about the use 
of force by the Government and the military command. In other words, the interpretation of 
the nature and dynamics of the guerrilla phenomenon under a different light by these officers - 
that is, less affected by ardent anti-communism, altered the grounds upon which the judgement 
about the utility of force had to be made. At least in principle, this meant that the government 
should start to calculate the use of force in parallel with other non-military means. The 
configuration of Colmil thinking under these conditions became more consistent for field grade 
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officers as a result of the experience during the military government of General Rojas Pinilla. 
As expected, during Rojas’ rule the Colmil acquired de facto non-combat roles that stimulated 
the assumption that the pacification of the country was not attainable solely by the use of force.  
A change in the approach to La Violencia –General Rojas’ National Reconciliation Plan 
 
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed the Presidency on 13 June 1953 with the intention of 
offering a political solution to La Violencia rather than a military one. His stated goal in the 
wake of the coup was to cease the Liberal-Conservative confrontation through the promotion 
of a National Reconciliation plan that aimed at a multiparty cessation of hostilities, and later, 
the rehabilitation of victims and former fighters.127 With the Colmil acting as guarantor, it was 
assumed that these two actions would prepare the ground for a political agreement between 
both parties and the reestablishment of democracy.  In this sense, the first step was to issue a 
decree (No.1546 of 14 June 1953) that offered general amnesty to all those involved in violent 
actions since 1946, whether Liberal guerrillas or members of Conservative paramilitary 
groups.128 Following this, the Chulavita auxiliaries and the local police forces, which were 
considered to be a main obstacle to the Colmil’s pacification effort, were disbanded to facilitate 
the creation of a nonpartisan National Police service which although civilian in character would 
be administered by the Ministry of War and hence under direct operational control of the 
Colmil.  
The amnesty decree not only established the procedures and requirement for the combatants 
to apply, but most significantly established that Colmil commanders in their regions of 
responsibility had to establish military tribunals, effectively placing them in complete control 
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of the administration of the amnesty and pardon procedures.129 The amnesty, explained an 
observer, was conditional only in demanding that those who surrendered brought along their 
weapons, swear to give up warlike activates and returned to their former occupations.130 
Conversely, the view that it was the Colmil’s prerogative to settle the terms of the amnesty led 
many rebels to consider it as a non-negotiable imposition which clarified their alternatives to 
the simple choice of accepting the laying down of arms or risking the threat of increased 
military pressure. These points help to illustrate the challenges the policy faced in its early 
days, as well as to explain the reallocation of the effort towards state-building via the 
rehabilitation phase of the plan. The promise of rehabilitation served to arrange a mode of 
compliance that did not appear too submissive to the guerrillas and dissipated doubts among 
the demobilised about the regime’s willingness to pacify without resort to force.131  
A few days after the coup an extensive propaganda campaign was initiated, with Colombian 
air force planes dropping thousands of leaflets announcing the fall of Gómez, and radio 
announcements extending guarantees of free transit to all the guerrilleros who presented 
themselves to army outposts to apply for the amnesty.132 By these means, less than two months 
after Rojas announcement, almost 4,000 men accepted to lay down their arms.133 Immediate 
results were achieved mainly in the regions of Antioquia and parts of Tolima where the ‘Peace, 
Law, Liberty, Justice for all’, slogan of Rojas not only had been positively received by most of 
the guerrillas, but also because the Liberal party had demonstrated ascendancy over the rebel 
leadership which secured compliance with the terms imposed by the Colmil. The initial success 
of the amnesty, was also related to the fact that Rojas stressed his non-partisanship as a soldier, 
and thus, liberal rebels who hardly would have trusted an offer of amnesty from a politician, 
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were prepared to give the military the benefit of doubt.134 In principle, the guarantees voiced 
by the Colmil that the amnesty would include a pardon to allow a fresh start to those who 
applied, as well as assurances that they would protect their lives after they disarmed allowed 
Rojas to empathise with the guerrillas. Following Schelling’s analysis on the logic of 
bargaining, the amnesty allowed to design a suitable environment to influence the decision to 
lay down their arms.135  
The application of the amnesty was, for its part, not that swift in Los Llanos. As the major 
centre of hostilities during the Gómez years it had developed its own dynamics and 
characteristics that were less responsive to Rojas paix de braves proposition. The main issue 
was that the behaviour of the guerrilla leadership in the region was less malleable, as their goals 
and interests did not correspond with the spirit of Rojas reconciliation agenda for various 
reasons. Firstly, after three years of bitter fighting, along with the use of widespread repression, 
it was extremely difficult to restructure the situation to create sufficient trust to influence the 
decisions of the rebels.  Secondly, the guerrilla movement had expanded considerably and had 
adopted an autonomous agenda from 1952, with only tenuous links with the Liberal party, 
which for commanders like Eduardo Franco had abandoned the leftist ideas of Gaitan.136  This 
meant that the Liberal leadership could not influence the guerrillas on behalf of Rojas because 
the fall of Gómez did not automatically mean the termination of the guerrilla’s raison d’etre.  
Consequently, the section of the insurgent movement under Franco felt that the successes of 
their campaign in the spring of 1953 could allow the transit from a guerrilla war to a positional 
one and to develop their political project nationally to pursue a veritable ‘Gaitanista’ 
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revolution.137 In this context, the Llanos guerrilla had little reason to give up their fight and 
accept in full the amnesty terms, as Eduardo Franco commented in a letter to his deputy:  
[...]Peace is necessary, but a peace to win rights and restitutions. A peace that we have won justly 
with blood, to rise the people and restore the liberal camp. The best for now is to retreat most of our 
group without making much noise, a ceasefire for as long as it is possible and to wait patiently for 
the events to unfold, that is, until a new betrayal comes to light as it has happened before so many 
times. Then the people will figure it out and will search for the mountains. The rebellion will return 
and we will be waiting for them with our arms open ready to continue the struggle. Sadly the army 
has stolen our banners and is dragging the people behind it. What an irony. But as I say, sooner or 
later our time will come, the truth will come to light and the usurpation will fall. Revolution is 
fashionable in the whole world these days, and needless to say, I am fully committed to it […] Let’s 
have a pause and later inevitably back to the arena, we can use the amnesty for this. But we must 
be prepared, as peace with no previsions is not safe. 138 
 
The situation in Los Llanos also revealed that despite the reconciliatory tone of Rojas coup, 
disparate perceptions of the conflict persisted within the Colmil that shaped their understanding 
of the amnesty as a solution to the conflict. When Rojas assumed the presidency the chain of 
command was not fractured. After removing key senior General officers who the day of the 
coup had remained loyal to President Gómez, Rojas went on to respect the seniority system of 
promotion admittedly not to alienate operational commanders.  These circumstances, recounts 
Valencia Tovar, led to the promotion to the posts of Chief of the Armed Forces and Army CoS 
of two officers with very different beliefs about the solution to the insurgency problem in the 
area. In Valencia Tovar’s opinion, the new Chief Brigadier General Alfredo Duarte Blum had 
a conciliatory and pragmatic character that from the Korean perspective made him ‘the General 
officer that better understood the national situation and the way to produce the demobilization 
of the guerrillas.’139 In contrast his junior, the Army CoS Brigadier General Pedro Muñoz, who 
had served in the area as operational commander, believed that the military odds were in the 
Colmil’s favour and so ‘was staunchly in favour of repression as he was convinced the 
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insurgency could be squashed with no need for compromise.’140 This ‘conceptual abyss’, as 
Valencia Tovar referred to it, led to different interpretations of the rationale of the amnesty, 
and which were only solved when Rojas intervened in favour of the assessment  of  Chief of 
the Armed Forces Duarte who eventually had to deploy all his political skills to secure guerrilla 
compliance with the amnesty. These tensions, Valencia Tovar recalls, were certainly visible in 
the early negotiations with the guerrilla leadership. 141 
As stipulated in the amnesty decree, Army CoS Munoz had guaranteed the guerrillas a 
cease-fire pending the outcome of the proceedings of the military tribunals handling their cases 
if they surrendered their weapons to the Colmil. However, this was not enough of for the 
guerrilla negotiators, who felt the terms, particularly of disarming with no consideration of 
negotiations on fundamental issues of national policy amounted to a demand of unconditional 
surrender underpinned by the threat of further use of force. These misgivings can be observed 
in a telegram to the General in which the negotiators complained about the attitude of the Army 
CoS and his delegates handling of the proceedings:  
Lt Gen Rojas: we communicate to your Excellency that we held a conference at Puerto Carreno 
on national pacification with your military delegates. Military attitude frankly contrary to 
postulates of your Excellency.  Hostility, threat, coercion precisely expressed. Dictatorial 
imposition. Complete rejection of our propositions. We hope your Excellency allow us to 
ventilate our positions of loyalty, peace, liberty, justice, and work that are consistent with your 
highest purposes.142  
From the extract above, it is somewhat clear that Colmil commanders, like Brigadier 
General Munoz revealed a basic understanding of the notion of bargaining through coercion in 
an attempt to induce the rebels to accept the terms. But given the character of the conflict in 
Los Llanos, the guerrillas’ view of their own situation and of the Colmil’s limitations in the 
area, the threat of further military pressure proved vain even if various senior officers believed 
otherwise. In particular, given that ‘coercion depends more on threat of what is yet to come 
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than on damage already done,’ 143 the apparent limitations of the armed instrument in the 
battlefield in the late spring of 1953 reduced the credibility to the threat. Moreover, given the 
behaviour of the Rojas in the wake of the coup and the value he put in the idea of reconciliation, 
it could have induced them to believe the General did not have the ability or the will to step up 
military pressure. One could consider that the threat of continued military action in the region 
might have put at risk Rojas’ early political position which rested on the promise of stopping 
further bloodletting. In this sense, the effective application of the amnesty in Los Llanos 
required a more accommodating approach on the part of the Rojas regime, and an attempt to 
tease out common ground with the guerrillas. This materialised to a great extent via an overt 
commitment by Brigadier General Duarte Blum to finding a negotiated settlement, after Rojas 
sent him to Villavicencio to deal with the amnesty proceedings in person and who 
communicated that the administration’s rehabilitation effort was none other than broad social 
programme that would generate material prosperity for the local population, a discourse which 
in principle had a strong appeal with the base of the rebel movement.144  
In September 1953, General Duarte named his protégé Colonel Alberto Saiz Montoya 
to the position of Civil-Military Chief of Los Llanos. He was given widespread administrative 
authority and allowed to engage in a more open-ended political bargaining with the guerrilla 
leadership to generate incentives for their demobilisation and cooperation with the Colmil 
authority. Colonel Saiz emphasised during the negotiations that the Rojas administration 
effectively marked a ‘new dawn’ for the eastern plains. He explained to the guerrillas that the 
times of excessive repression via scorched-earth land measures were over, and that the civil- 
military command’s purpose was not only to protect the population to restore a semblance of 
order, but primarily to deal with their needs delivering public service goods that could foster 
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the conditions for achieving what he termed as ‘social peace’.145 The proceedings of the 
amnesty meetings with the guerrillas showed the multiple demands that were voiced. These 
demands were in effect accepted by the Colmil, who committed to address them in exchange 
for the cessation of hostilities.  This stance was highlighted in one of the joint declarations 
drafted between the Colmil and the guerrillas: 
[The object of the meeting] is to attend to the requests and problems faced by the guerrillas. 
The following petitions, and which are considered of vital importance, were made to the 
government with the interest of achieving and maintaining peace in Los Llanos. First, the 
establishment of health posts and financial or other money lending institutions for peasants. 
Second, that money is borrowed to the peasantry without many restraints, and that access to 
machinery, tools and agricultural supplies is increased. Third, that road building and 
electrification plans are intensified. Fourth, that military authorities in the region act 
impartially, and that a way to terminate the persecution of liberals in regions affected by 
violence is studied. Finally, that the military authorities in the region use their means to prevent 
the arrival in Los Llanos of armed elements denominated as pájaros that generate a state of 
anxiety […] 146 
In the short term, it is clear that the change of approach was successful because it enticed a 
great part of the Llanos guerrillas to accept the terms of the amnesty, beginning its definite 
disintegration. According to one of Saiz’s reports, by 25 September 1953 almost 1,474 
guerrillas had decommissioned their weapons and were returning to their villages. The number 
rose to 10,000 by mid-1954 when the instruments of the rehabilitation programme were 
officialised and money began to flow to the region. In particular, the materialisation of the 
amnesty was a blow for the most ideological leaders like Franco, who began to lose control of 
his men and was eventually forced to flee from the region.   
The Colmil derived genuine popular kudos as a result of the massive demobilisation of 
guerrilla fighters and its effect in reducing the levels of violence nationwide at the turn of 1954. 
This allowed General Rojas to consolidate his hold on power. However, as the final part of this 
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section will discuss, in the long-term both the amnesty and the rehabilitation agenda that 
followed were not successful in bringing about the end of the violence in various regions as the 
internal conflict soon regained new strength. This was particularly the case in the rich Coffee 
growing region of the Central Andes, which soon became the main trouble spot for the Colmil 
with the explosion of banditry after the failure of the amnesty. 
What is important to note, is that at least in principle, the recognition of the grievances of 
the Liberal guerrillas at the start of the Rojas regime confirmed the views of higher echelons 
of the Colmil in their belief that the failures of previous governments and the absence of 
material progress were the main motors of rebellion. This led to the emergence of the idea that 
the provision of economic development and social progress by means of proficient technocratic 
administration that disregarded the vices of partisan politics, alongside a determined use of 
force to offer population security, was the solution to violence. For example, the recently 
promoted Brigadier General Gustavo Sierra Ochoa, who was named by General Rojas Military 
Governor of the department of Caldas, the axis of the coffee producing region of Colombia, 
synthesised the view during his inauguration speech: 
It is necessary that the functions and tasks of all civil servants are technified, up to the point that 
the organisation of an army can be imparted to public service […] The military government should 
move from an “electoral mentality” to an “enterprise mentality”.  To save the Fatherland of the ruin 
of violence is the military government’s historic mission. And this mission extends to multiple 
requirements that go from the need for public order to an intense administrative service.147   
Enlightened military rule, it was believed, could achieve the rapid material progress of the 
population by promoting industrialisation, road building and public works. In particular, the 
convergence of the influences of the state-building narrative and the civilising mission were 
clearly perceptible in this change of attitude, which reduced the politics of the conflict to a 
question of virtuous administration. ‘To the State falls today a greater responsibility than in the 
past,’ explained Rojas, ‘because its mission is through righteous policies to assure the equitable 
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distribution of riches in accordance with the teachings of the Pontificates and Christian thinkers 
for whom the beginning and end of all economic activity is man and his transcendent 
destiny.’148 But one can ask, was this ideological basis a guide for effective strategic 
formulation to deal with La Violencia? Most certainly it was not, as they were simple 
generalisations about Christ and Simon Bolívar, religion and fatherland. They were too vague 
to define the mission of the regime, and possessed scant consistency to be translated into a 
workable course of action as to how the Colmil could be employed to achieve the cessation of 
the conflict.    
The characteristics of this military attitude also corresponded with what commentators of 
the period referred to as a ‘new Latin American militarism,’ that in their opinion was attempting 
to resolve the economic backwardness and political inequalities of the region. For example, 
Edwin Liuwen of the Council of Foreign Relations considered the region’s military rulers 
during the 1950s to be reform minded individuals who ‘played antidespotical political roles, 
intervening to terminate tyranny of one of their own errant colleagues or to supply correctives 
to the excess of civilian politicians’.149 In a similar vein, the US consul in Medellin, Vernon 
Lee Fluharty, who after leaving Colombia became a staunch defender of Rojas and published 
a detailed study of his regime – conveniently  published in 1957 when the then unpopular 
dictator was in need of publicity abroad – explained that the termination of La Violencia 
required the General  to manage ‘the social revolution of 9 April’, via strenuous administrative 
efforts to secure ‘greater economic democracy for the masses’ against the ‘oligarchy’ that had 
ruled the country.  ‘Perhaps the knottiest problem that Rojas has to face,’ Fluharty wrote, ‘is 
that of elevating and integrating the peasant and the small freeholder into the national life. The 
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complex sequel of evils that deprive too many men of land and keep others in de facto serfdom 
must be broken up to achieve this.’150 
To spearhead his rehabilitation plan Rojas founded two institutions: the ‘National 
Secretariat for Social Assistance’ and the ‘Institute for Colonisation and Immigration’, with 
the object to formalise the guarantees offered to the demobilised guerrillas and attend to their 
families as well as the numerous peasants that had been declared as victims of ‘official 
Conservative violence’.151 Initially, this translated in the requirement of resettling almost 5,000 
displaced persons who had escaped their places of origin and execute social and welfare 
programmes as well as initiatives of infrastructure development.152 The ‘National Secretariat 
for Social Assistance’, known by its acronym SENDAS, was a civil-military agency that had 
the task of diminishing material poverty and inequality in order to reduce the incentives of 
those engaging in violence and increase collaboration with the military regime.153 In its first 
report on the situation, SENDAS established that at least 33.9 per cent of territory had been 
affected by La Violencia, including the destruction of 40 towns and 30,000 homes. It had 
received in its first six months more than 26,000 petitions for restoration of property to its 
lawful owners.154 However, SENDAS in the end proved a fiasco as an instrument of 
pacification. While it succeeded in delivering basic aid to the population in many of the 
violence prone areas, it utterly failed in dealing with the majority of cases of property 
restoration and executing the rebuilding promises.155 Moreover, it increased political 
opposition to the military regime. ‘It was becoming the norm at each inauguration of new 
highway, school, or clinic to see a military chief preaching the virtues of the ‘pueblo-armed 
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forces alliance,’ writes Colombian historian Gonzalo Sánchez. ‘In a country where the virtues 
of the spoils system was deeply rooted and helped to ensure the monopoly of the two traditional 
parties, this development clearly threatened the elite.’156 
In part, a reason for the inability to execute the rehabilitation tasks in many of the regions 
was the product of the intense competition for the resources of SENDAS by Colmil brigades.  
Brigade Commanders (as a rule Colonels) had to be able to lobby for their areas of 
responsibility, demonstrating they were ‘zones highly affected by violence’ to be able to 
receive enough financial resources.157 Historian Cesar Torres del Río has argued that  despite 
the government’s rhetoric about proficient and technical based public administration and the 
Colmil CoS order to avoid ‘political contamination’ when assigning resources notwithstanding, 
successful commanders were the most politicised ones. Particularly successful in initiating 
rehabilitation programmes were those who served in the departments where Rojas had named 
loyal general officers who became ‘godfathers’ of the Brigades and offered more access to the 
regime’s coffers to create local political clienteles.158  
For its part, the creation of the’ Institute for Colonisation and Immigration’ resulted from 
Rojas’ wish to recover the original 1930s mission of the Colmil as it fitted with the state-
building narrative his regime developed. The Institute was to be in charge of planning the 
government’s policy for the economic exploitation and distribution of uninhabited land, and 
placed the onus of the army for the fulfilment of the task. ‘From now on the military is a 
coloniser’ announced the General at the inauguration of the institute in September 1953, ‘no 
more deserted extensions of land, but inhabited ground, controlled and colombianised.’159 One 
of the executive officers of the Institute explained for example, the need of organising a 
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Colonisation Brigade which would serve to give the army a ‘modern sense.’ 160 The unit would 
consist of engineer and infantry battalions employed in opening fields and adapting them for 
agricultural work, creating penetration lines, road networks and housing. Colonisation works, 
it was proposed, would be advanced by both volunteers and conscripts that after a period of 
service would receive land where they could eventually settle.161 Furthermore, the colonisation 
mission would also result in a cost-effective means for civilian re-adaptation of enlisted 
personnel. Accordingly, it was asserted that national service directed toward colonisation 
would provide well prepared and suitable human capital to work in the rural extensions. This 
would also facilitate the de-escalation of violence by affecting the recruitment base of the 
armed groups. 162 
Another influential thinker in the configuration of the Institute of Colonisation’s goal was 
Brigadier General Sierra Ochoa in his role as Military Governor. As a reaction to what he 
considered was the unsuccessful experience of the Colmil during Gómez administration in 
restabilising public order, colonisation was seen as ‘the only efficient means to resolve for once 
and for all the problem of banditry which keeps intensifying.’163 Moreover, the process 
permitted articulation of the aspirations of those officers, like him, who believed the military 
government should by all means ‘seize the opportunity’ offered by its new position in power 
to both design and execute a policy to ‘incorporate to national life half of its territory.’164 A 
particular point of Sierras’ line of thought was that even though it ascribed to the material 
causes of violence theory, which underpinned the strategic logic of state-building via military 
colonisation and virtuous administration as a method to raise the standards of living of the 
peasantry and promote social progress, it also revealed the potency of the anti-communist 
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ideology which had permeated a sector of the Colmil. This translated into the brutal side of the 
civilising mission with a more hard-headed judgement about the object of force: 
The solution to the problem consists in exterminating the bandits and in incorporating the territory 
in which they roam into the national economy. The cost that the military extermination of banditry 
demands is not justified if the territory is not colonised and the healthy peoples of Colombia do not 
take effective possession of the land. These considerations are supported by several reasons: a) The 
immensity of the territory, its natural obstacles bordered by vast unexplored forests and jungles are 
factors that foment enemy dispersion and the use of ambushes and nullifies annihilation efforts. b) 
The action of the troops and auxiliaries cannot be maintained indefinitely, its costs are not justified 
as they don’t produce decisive results c) The conditional surrender of the inhabitants of many 
regions addicted to banditry cannot be accepted without leaving superior forces, particularly in Los 
Llanos, to prevent new risings. d) However, the cost of permanent occupation troops to hold the 
territory is also high, and this manpower could be used to continue colonising other areas. Settlers 
could replace these occupation troops.[...] Selected settlers [by the Institute of Colonisation] will 
serve as occupation elements in improvised encampments, each consisting of at least fifty families. 
They will be supplied with weapons and will be reinforced with a small military garrison. The 
commander of the garrison will be the chief of the encampment and will organise defence activities, 
and will also proceed with land and cattle repartition. Settlers would be obliged to carry out 
mopping up operations of remaining bandits in combination with the other encampments.165  
Although by the end of 1953 the colonisation plans for the eastern-plains had been defined, 
the reconversion of the army, or at least the introduction of units solely devoted to the fulfilment 
of the mission, remained on paper only. One year after the military coup, the only results the 
Institute of Colonisation had to show in Los Llanos was the ‘acquisition of 30,000 hectares of 
land in Casanare, where 1,000 families were placed by direct action of the military authorities 
of the region, each of them counting with an adequate parcel of land and hygienic housing.’166 
By 1957, even the regime’s supporters felt the plans were too idealistic. Such was the opinion 
of Fluharty, who asserted that even if General Rojas sincerely believed in the strategic necessity 
of integrating the eastern plains into the national economy and populate them with immigrant 
agrarian populations, the simple fact that the Colombian geography was so complicated 
prevented any meaningful action to be taken. ‘The mountains stand forbiddingly between the 
resources of the plains and those who could use them; they lie there, lonely, immense, inert and 
virtually sterile,’ explained Fluharty whilst adding that the eastern plains were ‘a contradiction 
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in terms per se to the words of a writer who described them as a region where the most 
formidable wealth sleeps.’167 
On the face of it, the interest of the Rojas regime in the colonisation mission reduced 
after his consolidation in power by 1955. One reason for this was that the rehabilitation plan 
and the institutional machinery that was put in place soon lost its original purpose as an 
instrument for state-building, and became a tool of Rojas to purchase goodwill and create a 
popular base of support for his regime. This was largely a consequence of his move towards 
dictatorial rule in the second year after the military coup. The General announced that he would 
stay in power until 1958, and made it clear he had no intentions of re-inaugurating congress or 
organising elections, and moreover that he was determined to maintain the state-of-emergency 
which had remained active since 9 April. ‘The parliamentary system’ argued Rojas, ‘is only 
possible when a country has achieved a high cultural level and when political parties have 
become civilized. To throw the country back into the electoral debate would be the equivalent 
of paving the way back to the return of violence.’168 Thereafter, he showed his determination 
to create a state organised labour movement to underpin his personal political movement 
known as the ‘armed forces-population binomial’ or ‘Third Force.’169 To advance his political 
movement he decided to position his 20 year old daughter as director of SENDAS, whom he 
wished to transform in a symbol of his regime, a sort of ‘Evita’ following the example of Perón 
in Argentina.170 The partisanship of Rojas also led him to name many of his cronies in high 
posts of the rehabilitation institutions, who demonstrated sheer administrative incompetence.171 
The grandiose development projects SENDAS envisaged never materialised. In effect, the 
work of SENDAS was reduced to the distribution of hand-outs and the subsidy of essential 
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commodities, mostly for the benefit of the legions of displaced persons who had escaped the 
violence in the countryside to settle in Bogotá’s periphery. Meanwhile, the assistance offered 
in the regions by the Military Governors and the Brigade Commanders, simply turned into 
propaganda to praise the ‘armed forces-population binomial’ and criticise the failures of 
civilian politicians.172   
Evidently, the alienation of the political parties resulted from Rojas intention to remain in 
power. In particular the work of SENDAS’ charitable work in the main urban areas became a 
target of their criticisms, as it was considered a serious threat by both parties and the Catholic 
Church to their patronage systems. Opposition started to grow and charges of corruption and 
graft became common place. Rojas reacted swiftly in mid-1955 by passing a more severe 
censorship decree than the one already in force with the state-of-emergency, which in effect 
terminated all remnants of free press in the country. Disapproval of the regime was generalised 
in the Liberal camp, which felt that the General had betrayed the goodwill the party and its 
followers had offered at outset of the regime, after facilitating the demobilisation of the 
guerrillas as a step towards political normalcy. Rojas responded to the growing opposition 
along the lines of the previous Conservative administration, stepping up the anti-communist 
rhetoric and declaring the Liberal opposition as Marxist subversives in character and outlawing 
the left wing parties.  
The situation marked the beginning of the escalation of the conflict as many of the Liberal 
guerrillas who had demobilised began to regroup, and resumed fighting, targeting the Colmil 
as the symbol of the regime’s power and in retaliation for the un-fulfilled promises of the 
rehabilitation agenda .173 ‘In Los Llanos misery still prevails among the immense majority of 
the population, and demands [peasant petitions to respect the guarantees of the amnesty] are 
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receiving the worn out label ‘communist’ to justify repression […] This in our opinion is why 
guerrilla action has restarted in many parts of the country’,174 explained a number of regrouped 
Llanos guerrillas in a letter to a former commander. A similar posture was evident in Tolima 
where a local newspaper, before its closure by Rojas, transcribed a letter from a local guerrilla 
leader to the President: ‘I said in a solemn ceremony for the surrender of the revolutionary 
forces under my command “I exchange my rifle for a hoe,” I believed that the promises made 
by the Colonel in representation of the National Army, would be happily and quickly fulfilled 
[…] We ask no other help than what was offered at the moment of the armistice when we 
surrendered our guns.’175  
While the attitude of many of the former Liberal guerrillas was considered black mail by 
supporters of Rojas who believed it did not justify the further resort to violence, it was also 
read by critics as a legitimate complaint resulting from broken promises of the amnesty and the 
regime’s administrative incompetence. A staunch critic was Latin America scholar John Martz, 
who in his survey of Colombian politics on the eve of the transition to democracy expressed 
the view that: ‘Having been placed in a position where enlightened rule might have generated 
necessary reforms, the military abrogated responsibility by trusting in the false value and 
personal pretensions of its leader, who was out of his element and unsuited to the administration 
of government.’176 However, it was clear that there was also growing disaffection among 
Colmil officers with Rojas’ mishandling of the rehabilitation policy, especially the attempt to 
build an urban political clientele and the inattention of the countryside. They judged that the 
mission of the military to be politically neutral was being undermined with the General’s 
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growing partisanship, and that the lack of concrete state-building efforts in the violence prone 
areas amounted to dereliction of duty.  
The view that the Rojas regime was administratively incompetent also gained strength due 
to the poor economic performance of the country after 1955, with criticisms of the regime’s 
lack of preparations as the sharp fall of the price of coffee in the international markets generated 
a shock. The resulting need to devalue the currency led to an inability to acquire foreign loans 
to sort the growing fiscal deficit, all of which reduced the amount of resources to invest in the 
rehabilitation mission. As the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Duarte Blum is said to have 
commented to US officials in Bogotá ‘the promises of economic aid [to the demobilised 
guerrillas] have not been met. Golden birds had been offered, and at the end everything 
amounted to a pair of blue jeans, a shirt and a safe-conduct.’177 
 So, for those officers who had subscribed to the material causes of violence school of 
thought since 1953, the lack of ‘virtuous administration’ and the alleged corruption, and 
charges of ineptitude in the Rojas clique became a source of tension that would eventually lead 
to the General’s removal by his own comrades. Not surprisingly, two of the main conspirators 
were Chief of the Armed Forces General Duarte Blum and his protégé, the recently promoted 
Brigadier General Saiz who was named Secretary General of the Ministry of War; an officer 
who as mentioned had been appointed to undertake the state-building effort in Los Llanos.178 
It is clear that the failures of the Rojas regime in the execution of the National Rehabilitation 
plan deeply disturbed this faction of the Colmil. The feeling was summarised by Valencia 
Tovar, who in his memoirs nostalgically expressed the view that the military coup was an 
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exceptional episode in Colombian history, foreign to the tradition of the Colmil, and concluding 
that it was a missed opportunity to take advantage of the situation and utilise the power vested 
in it to advance a true national policy of state-building that could have de-escalated the causes 
of the conflict.179  
The battle of Villarrica– the intensification of violence and the road to The National 
Front, 1955-1958 
 
The effects in terms of violence reduction generated by the amnesty had worn off by the end 
of 1955.  In that year there were 11,000 deaths, one of the highest rates since 1948. Murders 
had begun to increase as a result of payback, vendettas and repossession of land. There were 
numerous accounts of former Liberal or Conservative fighters who had returned to ‘civilian 
life’ only to be tracked by their victims, or returned to their land to see it occupied by others,180 
by rival political factions, which generated a vicious circle of violence. This was precisely the 
situation that Rojas had vowed to prevent from happening when he assumed power, and so, the 
growing sense of insecurity augmented public mistrust of his regime, and in the Colmil more 
generally, as its legitimacy rested on the role that it had acquired as a protective force after the 
fall of Gomez.  
Mainly though the new wave of violence in the countryside that began early 1955 was 
provoked by organised armed groups that operated in more or less the same geographical areas 
between the eastern and central cordilleras. The most pervasive type of violence was 
undertaken by demobilised guerrillas that had either violated the terms of the amnesty, or had 
not accepted them in the first place, turning to outright banditry, particularly in the rich coffee 
growing areas encompassing the departments of Cundinamarca, Tolima, Caldas and Valle. The 
dynamics of these groups were summarised by the British Ambassador in Bogotá in a report to 
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Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan on the escalation of violence. The Ambassador explained 
that numerous villages in these departments were being attacked by groups of well-armed 
bandit groups formed of up to sixty men. The Ambassador judged ‘that while the political 
parties seemed not to have no part in the bandit activities, party feeling probably has,’ and 
stressed that ‘there appears to be a large number of dispossessed peasants who resort to banditry 
either for lack of any other means of livelihood, or for the purpose of getting back their former 
property or acquiring another.’181   
The second type of group were the communist guerrilla forces, known as ‘movement 
of peasant self-defence’ that had consolidated after the establishment of ‘free zones’ at the end 
of Gomez regime,  and which since the coup had viewed the Rojas regime with open hostility. 
The two areas under the communist control were known as El Davis and Villarrica, in the 
Sumapaz region, located in the fringe between the departments of Cundinamarca and Tolima 
less than a hundred kilometres from Bogotá. They had been areas of peasant colonisation since 
the late 1930s, and where constant clashes with legal land owners of the region constantly 
ended in bloodshed.182 The Communist Party had a strong rapport among the peasant 
population there, and had advanced a process of political indoctrination which had included 
the creation of a cadre school at El Davis.183 The high degree of organisation had been 
fundamental in the formation of the ‘self-defence’ peasant guerrilla force after 9 April and 
which had since then maintained a defensive posture. It is in this movement, FARC historians 
assert, that the roots of that insurgent group are found.184   
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At the start of 1952 the Communist’s strengthened their organisation by acquiring new 
allies: Liberal guerrillas of the wider region who had gone through a process of political 
reconversion after their contact with elements of the Communist Party. These liberal rebels and 
their families moved into these mountainous areas to join efforts against the repression of 
Gomez’s Chulavita auxiliary forces, but mainly to escape from retaliation from their former 
comrades, who referred to them as liberales sucios or comunes (dirty or common Liberals) and 
accused them of treason for falling out with the party leadership.185 The military coup marked 
a change in direction for the leaders of the communist enclaves who thought it marked the 
transition to a new phase of the conflict between the ‘oligarchy’ and the communist peasant 
movement.186 According to historian Alfredo Molano, the peasants deeply mistrusted General 
Rojas, who they rightly considered a staunch anti-communist, and so did not engage in 
negotiations with his delegates at the wake of the coup. They were suspicious that the amnesty 
was a ploy of the Colmil to ally with the mainstream Liberal guerrillas and incorporate them 
into the regimes’ forces in order to exterminate the comunes.187   
The bandoleros and not the communist ‘self-defence forces’, were the groups that had 
been undertaking the greater number of violent acts after the coup, and given that their activities 
affected a wider segment of the population, making them the biggest threat to Rojas political 
standing. It was somewhat paradoxical then that the focus of the military effort became the 
extermination of the ‘self-defence forces’. Inevitably, the decision to commit the majority of 
the scarce  resources and the remaining political capital to the neutralisation of the communist 
enclaves, despite the fact that they did not pose a real challenge to the stability of the regime, 
given that they were strictly adhering to the doctrine of self-defence imposed by the Communist 
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Party, led to Rojas’ fall. Moreover, the decision to resort to force against the enclaves 
highlighted many of the failings evidenced during Gomez administration. Not only did it 
alienate sections of the Colmil who judged the General was acting irresponsibly by committing 
the military to an infeasible operation, but also that the use of excessive force was counter-
productive, and furthermore, that such an effort did not tackle the real sources of the growing 
violence and even less the roots of the conflict which was to what they had committed to solve 
in June 1953. 188  
The anti-communist narrative continued to be ever more pervasive during the final two 
years of the Rojas regime. This led officers to complain that the Colmil seemed still to operate 
within a constricted intellectual framework that hindered the correct identification of the 
adversary and how the armed instrument should be employed. In the words of Valencia Tovar: 
‘The myopia and inefficiency of the secret services and of military intelligence led them to see 
the guerrilla problem  as an indecipherable amalgam, which they took as proof, although 
inexact, of what the government was propagating: the definition of the enemy as liberal-
communist.’189 But more than a dogma of faith in the need to utilise force to exterminate an 
existential threat, anti-communism was also being utilised by the regime with two political 
purposes in mind: first, to continue discrediting the growing Liberal opposition to the regime 
that was demanding General Rojas fulfilled his promise of holding free elections. Rojas 
responded with an argument retrieved from the Gomez period, arguing that the growing 
guerrilla activity was being supported by the Liberal leaders. Second, the resort to anti-
communism was used leverage US support and obtain material assistance to wage its 
campaign. ‘Aren’t Communists criminals?’ 190 This was the answer of the Colonel in charge of 
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operations in Tolima when questioned by US Embassy officials regarding the mélange of 
groups operating in the region which included bandoleros, conservative pájaro death squads 
and the communist guerrillas. US officials in Bogotá transmitted to Washington that various 
Colmil commanders were convinced that they were facing a Communist organised movement, 
of which banditry was one of its manifestations. They were prudent, however, before granting 
validity to any of the assertions regarding the nature of the enemy offered by the Colmil, which 
they considered contradictory. 191 The explanation given by the Embassy to Washington in a 
report on the public order situation in Tolima allows to illustrate these reservations: 
Aside from the purely military information contained in the report, Embassy believes the analysis 
interesting for the insight it gives into official Colombian thinking on the problem of the continued 
public disturbances. The analysis reflects the desire of the Colombian authorities to blame the 
outbreaks on Communist provocateurs, and at the same time reveals their realization that the 
problems involved are much more complex than the relatively facile explanation of Communist 
agitation would indicate. The analysis also shows the extreme frustration evinced by an organized 
military group confronted by guerrilla activity – an unseen and unknown enemy attacking from and 
escaping into large uncontrolled areas.   The analysis [by the Colmil] stated that “The Brigade 
Command has reached the conclusion that the terrorist plan, in its widest program, is completely of 
Communist origin.” Later in the report, however, the conclusion is reached “that all the rural 
inhabitants are potential bandits.” In another part of the report it is estimated that “the anti-socials 
in Tolima do not number more than 2,000. The rest of them are followers who let themselves 
become disoriented by political passion or ambition.” The analysis fails to present satisfactory 
evidence of Communist infiltration and inspiration for the continued and widespread outbreaks. 
The sum of the facts serve only to support a thesis that Communist efforts at provocation exist,  and 
are made easy by the state of fear, disorganization and atmosphere of vengeance brought about by 
banditry and the remnants of the politically motivated fighting of past years.192 
 
To understand better the problems Rojas military policy faced against the communist 
enclaves, let us briefly analyse how the campaign against the enclaves developed. The Colmil 
offensive began to escalate on 22 March 1955, after 28 former liberal rebels of the region were 
massacred in plain daylight in a Coffee hacienda. The commander of the Army Brigade in 
Tolima declared he had irrefutable proof that the perpetrators were the comunes operating from 
Villarrica who had descended from the mountains to attack their enemies and get their hands 
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on the produce of the harvest.193 As a reaction the Colmil stepped up its patrolling in the area 
via multiple public order commissions, which became easy targets for the guerrillas. Not a 
week passed when an army company was ambushed by superior guerrilla forces.194 Rojas 
reacted vehemently to the setback and declared the whole area a ‘zone of military operations’ 
to conduct a major campaign to destroy the comunes.  The conduct of the Villarica campaign 
demonstrated the armed forces still suffered from severe operational deficiencies demonstrated 
during the early days of La Violencia. When orders came to initiate the offensive, three 
reinforced Battalions numbering 2,000 men were mobilised to the area in what was to be an 
unplanned and uncoordinated operation, 195 with poorly prepared officers commanding units 
given only vague orders to ‘pacify’ the area, which they usually interpreted as a blank check to 
chastise and displace the population.196 ‘The troops burned everything, they cut down coffee 
groves, destroyed crops of everything edible’ according to accounts of villagers gathered by 
historian John Henderson.197 
The Colmil’s actions generated a wave of refugees, at least 3,000 alone in the first week 
who arrived in Ibague, the departmental capital.198 Initially the Colombian press (the majority 
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of it controlled by Liberal party sympathisers) reacted positively to Rojas’ determination to 
take action against the comunes, who were seen as radicals manipulated by the Communist 
party and causing chaos in the Tolima region, raising the flag of class warfare to mobilise the 
local peasantry and direct violence against the limpios and Liberal landowners.199 But the 
support for the military action had its limits, as the weekly magazine Semana, owned by the 
exiled Alberto Lleras stressed, a ‘complete analysis of the social and economic aspects of the 
situation’ was necessary to stabilise the area and suffocate the incendiary discourse of the 
Communists.200 This signalled the need for the ‘construction of hospitals, schools, the 
amplification of housing and the revision of land titles in order to take care of the claims to 
rights of numerous peasants that had armed themselves.’201  
But as soon as the reports of army atrocities began reaching the press they became a liability 
for Rojas, as criticisms of his conduct of the campaign generated a backlash in the capital. The 
General promptly used his executive powers to sign a censorship decree defining the spreading 
of news from violence ridden areas as ‘acts of sabotage’ fuelled by communist conspirators, a 
move that the US embassy considered was prompted by the Government’s fear of more reports 
‘gaining greater currency and credence.’202 Rojas’ move however, did not come without costs 
for his credibility in Washington. President Eisenhower, for example had authorised the State 
Department to inform the General privately that US opinion would be aroused if he persisted 
in suppressing the printed press. Indeed, as it had been the policy of Washington during the 
Gomez years, assistance to Bogotá would not be based simply on the fact that the regime was 
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anti-communist, as it was felt that the threat was being amplified to supress mainstream 
opposition.203   
The problem of not being able to influence the US positively in the hope of obtaining 
military assistance was that the Colmil continued to showcase serious operational weaknesses 
in confronting the communist self-defence forces who were engaging in a campaign of attrition 
at Villarrica. The Colmil, looking for option to break the impasse, had pressed for a speedy 
delivery of materiel that could serve that objective and expedite the destruction of the enclave. 
This request included a petition for 3,000 napalm bombs to be dropped in Villarrica, which 
was promptly rejected by US diplomatic sources.204 Incendiary bombs were eventually 
acquired and used in a massive bombardment by Colombian air force planes between the 7 and 
10 of June, which broke the communists’ defence, which began evacuating the zone. According 
to Molano, the army offensive forced the guerrillas to change their tactic of static defence and 
shift to one of mobile warfare, which allowed them to harass the Colmil and facilitate the 
relocation of the survivors of Villarrica across the cordillera to new zones of colonisation.     
Despite the escape of the main body of the guerrilla movement, the seizure of Villarrica was 
declared a success by the Army CoS Colonel Navas Pardo, who argued that the ‘communist 
organisation of Tolima’ had been broken.205  
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But for Colmil officers critical of Rojas conduct of the conflict, the Villarica campaign 
was nothing less than an improvised operational response characterised by the excessive use 
of force which had been unable to deliver strategic results. In part, they concluded, this was 
mainly the result of an ideological explanation of the enemy’s nature that made the military 
regime focus on the symptoms of the problem, rather than its causes. Chief of the Armed Forces 
Brigadier General Duarte Blum, for example, stated to the US military mission that he was 
being by-passed by Rojas in the conduction of the campaign in Tolima, and that excessive force 
had brought the area into total turmoil. The solution to violence in the area, Duarte argued, did 
not depend on the application of military force, but rather in social and economic rehabilitation, 
particularly addressing the issues of land tenure. 206 He thus proposed a ‘revaluation of the 
government’s strategy’ which would allow for a return to the original objectives traced under 
the amnesty programme of June 1953.207 There was clearly no possibility of anything of the 
sort happening under Rojas. To begin with, given the political conditions it was certain that the 
regime was only interested in procuring the demobilisation of the communist groups. De-
escalating the offensive would have made Rojas look weak, not to mention that he was unable 
to offer an alternative, and that the instruments of rehabilitation had already lost all credibility, 
and the limited resources available had been diverted by the General’s acolytes to other 
purposes –including personal gain- rather than pacification.208 
The importance of this interpretation of the dynamics of the violence by Colmil chiefs 
like General Duarte Blum, was that it found its echo in the discourse of the Liberal leader 
Alberto Lleras.209The opposition leader appeared to offer a political alternative to those officers 
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that had been subscribing to the causes of violence school of thought and who were finding 
themselves at odds with Rojas and his conduct of the conflict. These officers eventually became 
instrumental in aiding with the downfall of the regime by offering their support to the National 
Front accord, which Alberto Lleras Camargo and Laureano Gomez signed in Spain in June 
1956, and which set the basis for the transition to democratic rule.210  
In overall, General Rojas evidently failed in his role as pacifier, which was the initial 
excuse for pushing him to power in 1953. These disenchantments, combined with his intentions 
of prolonging his tenure as President beyond 1958 turned out to be the pretext for his removal 
from office. After a brief period under a junta militar composed of five General officers, the 
power-sharing compromise between Liberals and Conservatives was validated through a 
plebiscite.  The National Front compromise called for the alternation of the presidency between 
the two parties for a period of 16 years and the equal repartition of government bureaucracy as 
a means to deactivate political competition and defuse the bipartisan nature la Violencia. 
Conclusion: The influence of La Violencia in Colmil thought 
 
The origins of the premises that underpinned the Colmil strategic outlook since the 1960s are 
found in the tensions produced by La Violencia, in particular, the conduct of that part of the 
conflict by President Laureano Gómez and the initial expectations created by General Gustavo 
Rojas after the coup d’etat of June 1953. In particular, four basic conclusions would give shape 
to the Colmil’s value system at the turn of the decade.  
First, that not only extreme partisanship had originated La Violencia, but that it was 
above all caused by socio-economic grievances in the countryside. From this followed the view 
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that the conflict had been allowed to deteriorate due to the negligence of the politicians. In this 
respect, the Koreans argued that the politicians with their partisan bickering had forced the 
peasantry into an intractable cycle of violence, and that the real causes of the conflict were 
being concealed under the façade of the Conservative-Liberal divide. A third point, was that 
the Colmil would require to reflect on its behaviour during the 1950s, and learn from the 
political and operational mistakes it committed, both in terms of its excesses during the Gomez 
administration as well as the lost chance of achieving national reconciliation during Rojas 
mandate. Finally, that to solve the conflict it would be necessary that politicians and soldiers 
worked together to execute some sort of enlightened government policy that could awake the 
Colombian peasantry from the superficial bipartisan split, and to deal effectively with the 
lamentable socio-economic conditions in rural Colombia to deactivate the real causes of La 
Violencia and ultimately reduce the potential for communist radicalisation.   
As will be analysed in the following chapter, as a reaction La Violencia Colmil officers 
would promote the view that the effective protection of the population was a pre-condition to 
solve the conflict, no matter their political allegiance.  This included a demand for a military 
approach that favoured less coercive means, resonant of the mantra of so-called ‘population 
centric counter-insurgency.’211This evidently translated into a requirement for the Colmil to 
assume a nation-building role, by emphasising that rebellion was caused by legitimate 
grievances of socio-economic character that had to be addressed effectively to pacify the 
country. Force, for its part, was considered to play a supporting role in the strategy. Its goal 
was to achieve the surgical elimination of the armed elements of the insurgency in order to 
enhance the manipulation of the structure of incentives of the target population by other means.  
 
 
                                                          





CHANGES IN COLOMBIAN MILITARY THINKING – MODERNISATION, UNCONVENTIONAL 
WAR AND THE TRANSITION TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY, 1958 -1962 
 
The restitution of democracy via the National Front accord mandated a change in the 
role of the Colmil and its relationship to Colombian politics and society. In this context, in May 
1958, President elect Alberto Lleras Camargo furnished a working agreement with the military 
leadership that effectively granted them autonomy in exchange for political neutrality and non-
deliberation. The immediate goal of the agreement was to secure a smooth democratic 
transition by alleviating political tension, as a failed army putsch organised by a group of 
disaffected colonels prior to the presidential elections had demonstrated that deposed General 
Rojas still commanded some allegiance within the ranks. Although the agreement on military 
autonomy eventually became an inflexible doctrine for the conduct of civilian-military 
relations hindering the formulation of strategy ever since, at the time, it appeared to be an 
adequate measure that satisfied both politicians and soldiers during the transition from military 
rule for two intertwined reasons. 
First, given the belief that the National Front heralded the end of La Violencia, the 
tenets of the ‘Lleras doctrine’ seemed to be conducive to the Colmil’s political subordination 
and to promote non-partisanship, which reassured both political parties that the military would 
not be pitted against the other. Second, the agreement went in line with the belief of many 
senior officers associated with the Prusso-German tradition, that the protracted involvement in 
‘public order’ had been detrimental to their ethos and had intensified their politicisation.  In 
other words, the ‘Lleras doctrine’ responded to the desires of those who believed the civil 
conflict had diverted the Colmil from attending to matters more appropriate to its profession. 
In this sense, many officers considered that given the expected denouement of La Violencia 
with the National Front, the new civil-military accord allowed them to reassert their 
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professional ethos to focus on improving capabilities, as well as standardise procedures with 
Western armies for the planning, training and conduct of conventional war.   
As mentioned in Chapter 2, since the war with Peru in 1930, military thinking in  the 
country was firmly restricted to European concepts of warfare, with a firm belief that the 
military’s  main role was to defend the country in case of external war. In the words of a group 
of US military officials reviewing the Colmil in 1960 for the DoD, prior to the Second World 
War the typical career officer in the country had ‘sought for the Colombian armed forces to 
attain the standards of the great military powers of Europe, planning and organizing for external 
war following the models of the much admired German General Staff system.’1 This outlook 
had accordingly, made it difficult for many officers, since the outbreak of La Violencia, ‘to 
believe that the armed forces should play a role in the maintenance of internal order or defence 
of the government’.2 During the 1950s, the experiences of the Colombia Battalion in Korea 
and Suez as part of the UN peacekeeping efforts also influenced Colombian army planners’ 
ideas on the suitable configuration of the armed forces. In fact, the Colombia Infantry Battalion 
begun to function as a template combat unit for the general adoption by the Colmil of the US 
staff structure and organisation.3 The importance of the Colmil’s international experience in 
the early Cold War, according to an officer of the US Military Mission in Bogotá at the time, 
was that it allowed field grade officers to acquire a ‘more professional view of military matters’ 
and inform their efforts to restructure their command and staff system in accordance to the 
practices and priorities of the US.4  
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Clearly, after 1945, the focus of Colombian officers with the preparation for external 
war was also influenced by the emerging concern of Washington with Soviet encroachment in 
the region. The ratification of the Rio Pact in 1947, which guaranteed mutual assistance in case 
of extra continental attack, and the promotion in Washington of the concept of Hemispheric 
Defense helped to shape Colmil thinking. The concept demanded the provision of Latin 
American armies with new capabilities to aid the objective of defending access to the continent 
and face ‘diversionary attacks’, particularly in the Panama Canal area.5 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, military thought in Colombia had tended to subscribe to those continental 
defence requirements, despite the challenge of La Violencia. This was a consequence of the 
fact US military assistance since the signing of the MAP in 1952 was restricted to that specific 
purpose.6 Nevertheless, divisions of opinion within the ranks about their core missions were 
already present from the mid-1950s. They became more prominent, however, once civilian 
government was re-established and it became evident that the pacification of the country would 
require the use of the Colmil and not simply an accord between the parties. As US army 
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koontz, who led the DoD Colombia survey team in 1960, 
explained: 
Senior officers reflect the high sense of professionalism and dignity of the Army. Many 
maintain attitudes of strict disinterest in civilian affairs, and desire the Army to remain an 
isolated segment of the population, concerned only with preparation for defense by 
conventional methods against orthodox external aggression. Others appreciate the necessity for 
the Army to close the gulf which now separates it from the civilians of the country, and for it 
to act effectively for the public welfare, whether its action may be to chase bandits, or to help 
civilians in underdeveloped areas.7 
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However, the renewed intention of the Colmil leadership to continue theorising and 
preparing for the requirements of Hemispheric Defense as its main assignment changed. Lleras 
Camargo’s administration soon requested the chiefs of staff to prioritise internal security for 
two fundamental reasons. First, because despite its conciliatory tone, the National Front did 
not put a closure to the violence and soon spun off new bandit and guerrilla groups un-
reconciled to the partisan compromise and defiant of the renewed calls for amnesty and 
rehabilitation offered by the government. Second that the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, 
less than five months into the Lleras Camargo administration, had an almost immediate effect 
on the country’s political elite which began to consider seriously the threat of Communist 
influenced insurgency. These were the key arguments of the President in his yearly report to 
Congress (the Colombian equivalent to the US ‘state of the nation’ speech) in 1959, when he 
explained the foreseeable role of the Colmil: 
The armed forces cannot abandon the major role that corresponds to them for the preservation 
of internal public order. A bigger perturbation, or if disorder becomes endemic, will weaken 
the nation for its international defence. This internal assignment has to be understood after a 
necessary revision of all the accumulated experience of a decade filled with agitation and fights 
in which the army has been forced to improvise varied operations on a daily basis, and, in which 
their organisation and personnel has had to live in a constant state of emergency. We have to 
consider now the preparation and training of units that could work as an experiment for an 
ample transformation and adaptation of our military to present and future needs. 8  
 
Moreover, the Cuban revolution placed the continued rural banditry problem in 
Washington’s spotlight, which, preoccupied with the possible regional repercussions of Fidel 
Castro’s success, began to modify its military priorities in the region. Hence the US became 
more engaged with bolstering the stability of the new Colombian government with renewed 
defence and security assistance.9 Finally, Lleras Camargo’s political agenda would adhere to 
                                                          
8 ‘Informe al congreso, 20 julio 1959,’ Quoted in: Benjamin Villegas (ed.), Alberto Lleras: Antología. Tomo IV: 
El Gobernante, (Bogotá, Villegas Editores, 2006), p. 357. 
9 Eventually by 1962, as the US had feared, the Cuban success did serve to embolden the already existing self-
styled communist guerrilla groups that dated from the Gomez era. These groups soon adopted new strategic goals 
aimed at the seizure of political power via the use of force. But mainly, the revolution influenced the formation 
of new local insurgencies following the revolutionary ‘foco’ theory popularised by Che Guevara and Regis Debray 
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the discourse of modernisation theory, promoted by the recently inaugurated Kennedy 
administration, and which considered that the containment of internal unrest and the advance 
of communism would require the close collaboration of the armed forces with the government’s 
development plans. But the promotion of development or nation-building roles for allied 
militaries in the third world had some precedent in US policy. The Eisenhower administration, 
for example, had begun, in its final stages, to organise the requirements to bolster the internal 
security capabilities of Latin American countries, which gained momentum after Castro’s 
triumphal entry to Havana.  In November 1958, the ‘Drapper Committee’ formed by the US 
President to review military aid to Latin America concluded that there was a correlation 
between military aid and socio-economic development, thus suggesting that assistance along 
those lines might promote simultaneously  security and modernisation. These assumptions led 
to the eventual readjustment of the MAP’s terms, for example, shifting from the promotion of 
air defence battalions to combat engineer ones, with the argument that better mobility would 
provide benefits for the population as well as security.10 In a speech to the Colmil leadership 
in June 1961, Lleras Camargo summarised the broad strategic situation the country found itself 
in and clarified what the military instrument’s goal was: 
At this time we are faced with the contradictions of a world engaged in cold war. For the first 
time in our history we are in the front lines against the danger of a frontal attack. We do not 
want to be, we cannot be, neutral. […] You know that our enemies have been able to conquer 
almost without a shot half of the world for the new imperialism. Our mission is to maintain 
democracy, an efficient, strong democracy, able to carry out the needed changes in social 
conditions to bring about prosperity. Our duty is to defend peace and security.11  
As this chapter will elucidate, the correlation of Colombia’s endemic violence with the 
growing concerns of the Cold War at the closure of the 1950s marked the beginning of a 
transitional period in Colmil thought that extended into 1962, with the development of counter-
                                                          
and which were to receive support from Havana. Followers of ‘foquismo’ in Colombia included the MOEC 
founded in 1960, and eventually the ELN founded in 1964, and the M19 in 1973. 
10 Coleman, Colombia and the United States, pp. 188, 190-191. 
11 ‘Lleras addresses Bogota Military Club’, Bogota Domestic Service, 1 June 1961, Accessed via: FBIS. 
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insurgency theory and practice. The transition commenced with the inauguration by President 
Lleras Camargo of a new rehabilitation and development programme to finally put an end to 
the chapter of La Violencia. His policy signalled the return of the Colmil to the mission of main 
guarantor of ‘public order’, with the objective of putting muscle behind the government’s 
amnesty and relief agenda, and to coerce armed elements that did not respond to his renewed 
calls to cease violence. Likewise, the lack of capacity in key sectors of public administration, 
led the President to consider the Colmil as a key instrument to execute the diverse economic 
and social development initiatives of the government in the war-torn countryside.12 As 
expected, this led to the revival of the state-building narrative in Colmil thinking which would 
become a theme of fundamental contention throughout the decade. 
As noted, Washington soon became enthusiastic with Lleras Camargo’s policies and 
his engagement with the Colmil.  As a result of the Cuban revolution the military role in state-
building gained political credibility in much of Latin America as a viable strategic course of 
action to deal with underdevelopment, considered to be the main cause of violence and a Petri 
dish for Communist insurgency. The main thrust for the revival of the mission was the counter-
insurgency discourse promoted by President John F. Kennedy’s, and which would permeate 
the Alliance for Progress initiative.  The Alliance, apart from its anti-communism which gave 
it strategic logic, was also shaped by modernisation theory with a ‘notion that there was a 
single, linear path to economic development’.13 By late 1962, with proactive US endorsement, 
counter-insurgency became the distinctive framework to manage the recurring violence in 
Colombia. By arguing that the nature of war had fundamentally changed with the multiplication 
of Communist insurgencies in three continents, and with Colombia as one of the perceived 
frontlines in Latin America, the military instrument’s role and utility had to be reconsidered. 
                                                          
12 ‘Army to aid in eradicating violence,’ Bogota Radio Cadena Nacional, 3 February 1961, Accessed via: FBIS. 
13 Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, pp.44-45. 
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In this respect, the chapter will be divided thematically in three parts to analyse in depth how 
the Colmil reassessed the role of the armed instrument during its transition to counter-
insurgency and how its basic prescriptions influenced the Colombian’s strategic outlook to 
become dominant features of its thinking thereafter. The first two sections are concerned with 
the reasons why the Colmil reassessed the nature of the conflict and the instrumentality of force 
through the main operational precepts of counter-insurgency theory. The third section is 
concerned with how a modernisation narrative influenced Colmil thinking, in the context of 
Lleras Camargo’s Rehabilitation agenda and The Alliance for Progress, leading to the revival 
of the state-building mission.  
Reacting to La Violencia - Unconventional warfare and the debate over military 
technique  
 
As a result of the sense of apparent intractability of La Violencia during the late 1950s, the 
reaction to the failure to produce tangible results against the guerrillas was explained by various 
officers as an inability of the armed forces to adapt to the behaviour of the adversary and apply 
the correct sort of methods. This reflection gained impetus due to the unrelenting rural banditry 
problem and the increased threat of communist influenced insurgency which could affect the 
stability of the newly inaugurated civilian government of the National Front. Some officers, 
particularly those that were later associated to the Korean tradition, would begin to advocate 
the adoption of the tenets of counter-insurgency to inform the conduct of the Colmil. This 
section will argue that counter-insurgency, actively promoted by the recently elected Kennedy 
administration, offered to these Colmil officers a consoling narrative to explain and avoid the 
past failures in dealing with La Violencia, and hence, gained ground as the basis for their 
strategic formulation as the decade progressed.  
210 
 
The transit to counter-insurgency in the Colmil was all but immediate, the rapidly 
changing geopolitical conditions notwithstanding. As already mentioned, at the onset of the 
National Front, the main concern of the Colmil chiefs was the recovery of the professional 
character of the army. The stress was placed on the study of defence issues termed as 
‘conventional’, like the modernisation of their General Staff, questions of national mobilisation 
and the transfer of lessons from the Colombia Battalion to the operational units of the Colmil. 
In this sense, there were strong voices within the Colmil demanding the avoidance of internal 
security missions and the entanglement with sectarian politics. Even President Lleras Camargo 
lamented to a US DoD survey mission that visited the country in 1960, how adamant his Chiefs 
of Staff were about avoiding the internal security mission: 
[Lleras Camargo] had tried to impress on the leaders of the armed forces the need of training 
for this kind of [unconventional] warfare, but they would not listen to him. He thought, 
however, they would listen to American army leaders […]The president then stated that one of 
the most useful things that we could do would be to have our mission train the armed forces to 
fight this kind of [unconventional] warfare.14 
  Nonetheless, there were already plenty voices within the Colmil counselling against the 
conventional-minded leadership. Colombian officers confided to US military officials that 
many of them agreed with the President’s view that the precepts of Hemispheric Defense were 
outmoded given that in the ‘age of massive weapons it could be entrusted to largely to the 
United States.’15  The Secretary to the Minister of War, Brigadier General Alberto Terán, 
apparently behind his boss’s back, even went further, and apprised to the Military Attaché 
informally at a dinner party that he was sure the military would formally re-examine their roles 
and mission ‘should there be a re-orientation in regard to advice and assistance of the US 
military mission toward the Colombian Armed Forces in light of what many Colombian senior 
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officers now regard as their primary mission – viz. Internal Security.’16  Indeed, as shown in 
the previous chapter, the view that the Colmil should modify its roles and missions and focus 
on the fight against local guerrilla and bandit groups was already present in the minds of many 
officers from the mid-1950s onwards. This was a factor which eventually facilitated the 
adoption of the tenets of counter-insurgency, as promoted by US and French sources, by those 
officers less resistant to the idea that the military should give priority to its domestic ‘public 
order’ mission, provided that a change in approach and tactics took place. For instance, already 
in 1956, a Lieutenant Colonel addressed a very candid letter to a Brigadier on his views on the 
Army’s general problems on issues of organisation, training and doctrine and complained that 
the tendency of copying US military practices observed in Korea were not only unrealistic for 
Colombia, but mainly counter-productive in dealing with the internal problems the country 
faced: 
Is there a planning of our organisation? No. We are planning for Divisions that we cannot 
create. We have Brigades that do not correspond to our current military needs […] We have 
been copying a lot from American organisation, but its convenience for our army has not been 
studied nor tested. We have created little and limited ourselves to translate badly many manuals 
that are applied halfway, with no judgment. […] As a solution, I consider it wise to gather a 
group of prominent officers: specialists of all arms that combined with service schools and the 
Colombia Battalion, organised as experimentation unit, who would study the organisation of 
the army’s units and makes proposals, in such a way that they respond to our internal needs and 
adjust to our possibilities.17 
At the height of La Violencia, local military thinking was ‘heavily influenced by the science 
and techniques of battles of annihilation, very distant from Colombian reality’, the official 
history of the army emphasises. 18 According to this reasoning, the ‘conventional’ mentality of 
the Colmil during the Gomez era had reduced significantly the operational efficiency of the 
armed instrument in the conduct of the war against the liberal guerrillas.  This view was to be 
                                                          
16 Howard C. Parker, Army Attaché to Milton K. Wells, Chargé d’Affaires,  ‘Role of the Armed Forces’ 
Memorandum of Conversation, 2 May 1960, RG59 1960-63, 721.00114-1860 Box 1547, NARA. 
17 TTE.COR Arturo Gonzalez Arcila a  Brig. Gen Navas Pardo, ‘Un tema sobre el Ejército’, Diciembre 12 1956,  
Secretaria General, Fuerzas Militares, caja 2, carpeta 71, ff.273-278, AP. 
18 Valencia Tovar (ed.) Historia de las Fuerzas Militares, p.170. 
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summarised by Joaquin Matallana,  who as a Colonel in the early 1960s played an influential 
role in the change in the Colmil’s modus operandi, and was convinced that ‘irregularising’ the 
army to face the domestic enemy’s tactics was the crucial aspect to deal effectively with them.  
[...] at that time [1950s] the Army was organised for regular warfare, for the fulfilment of its primary 
mission: the defence of the nation. For example, for every battalion there was a company of heavy 
weapons that mobilised its equipment on mules. Under the mentality of regular warfare, the troops 
crossed the cordilleras trying to transport the heavy weapons over them because it was demanded 
by the TOE. Obviously the result was negative because the guerrillas were more agile, they moved 
fast and the situation favoured their hit and run operations. We had begun at that time to adopt the 
patterns of the US army, due to the agreements that followed the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
and this augmented the disagreements [over technique]. We were receiving a doctrine for regular 
warfare and it was completely different to the situation and needs of the Colombian army. [...] 
Slowly, it became necessary to plan and change our tactics in line with the requirements of irregular 
warfare.19  
The reflections of many field grade officers over the technical corrections required to 
prevent past operational mistakes, only took hold with the consolidation of the Cuban 
revolution. Very soon they displaced the conventional-minded leadership of the Colmil and 
found themselves promoted to key positions were they could shape military policy, as their 
demands were in sync with the political priorities of presidents Lleras Camargo and eventually 
Kennedy’s. Indeed, the success of Fidel Castro’s guerrillas changed the regional strategic 
setting, directing the attention of the US military and its neighbours to the problem of 
‘unconventional’ war.20  
The emphasis on the need for Latin American armies to design and apply novel methods 
for the application of force, was underpinned by the idea which had gained ground in influential 
segments of western military thought, that the nature of war was radically changing. A 
complete review of the norms of military thinking, organisation and tactics had to materialise 
to effectively contain the perceived threat communism posed with its intentions to export its 
revolution across the region following the Cuban model.21 In this respect, the belief that 
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‘unconventional war’ was a new norm, allowed Colombian officers to place the conflict they 
had been facing in a wider global context and asses its importance vis-à-vis other Western 
armies.22 Particularly, the writings of many high-ranking officers during the period were 
permeated by the tenets of revolutionary war theory, in the form promoted by French thinkers, 
and which helped locate the Colmil in the front line against a communist directed conspiracy 
to take over the free world by attacking targets of opportunity like Colombia. The apparent 
implications of this worldview in reassessing the role the armed instrument, were summarised 
in an editorial by the Chief of the Armed forces in 1962: 
Communism has adopted ‘revolutionary war’ to take power in diverse countries, which is in many 
ways more economical and convenient for the Soviet Union than an atomic conflict. The 
circumstances of an atomic war would almost signify the complete destruction of the countries 
involved, which leads us to the conclusion that guerrilla war is the future, and hence, that 
conventional war is something of the past. While we must continue to study conventional war 
during some time, it will cede space to revolutionary war as it will be the scenario in countries 
where communism can use subversive means or guerrillas. […] It is necessary that revolutionary 
war occupies the main place, and that we dominate all of its systems and procedures. Therefore, as 
we have said, we need a change of mentality that should make us consider reviewing individual 
basic training and the Lanceros, as they are primordial to make our soldiers excellent in waging 
guerrilla warfare. This change of mentality will also impact our operational planning and 
organisation of tactical units.23 
With these points in mind, the remainder of this section, as well as the following one, will 
centre on the way high-ranking Colombian officers who led the transition to counter-
insurgency, reassessed the use and value of the military instrument. The apparent conceptual 
clarity of the theory in explaining the dynamics of violence in Colombia consolidated a 
conviction, particularly for those associated with the Korean tradition, that if its norms were 
correctly followed, counter-insurgency would be an effective formula to fight a new form of 
war.  
These transitions in Colmil thinking started to gain momentum in late 1960 when President 
Lleras Camargo named Brigadier General Alberto Ruiz Novoa as army CoS, a former 
                                                          
22  For example see: Miguel Peña, ‘La misión del ejército’, Revista del Ejército Vol.1 No.1 (1961), pp.15-19; 
Bernardo Currea, ‘Las organización militar de una nación’, Revista del Ejército Vol.1 No.1 (1961), pp.21-26. 
23 ‘Notas Editoriales’, Revista del Ejercito Vol2. No.7 (1962), pp.143-144. 
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commander of the Colombia Battalion in Korea. According to Colombian scholar Francisco 
Leal, Ruiz Novoa was the first to truly understand the extent of the counter-insurgency 
discourse and desired to operationalise it in Colombia.24 ‘In September 1960, when I assumed 
the Command of the Army, violence was increasing in many parts of the country,’ explained 
the General in an interview after his retirement in 1965. ‘In my opinion our existing military 
organisation was inadequate for the type of struggle we were facing and various measures had 
to be taken.’25 One of the first steps Ruiz Novoa took to transmit his views about the road the 
Colmil should take to adapt to the new way of war, was the inauguration of two academic 
journals: Revista del Ejercito (Army Review) and Revista de la Fuerzas Armadas (Review of 
the Armed Forces). The object of these publications was, according to Ruiz Novoa, to advance 
the ‘general aim of implanting a new institutional conscience, so that the Armed Forces could 
emerge from the political and intellectual prostration in which they had been traditionally 
kept’.26   
The new publications not only included original articles authored by his subordinate 
officers, it also included operational concepts designed by the staff of combat units as well as 
informative and training material produced by the US on diverse planning and tactical issues. 
How to wage Guerra revolucionaria became a popular subject of a great number of the articles 
that appeared in the military journals from 1961 onward. In most of them Colombian officers 
drew conclusions from the experience of the French in Indochina and Algeria, and attempted 
to establish lessons of general application, some of which however, were somewhat feeble and 
disingenuous. ‘Normally guerrillas do not face regular troops in open combat until they have 
an advantage, but isolated units like advanced posts or patrols can be sieged or blockaded,’ 
explained an operational concept published by an Infantry Battalion, which went on to affirm: 
                                                          
24 Francisco Leal, Estado y Política en Colombia, (Bogotá: Siglo XXI Editores, 1984), p.208. 
25  Ruiz Novoa, El gran desafío, p.119. 
26 Ibid, p.120. 
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‘We have not heard of a besieged unit that has come out victorious by opposing to its adversary, 
with no external support, a tactical defensive concept. The heroic but vain defence of Dien Bien 
Phu against the numerous forces of the Vietminh corroborates the axiom that only offensive 
action produces decisive results.’27 Conversely, a report by the British military attaché in 1973, 
after a visit to the commander of the Vth Army Brigade in the department of Santander —
which became the main area of operations against the ‘Castroist’ ELN insurgency — gives 
some detail on the impact of counter-insurgency operational concepts as utilised by other 
countries for the conduct of Colombian officers in the field:  
His command group had studied various methods of anti-guerrilla tactics, particularly British and 
French. He said that, as I would know, they had been given considerable information about our 
methods in Malaya. But they had naturally been able to use as much of this information as could be 
applied to local conditions. It was really only tropical areas of Colombia towards Brazil that 
corresponded closely to Malaya conditions. In some ways the kind of physical conditions he had to 
cope with were more akin to the conditions faced by the French in Algeria. (He showed me some 
diagrammatic material from French sources showing various methods of anti-guerrilla tactics, 
including the use of helicopters in conjunction with operations on the ground designed to drive out 
the guerrillas into a small central area capable of being sealed off and attacked effectively). But he 
said, helicopters were hard to come by, even from the US, and while they had a few they were not 
sufficient to make really successful operations more than very occasionally possible 28 
 
The Malayan emergency, was indeed, broadly studied by Colmil high-ranking officers to 
inform their operational ideas. For example, in an article advocating for the development of a 
‘peasant self-defence’ mechanism in the Tolima department, the staff officers of a battalion 
with jurisdiction in the area discussed the costs and benefits of resettlement, following the 
example of the Briggs plan. ‘A necessary aspect when talking of self-defence is if the civilian 
population is going to be controlled in determined sectors as the English have done in Malaya,’ 
explained the report, which whilst considering resettlement as an ideal way to completely 
separate the population from the guerrillas, its final take was that it was unworkable in 
                                                          
27 Batallón de Infantería No.17 General Caycedo, ‘Operación Contra Guerrillas’, Revista del Ejército Vol. II No.6, 
February (1962), p.46. 
28 ‘Colombia Internal Security,’ February 1973, Guerrilla Activities in Colombia, 1 January 1973 – 31 December 
1973, FCO 7/2480, NAR Kew. 
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Colombia.29 ‘Such a system would require substantial expenditures by the state for the 
construction of housing and services in the concentration areas, the abandonment of cultivated 
farms and the opening of new work fronts to ensure the subsistence of the displaced families. 
It was possible for the English to do it, but it does not correspond to our environment.’30 Apart 
from the academic study of the Malaya Emergency, the Colmil also received sporadic visits 
from British officials who liaised with the US military group and surveyed the unstable areas 
offering wide-ranging policy and operational guidance.31 
Undoubtedly, it was mainly the veterans of the Korea war who were the conduit for an 
approach that emphasised the creation of specialised counter-guerrilla and intelligence units to 
fight the bandit and communist groups.  These veterans made part of a select niche of cadres 
which, given their previous war experience, had established close contacts with fellow officers 
of the US army, and went on to be trained in their service schools. These relations predictably 
increased Washington’s ability to influence Colombian military policy as well as the positive 
reception of an increased engagement in the country with a growing number of advisors via a 
Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) from 
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30 Ibid. 
31  During the course of the archival research evidence was found that a handful of FCO officials visited Colombia 
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to military action’ in the fight against communist insurgency, whilst stressing that Colmil officers certainly 
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late 1961. Some of the measures taken to implement the counter-insurgency model by General 
Ruiz Novoa following US advice, were, for example, changes in education and training to 
promote the study of ‘unconventional’ warfare, the reform of military intelligence and a 
reorganisation of the main operational units of the army to incorporate specialised combat 
units. In particular, an important aspect was to increase the profile of the Escuela de Lanceros 
(ranger school) created in 1955, and which was to become a laboratory for the whole spectrum 
of counter-guerrilla techniques. Originally, for the Colombians, it had not been clear if 
Lanceros were meant to be a ranger or commando force, and hence they failed to develop a 
clear framework to utilise them, viewing them simply as highly trained rifle platoons. This 
changed with the Korea veterans’ focus on unconventional warfare. For instance, Colonel 
Joaquin Matallana, who returned from a stint at the Command and Staff College in Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas in 1959, was prominent in elevating the profile of the Lanceros so they 
could take the brunt of the responsibility in the fight against the insurgents and bandits in the 
central cordillera. Matallana encouraged a rugged training course in diverse anti-guerrilla 
tactics, promoted the formation of specialists in intelligence, especially interrogation and 
investigation, civil affairs and psychological operations.32   
Most of the organisational and tactical developments of the early counter-insurgency era 
were managed by the Brigade of Military Institutes (BIM) and the Army Command’s Planning 
and Operations Department (E3). These were the Colmil’s main units charged with planning 
and training purposes, and controlled all the schools and instruction centres.33 A procedure was 
established by these units for operations that required a preliminary study of the areas to 
intervene in order to define an areas ‘salient socio-economic characteristics,’ to obtain detailed 
                                                          
32 Ramsey, ‘The Colombian Battalion,’p.554. 
33 The BIM was by far the largest unit of the Colmil by the late 1950s, with a staff composed of 542 officers, 2722 
NCOs and 6539 privates. In short, 25% of all the army strength. The BIM not only acted as the main army reserve, 
it also housed the Colombia infantry Battalion.  
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intelligence and define the lineaments for the approach to the population and the levels and 
type of force to be applied.34 The first special counter-insurgency units to act in this fashion 
were referred to by Special Warfare experts at Fort Bragg, as intelligence-hunter killer teams. 
Following the template, they were to be composed by the personnel trained at the Lanceros 
School with the supervision of the MTTs. The first units became operational by mid-1962.35 
Officially termed as grupos moviles de inteligencia localizadores or GILs, they were better 
known by their code name Flechas (Arrows), trained to gather intelligence and act on it to 
reduce the field of action of the bandoleros which resisted President Lleras Camargo’s calls 
for demobilisation. Drawing on the experience of the Flechas which acted at company level, a 
smaller, more agile spin-off known as comandos localizadores or Arpón (Harpoon) appeared 
in the most volatile regions of the central cordillera to act against the most ferocious of the 
bandolero gangs.36 These units took advantage of air mobility with the introduction of 
helicopters, which slowly began to make their appearance in the country, as well as better 
communications systems to expedite response times, all of which were offered in great part by 
US assistance via a comprehensive Internal Defense Program approved by Washington in mid-
1962, which was concerned with the growing levels of violence in the country.37   
Nevertheless, as the DoD survey team noted early in 1960, the growing awareness by local 
army officers about the technicalities of waging counter-guerrilla warfare, appeared to have 
created the impression that the Lanceros were the military solution to the problem of violence 
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35 See: Dennis Rempe, 'Guerrillas, bandits, and independent republics: US counter-insurgency efforts in Colombia 
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and stability in Colombia. ‘Properly used’, Lieutenant Colonel Koontz and his team went on 
to explain, ‘they will become a most valuable arm; but the only solution is a total effort of all 
the armed forces, the civilian government and the people’.38 With hindsight, it is fair to say that 
the views of Koontz on the behaviour of many Colmil officers and civilian with regards to the 
Lanceros were highly accurate. His remarks evidenced what would become a chronic tendency 
in Colmil thinking: a fixation with military technique as a quick-fix solution to the conflict. 
Koontz went on to explain: 
Steps taken are too small and uncoordinated. Each proposal, e.g. psychological warfare, helicopters, 
amnesty, etc., is treated independently by its proponents and pushed without regard to other 
proposals, as if it alone could solve the problem. Because of poor planning, organisation and 
administration at the seat of government, the heads of subordinate agencies there is no view of the 
inter-relationship and interdependence of their ideas and programs to others. There is a tendency to 
substitute a short range “gimmick” solution for a long-range program requiring constancy and 
sacrifice. Very often the inevitable result of the failure of one road, one time palliatives is 
disappointment and disillusionment. The inclination to substitute panaceas for a long-range broad 
view program which goes down many roads must be resisted.39 
 As has been constantly stressed throughout the pages of this thesis, the preoccupation of 
many in the Colmil with technique has been a serious structural problem at the level of strategic 
formulation and decision-making since the early 1960s. In other words, ‘gimmick solutions’ 
as Koontz called them, have become a substitute for cohesive, balanced strategic judgement up 
to the present. Ironically, at the beginning of the counter-insurgency era in Colombia, the 
organisational and tactical developments introduced by the Koreans under the argument that 
they were the response to a new way of war, would actually serve to embolden many officers 
of the more traditional Prusso-German school of the Colmil once the communist insurgent 
groups of the FARC and ELN escalated the war in the second half of the decade. Many of these 
soldiers, who believed they were facing an irreconcilable enemy that had to be ultimately 
destroyed, assimilated the tactical developments as instrumental to improve the armed 
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instrument’s proficiency. But as this thesis contends, many of these officers also considered 
counter-insurgency tactics as stand-alone solutions rather than as supporting tool to longer term 
policies that addressed the underlying causes of political instability. 
‘The sine qua non condition of victory in modern warfare’ – Reappraising the Colmil’s 
relationship with the population 
 
The strategic challenge in revolutionary war, according to its proponents, was to achieve the 
control of the population.  As Colonel Roger Trinquier put it, ‘the sine qua non condition of 
victory in modern war is the unconditional support of the population.’40 For the French thinker, 
the government and its military forces faced the same problems as the insurgents in terms of 
winning the support of the population. For example, support for the insurgents rarely came by 
spontaneously, despite the potency and accessibility of their ideology. Trinquier therefore 
considered that insurgents could attain it by intimidation and fear. Similarly, the government 
and its military forces also had to devise hard-headed measures to assure compliance of the 
population and to ultimately isolate the insurgents.41 This assessment served to reassert further 
the belief that the norms of war had radically changed, as the destruction of the adversary’s 
forces or the conquest of territory had become irrelevant. The new battlefield was no longer 
physical but psychological.42 In Colombia, these precepts of revolutionary war theory became 
extremely influential in shaping the value-system of many of the Colmil officers that led the 
transition to counter-insurgency. A key officer in transmitting them was Colonel Alvaro 
Valencia Tovar, who clearly echoed Trinquier in his own writings of the early 1960s:  
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 […]guerrilla warfare is no longer about articulating the manoeuvre of grand masses of men and 
material to find the strategic act that allows to impose one’s will over the adversary. What it is about 
today is the invisible combination of psychological pressure, the managing of political forces, of 
ideological penetration over the minds of men. 43 
After heading the Army Command’s E3 department, under direct orders of General Ruiz 
Novoa, Colonel Valencia Tovar led, between late 1961 and 1962, the campaign against one of 
the guerrilla commands of the first Cuban influenced guerrilla group that operated in the 
country: the Student –Worker’s Movement (Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Colombiano - 
MOEC). This group, which begun its subversive activities at the end of 1959, attempted to 
initiate ‘focos’ in the central cordillera and the eastern plains. It was easily defeated both in the 
urban and rural areas.44 Valencia Tovar’s operational success against the MOEC ‘foco’ in the 
eastern plains signalled his promotion by Ruiz Novoa to command the Infantry School in April 
1962. This position allowed him to write frequently in the nascent Colmil’s journals and to 
steer the publication of the army’s first comprehensive counter-insurgency manuals, which, in 
contemporary parlance, emphasised a population centric approach rather than an enemy centric 
one. The material relied heavily on the doctrinal output of US military publications, which in 
most cases was conveniently translated into Spanish and adapted to Colombian operational 
needs with the guidance of the MAAG.45 One of the crucial aspects from 1962 was the design 
of mechanisms to control the population, gain its support for the government, as well as build 
resilience in the face of constant intimidatory violence from rebel groups.  
The requirement for a new approach towards the population was also built around the 
reaction to the brutal conduct of the Colmil during La Violencia which, as has already been 
discussed extensively, was considered by these officers to be one of the main reasons the 
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44 A short history of the MOEC is available in: Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (Oxford: 
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military instrument had been ineffective in the past. In this respect, the campaign against the 
MOEC in the eastern plains was seen by Colonel Valencia Tovar as a turning point for the 
Colmil, because the lessons learnt in that theatre determined the germination of a new, more 
enlightened method to fight insurgencies.46 With hindsight, however, it is fair to conclude that 
the MOEC did not present a substantial challenge to the Colmil in general. Moreover, neither 
did the campaign against it, particularly in the eastern plains exemplify the inauguration of a 
new model to fight insurgencies in Colombia or a major re-evaluation of the relation to the 
population.  
The MOEC was founded by a small group of radicalised middle class university students 
who wanted to create a united revolutionary front with urban workers. In theory, the front 
would be led to victory thanks to the action of a rural guerrilla army that would be organised 
by the student vanguard. The leaders of the group left for Cuba in July 1959 where they 
received political and military training for six months to plan their scheme. In the end, these 
students proved to be inept, highlighting the often insurmountable divisions with Latin 
American leftist politics over ideology and the timing and methods of revolution, which 
invariably resulted in internal feuding that facilitated the work of the security services.47 The 
urban cells of the MOEC were no match for the nascent Colombian intelligence and police 
                                                          
46  His personal analysis of the consequences of the campaign for the Colmil can be found in: Álvaro Valencia 
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services, and were easily infiltrated at an early stage.48 For example, the correspondence from 
Cuba of the leader Antonio Larrota, were he detailed his stay and discussed MOEC’s future 
plans was intercepted by the intelligence services, which allowed the Ministry of War to direct 
its efforts to target the group.49  
In the rural areas, it was mainly the inherent mistrust of the peasants which facilitated the 
destruction of the armed focos the students of the MOEC attempted to initiate between 1961 
and 1962. The basic failure that marked their demise was their unsuccessful attempt to recruit 
former Liberal guerrilla rank and file, or, to ally with those still active in bandit gangs. If not 
denounced to the Colmil by the locals, the armed peasantry they recruited took into their own 
hands to get rid of the MOEC cadres. For example, the foco in the mountains of Cauca was 
decimated in May 1961 when Antonio Larrota and his collaborators were massacred by one of 
the competing bandit groups of the area during a meeting organised between both parties to 
discuss the incorporation of the gang’s rank and file to the MOEC. Apparently the bandit 
leader, a former Liberal guerrilla known as Aguililla, planned the execution of the students 
when he found out they had also been establishing contacts with an opposing bandit group.50 
The record that exists in the Colombian ministry of interior about this case shows the intricacy 
of the Colmil’s operational task when dealing with the multiple armed groups that originated 
in the territory after the National Front. The record also shows that Colmil units had to consider 
conciliating or cooperating with some gangs to attack others according to local political 
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49 ‘Informe sobre el comunismo’, Despacho del Presidente, 1962, Caja 4, AP. 
50 Díaz,  Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino, p.104. 
224 
 
considerations and the allegiances of the local populace.51 After news spread of his death, 
Larrota’s family denounced the national authorities declaring that the culprits were not detained 
by the Colmil nor the Police, even though the gang leader Aguililla who was well known in the 
area, was seen in the officers’ company during the judicial inspection to remove the massacred 
bodies. Although vague and unclear at times, the affidavit of the Lieutenant who commanded 
the local army outpost is extremely revealing of the problems faced by company level officers 
in the field and their appreciation of counter-insurgency methods:  
I did not capture him the day we went uphill offering security to the police inspector, as 
during the course of the month I had been having meetings with the aforementioned 
Aguililla to agree on plans to capture or kill the cuadrilla commanded by a certain Tijeras. 
Then my plan was to proceed, after this objective, against the gang of Aguililla and in that 
fashion to diminish the violence in my jurisdiction. The former, I was doing knowing that 
this method, of the many used in the counter-guerrilla war, has given magnificent results.52 
 
According to the local conditions many Colmil units would attempt to pitch individual 
gangs against each other and turn a blind eye, reach temporary cease fire agreements, or place 
them at their service as trackers, for example.53 This behaviour was criticised in various 
instances. For example, the Prosecutor General in a letter to the President in 1962 expressed 
his concern with the situation with the Tenerife Battalion in the departments of Huila, as the 
commander had apprised to him during an inspection that the command policy in the 
jurisdiction was: to ‘maintain the existing equilibrium between the armed gangs.’54 According 
to the Prosecutor, the Battalion commander had to act in accordance to the political preferences 
of the local authorities, who gave strict orders not to persecute some gangs operating there, as 
they were being protected by chieftains who considered them ‘bastions’ against the gangs of 
neighbouring regions. ‘The Colonel abstained from disclosing the exact origin of the 
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instructions I refer to,’ wrote the Prosecutor, ‘but if the military continues to proceed in a 
discriminatory manner, it is going to be very difficult to finish off the foci of violence that exist 
in the department; all the more since these groups of anti-socials do not fight amongst them, 
but limit their activities to the murder and pillage of defenceless peasants that do not have 
anything to do with politics.’55 
For their part, the efforts against the MOEC foco in the eastern plains, which was 
commanded by a physician named Tulio Bayer and Antonio’s brother, Ramon Larrota, proved 
to be a greater challenge for the Colmil than that of the central cordillera. The location of this 
foco in the frontier region of Vichada, where the government’s presence was tenuous and where 
support could arrive via Venezuela through the Orinoco River, ran parallel to the history of 
rebellion in the area after the events of 9 April 1948. The authorities considered that these 
factors played to the insurgent’s advantage. The population of Vichada was primarily 
composed of indigenous tribes and squatters who had arrived there displaced by La Violencia.  
This included experienced former guerrillas who had confronted the Gomez regime, all of 
whom augmented the anxieties of the government in Bogotá. When news arrived of the 
presence of MOEC guerrillas there in late 1961, the Ministry of War responded by dispersing 
the already overstretched units available in the eastern plains throughout the villages of 
Vichada, an area of more than 100,000 km². Evidently, the Colmil’s dispersion assisted the hit 
and run tactics of the insurgents. In September 1961, in a bold action, the guerrillas 
overwhelmed the only outpost in the jungle village of Santa Rita in the Orinoco delta, which 
was manned by 18 marines of the Colombian Navy. In response the Colmil decided to increase 
its footprint by deploying the Colombia Infantry Battalion in the area adjacent to the Orinoco, 




and executed an operation under the command of Colonel Valencia Tovar with the objective 
of eliminating the foco.56  
Colonel Valencia Tovar’s analysis of the success of Plan Ariete (Plan Battering-ram) 
in Vichada was that it was made possible only by a combination of enlightened methods 
towards the local population with a more measured use of force. According to Valencia Tovar, 
positive results were possible due to the application of a sequenced operational formula that 
allowed the separation of the insurgents from the population. His reading, was that by 
prioritising cordial relations with the local population, including a commitment to protect them 
and their property from acts of violence, and an assessment of the local conditions to discern 
basic socio-economic needs that could be solved by the soldiers ultimately facilitated the 
isolation of the guerrillas. Once rooted out, the Colmil’s specialised combat units could easily 
target, or simply starve out the guerrillas, keeping them constantly on the run with no access to 
resources. This approach would demoralise them and force their rank and file to surrender or 
to look for refuge in frontier areas.57 According to Valencia Tovar, three clearly defined phases 
designated as ‘isolation, destruction and consolidation’ guided the approach in Vichada. 
Supposedly, this was an operational concept that resulted from the Colombian ‘development 
of its own military doctrine, to be applied to unique and particular conditions’ given that the 
way in which ‘guerrilla warfare is waged in our soil under the label of violencia is different to 
that which can occur in any other part of the world,’ argued Valencia Tovar in his memoirs.58 
                                                          
56 The US embassy praised Colmil given the operational challenges. They commented the operation was planned 
and mounted with precision and alacrity, despite the great distances of the region, 340 nautical miles from the 
eastern plains capital of Villavicencio to the Orinoco, and the ‘paucity of suitable aircraft’ to mobilise a whole 
battalion, as the Airforce only counted with 8 transport aircraft (6 C-47s a C-54 Skymaster and a PBY Catalina). 
US Embassy to DoS, ‘Coordinated Operation Against Guerrillas in Eastern Llanos’, 13 October 1962, RG59 
1960-63, 721.00W/ 8-560 Box 1545, NARA. 
57 As a result of the offensive, MOEC operatives were forced to cross the border into Venezuela, and even had to 
look for refuge as far as the Brazilian amazon jungle due to the Colmil pressure. See: ‘La banda de Bayer se 
refugió en Venezuela’, El Tiempo, 18  October 1961. 
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Obviously, this is was a misreading by Valencia Tovar, who read the actions in Vichada 
through the lens of doctrinal concepts that only made their appearance in Colmil thinking after 
the defeat of the MOEC, chiefly with input from US military assistance which advised 
Colombian military planning in a more comprehensive manner after the approval of an official 
Internal Defense Plan in the summer of 1962.59  
Another point Valencia Tovar continuously made in his writings, whilst asserting the 
campaign against the MOEC as a model counter-insurgency effort, was that the tactical 
innovations the Colmil began to implement significantly improved its performance, but that 
they were only partial to its success. Almost five decades after the operation in Vichada, the 
Colonel would still underline that Ariete’s philosophy was that persuasion would be more 
important than force’, reasserting that it was a conflict of unique character by echoing the 
counter-insurgency creed he defended in the early 1960s: that ‘it was a war that had to be waged 
by penetrating the hearts and minds of men.’60 However, the historical record available today 
allows us to establish that Valencia Tovar’s ex post facto views and justifications were 
somewhat romanticised, and that the actual isolation of the insurgents in Vichada often required 
heavy handed actions towards the population. In fact, the starting point of the operation was 
not very dissimilar to the one the Colmil had used during the eastern plains campaign of the 
early 1950s to separate the population from the rebels by dropping leaflets to warn of an 
imminent offensive action and exhorting ‘honest citizens’ to leave the area, expecting in the 
words of the US embassy, a ‘showdown fight with the estimated 150 guerrillas and their 1000 
armed local sympathizers’.61 The key difference with the Gomez era, however, was that there 
was no threat of punitive action against those who remained, rather assurances of protection 
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and safe conduct to enable the military offensive.62 A massive displacement of a fearful 
population, predominantly squatters that had had an association with the eastern plains 
rebellion of the 1950s, could not be prevented. This population controlled the region’s rice 
cultivation which was the basis of the local economy, and so, led the Colmil to round up 
available men and force them to work to save the harvest.63        
Notwithstanding what the historical record can tell us today about the real extent of the 
Colmil’s conduct against the MOEC and the bandolero gangs at the onset of the 1960s, and 
how disingenuous Valencia Tovar was in his justification of the methods used, it is this mode 
of interpretation by the Korean section, highlighting  counter-insurgency as a special category 
of war that required progressive thinking, which gives insight into the way they thought about 
themselves and understood the value of force.  For example, by arguing that the campaign 
against the MOEC had been the manifestation of a new way to deal with armed rural rebellion, 
which offered long lasting lessons for the partial development of ‘a doctrine for the 
understanding of the causes of the conflict’, is what in Valencia’s Tovar judgement, offered 
the Colmil’s leadership of the time the underpinnings for a ‘proper strategic framework to guide 
its action,’ in opposition to the short-sighted conventional approach of the traditionalists. 64  
What Valencia Tovar was referring to, was the Colmil planners’ efforts, under the sway of 
General Ruiz Novoa, to come up with a comprehensive explanation of the complex nature of 
the conflict. As argued in Chapter 2, this resulted in the development of the theory for the 
deactivation of the causes of violence as a basis to re-evaluate the role of the armed instrument, 
fitting with the priorities of the Rehabilitation agenda of the Lleras Camargo administration.  
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The causes of violence theory of the Colmil would shape its counter-insurgency approach 
during the mid-1960s, under the assumption that all the groups had the same social  roots and 
that they deployed the same methods to achieve their goals, be them political or financial. The 
core element of the theory was that the identification of the objective or imagined grievances 
that made Colombian peasants assist local bandit gangs, or find the communist insurgent’s 
discourse appealing, was the primary step in correctly laying down the procedures to isolate 
these groups from the population. Following from this, the officers who accepted this line of 
thought considered that force had its limitations, or at least that it had to be used discriminately. 
In this regard, comments to the press by some unit commanders, when asked about their 
opinions on the role of the military instrument in their respective areas of operation, conveyed 
messages like: ‘military action to confront a problem as complex as la violencia must change 
according to the circumstances to avoid becoming a routine.’65 Or ‘I have preached among the 
peasants the advantages of peaceful relationships, but at the same time I have combined this 
with energetic military action…this is the only way to eradicate the tendency – very frequent 
among peasants- to consider guerrilleros their protectors, when all legitimate authorities go into 
a crisis.’ 66 
In a seminal article titled ‘Revolutionary War in Colombia,’ the executive officer of the 
BIM, Colonel Enrique Ruano, explained that the challenge for the Colmil was to outsmart the 
tactics used by the local agents of international communism, who promoted instability by 
fomenting the appearance of all type of irregular groups which exploited the penurious socio-
economic conditions in the country side to create havoc and guerrilla war. To curtail them, it 
would be necessary to advance a repertoire of immaterial and material actions directed to 
manipulate the structure of incentives of what he believed was a biddable population:  
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Colombia is one of the countries with the highest rates of illiteracy. Our masses just have one or 
two years of basic schooling. It can be deduced that they are in conditions to sympathise with 
communism and offer it their support given the circumstances. Let us remember that communism, 
as it was well described by Colonel Lacheroy, “starts like the Genesis: in the beginning there was 
nothing,” and has to work with minorities that form illegal revolutionary fronts to exploit the 
conditions to make the masses embrace their ideas […] Once the factors that determine the masses’ 
support for revolutionary war have been studied, the problem is to search for the causes and mobiles 
that can produce an adverse effect to their morale and criteria, and so to displace them from the 
wrong road they have taken. We have to remember that in revolutionary war, the main problem is 
not to destroy the rebel bands: problem number one is to dominate the population, as the one who 
achieves this has already won.67    
 
A main contention that underpinned this line of thought was that solely focusing on Acción 
Militar (military action) the Colmil would only attack the consequences of violence, and so, 
force was rendered incapable of delivering strategic results. As colonel Ruano Monzon 
explained, ‘for an anti-revolutionary, anti-communist, anti-guerrilla action or its equivalent to 
succeed, MILITARY ACTION IS NOT ENOUGH [emphasis on original]; it indispensable for 
all the live forces of the nation to contribute to the success of the campaign, to correct the 
social, economic and moral factors that produce violence.’68 Clearly, the idea that there was a 
lack of structured national effort, or what today is commonly referred in specialist literature as 
a ‘comprehensive approach,’ to deal with the conflict and prevent the encroachment of 
communism was a fundamental anxiety of the Comil that began to be voiced more publicly in 
the context of the escalation of violence since 1962. It was even voiced by General Ruiz Novoa, 
who despite praising the efforts of the Lleras Camargo administration, began advancing a 
deeply politicised discourse in which he argued that the reason violence intensified was 
precisely because of the lack of national response in addressing structural causes. To his mind, 
the guilty party was the ‘political class’, who were actually fostering the conditions for conflict 
and underdevelopment with their politicking, consequently he made public calls for the 
politicians to resolve their differences to permit the effective pacification of the country and 
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foster the conditions for its modernisation.69 The transit to modernity should become the 
country’s ‘National Purpose’, explained Ruiz Novoa, who despite the strong political nature of 
his views, was not considered a competitor by Lleras Camargo. In fact, the Army CoS was in 
tune with the President’s view on the perceived benefits of economic development, assisted by 
the military instrument, as the correct means to solve the conflict and contain communism. In 
this sense, there was agreement that the rehabilitation effort should have continuity as a state 
policy unconstrained by partisan divides. Despite Ruiz Novoa’s political rhetoric, it can be 
suggested that his call for a clear definition of a ‘National Purpose,’ was nonetheless an 
essential step to formulate a workable strategy to address the conflict. To begin with, it would 
help define the goals to be achieved, the type of means and the level of effort required: ‘If we 
esteem the national purpose as the ultimate end pursued by a nation, we see that its achievement 
is intimately related to the use of the armed institution […] the doctrine of National Defence 
will be inspired in the national purpose.’70 Still, given the disagreement generated by Ruiz 
Novoa and his Korean clique’ supporting ideas that placed the Colmil at the centre of the 
country’s political life, doomed the possibility of generating a workable and sustainable 
strategic course of action. Many politicians would come to argue that the General espoused a 
populist discourse that turned them into scapegoats in a simplistic narrative about the causes 
of rural violence and the expansion of insurgency. Meanwhile, many within the ranks would 
also complain about the General’s strategic priorities, which apparently converted the Colmil 
into a social welfare agency, and not an efficient fighting organization to deal with a security 
problem.71  
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The following section will address in more detail the diverse sources of the modernisation 
narrative in the early 1960s, and assess its influence in Colmil thinking for the reappraisal of 
its mission in the conflict and the formulation of strategy, in particular how it emphasised 
grievance management as the key element in dealing with the conflict. 
The Colmil and modernisation - Rehabilitation and The Alliance for Progress 
 
President Lleras Camargo was part of the left wing of the Liberal party, and so believed that 
development and industrialisation required substantial levels of state intervention to ensure fair 
distribution of wealth and to avoid further social turmoil and violence.72 Moreover, he thought 
that to alleviate the war-torn countryside, socio-economic initiatives that improved the life 
standards of the peasantry would fundamentally deal with the issues of land tenure and help 
deescalate the sources of insurrection.73 This narrative was extremely appealing to the officers 
of the Korean school because of its apparent simplicity and clarity in explaining the causes of 
violence in Colombia. It seemed to offer a correct framework to guide the action of the Colmil, 
particularly towards obtaining the unequivocal support of the peasant population, which was 
considered the centre of gravity of the counter-insurgency effort.74  
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A key foundation for this line of thought were the findings of the Commission for the 
Study of the Causes of Violence. Set up by President Lleras Camargo in 1959, the final report 
became something of a mandatory text that served as the basis of the Koreans counter-
insurgency theorisation on the need to reconsider the instrumentality of force to manage 
violence. As it was expressed by Augusto Ramirez, leader of the Commission and later interior 
minister during the first year of the Lleras Camargo administration:   
[...] Is it possible that a problem with such complex roots admits a unilateral response? Furthermore, 
is it logic that such a solution might come from the Armed Forces, which for many years have 
uselessly tried to contain an avalanche unleashed by forces cosmically superior to their limited 
resources? The Republic, the nation, public opinion, cannot expect from its armed instrument a 
solution which it is not in capacity to offer. And this is so because the armed gangs are only a 
manifestation of deeper causes, which if not combated in their origins, will continue to produce the 
same effects. The elimination or capture of a score of anti-socials does not help prevent that a 
number twice or thrice larger surges from a mad youth ready to follow the path of crime.75  
 
Moreover, the findings of the Commission also asserted that violence in the country had 
escalated during the 1950s because of the government’s policy to favour the use of excessive 
force, which had clearly alienated the population. For that reason it exhorted that the Colmil 
should regain the trust of the peasantry and redress their concerns. In a similar tone, the 
observations of French priest Louis-Joseph Lebret, ‘Economy and Humanism’ mission to 
Colombia, became an important influence in shaping further the theorisation of the Colmil in 
terms of grievance management. More precisely, it led to the diffusion of the civilising mission 
within Colombian military thinking. Both the scope and content of these two sources as long-
term drivers of Colombian military mind have already been discussed in Chapter 2, but let us 
now look at how they originally manifested themselves in the context of Lleras Camargo’s 
Rehabilitation policy, which provided the impetus for the adoption of the population-centric 
counter-insurgency narrative by 1962. The President explained the nature and extent of his 
policy in his first report to Congress in the following terms: 
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[Rehabilitation] has begun to be tested in the departments with high levels of violence, and where 
the state of siege still exists, adapting the policy to each region’s modes of violence and basing it 
on past lessons, most of them sour. First, the policy parts from the unequivocal recognition that no 
Colombian, or maybe with a few exceptions, does not have something to repent from in terms of 
direct or indirect contribution to this great catastrophe. Second, it cannot be true that hundreds of 
thousands of countrymen converted to banditry and the brutal life of guerrillas simply out of 
pleasure, or a sudden perversion of the Christian sentiment of the people. Because of these, we saw 
that repression with no reasonable discrimination, nor opportunities to recover peaceful 
coexistence, would simply increase evil. At the same time, we recognised that a full, non-qualified, 
amnesty, would not do anything but give a passport to peoples that cannot regenerate, and that it is 
necessary to hand to justice and isolate from society. [Amnesty] is discriminate and qualified, and 
is only obtained after filling out a request and with confirmation from relevant authorities that there 
are reasons to think that it is demanded for the honest purpose of rehabilitation. The goal is to give 
opportunities to these individuals so they can find a way to return to honest and productive work, 
and that they do not feel driven to return to the mountains and arms due to a mistrustful and hardened 
society affected by loss of life and property.  One of these opportunities has been to employ them 
in public works, to pave roads through those regions where they found banditry and guerrilla 
warfare, and where authority did not have any access in many years. Like that, we can imagine that, 
by the time the harvests arrive and farms have been re-established, these peoples will find salaries, 
doctors, tools and bank loans to complete rehabilitation […] Certainly it is not going to be a 
permanent policy, and the country does not have the resource to extend beyond a few years. But I 
do not have any regrets about the principles that guide it or of the way in which it has been 
developing. My conviction is that without an effort to rehabilitate the people and the areas affected 
by violence, many more years of tragedy await and it may be impossible to eradicate it.76  
 
In broad terms, Rehabilitation was founded on the recommendations of the ‘Commission 
for the study of violence’ and the work of Father Lebret, specifically with the intention of 
implementing a series of social and economic programmes to favour the pace of development 
as a solution to rebellion. In particular, it reintroduced the state-building mission of the Colmil 
which had been dismissed with the fall of Rojas Pinilla. According to Lebret, the Colmil had 
to be placed unequivocally ‘at the service of the people’, moving away from the partisanship 
of La Violencia and the corruption of the military dictatorship. The Colmil had to selflessly 
assist the government in the implementation of development policies. For this to happen, Lebret 
explained, a change of mentality at all echelons of the Colmil was required that broadened the 
spectrum of the military profession and made available a pool of enlightened men. These two 
points were seen as essential prerequisites for modernisation: 
We wish to insist on the optimal use of the armed forces to insure harmonious development, in 
particular with regards to the prompt establishment of infrastructure, the preparation of technicians 
                                                          




at all levels for the exploitation of the territory and the cultural elevation of the ensemble. In other 
words, the armed forces of a developing country do not only have a defensive function. They must 
be, according to the eminent French rural economist Jean Marius Gatheron “an army creator.”[…] 
The modern soldier is no longer a performer of manoeuvres rigidly defined in manuals, who 
executes drills and exercises to perfection. From now on, an army’s worth is its technical level and 
capacity to adapt. Young enlisted men have to be trained in the great works that are required for the 
installation of fundamental infrastructures: roads, railways, irrigation, drains. Far from harming 
their military qualities this training can increase them considerably, but only if officers and non-
commissioned officers are also prepared carefully. To conceive an officer as a man isolated from 
the great problems of the Nation, does not have any sense whatsoever today. A modern officer has 
to be a highly capable technician, who since military school receives a multipurpose77 training […] 
Like this, the army will have superior and selfless men at its disposal whose role in development 
will be extremely favourable, and who will ensure the coherence and homogeneity of development 
initiatives in new colonisation zones.78  
 
It was not only the Lebret study which saw soldiers as agents of social change. The 
discourse developed by the Kennedy administration’s Alliance for Progress initiative, which 
was also based on modernisation theory placed the same onus on them and legitimised the 
Colmil leadership’s views.  Launched on 13 March 1961, the Alliance for Progress was a vast 
programme of cooperation planned for a period of ten years with measures seeking to promote 
economic development and welfare in order to address the social and political conditions that 
could spark communist revolution.79 If the strategy of containment in Latin America required 
carrots and sticks, explains Lawrence Freedman, the carrots would come via the Alliance, the 
stick in the form of covert action and military assistance.80 The positive reception of the 
Alliances’ philosophy in various Latin American countries was obviously facilitated by the fact 
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that it went in line with the policy priorities of governments that were following a desarrollista 
agenda, with similar theoretical parameters, such as was the case of Arturo Frondizi in 
Argentina (1958-62), Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela (1959-64) and Lleras Camargo in 
Colombia.   
The execution of the resources and implementation of the development programmes of the 
Alliance for Progress was the responsibility of the national governments, which predictably 
turned to their militaries. These had indeed the organisation, the means and manpower to assist 
in delivering the Alliance’s objectives. ‘For the United States, our Armed Forces cannot 
continue as simple spectators’, declared one of the editorials of the Colmil journal endorsing 
the state-building mission: ‘they should intervene and support in ample form the plans that the 
government points towards modifying the economic and social situation of the country.’81 
Furthermore, underpinned by modernisation theory, counter-insurgency thinking would also 
serve to argue that the militaries of the region were the main actors in the implementation of 
development programmes. As voiced by President Kennedy, Latin American Military forces 
in support of the Alliance for Progress would endeavour to become ‘a tool of democracy to 
prevent the arrival of communism’.82 
Colombia became one of Washington’s most touted platforms of the Alliance for Progress. 
It received almost $1bn in aid whilst the scheme was in effect, which amounted to roughly 11 
per cent of the whole package.83 In strategic terms it was a logical candidate as positive results 
could be expected at a low cost and without serious political risks, granting credibility to the 
venture. In the first place, beyond the effects of violence, which were mostly focused in 
peripheral regions, Colombia had a limited but consolidated democratic system of government, 
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an emerging middle class, as well as a functioning bureaucracy capable of implementing public 
policy. Moreover, the violence stricken country was paradoxically benefiting from a steadily 
growing economy (growth rates reached almost 6 per cent annually from the early 50s), and by 
the end of the decade, it also possessed a growing if incipient industrial base. 84 Its challenges 
were mainly in the rural areas, where inequality was more pronounced, with pre-modern social 
structures and a severe concentration of land. The Alliance could help Colombia boost its 
already existing economic development and aid in a better distribution of resources whilst 
addressing the existing problems in the rural periphery. The enthusiasm of Kennedy’s 
administration was such that the President flew to Bogotá in December 1961 where he 
witnessed the signing by Lleras Camargo of an Agrarian Reform law.85 In terms of security, 
the prospects by late 1961 were even better, as US officials reckoned the country was not a 
victim of general communist subversion, and considered existing armed groups far from being 
a threat to Colombia’s national survival. In short, they were perceived as a source of instability 
that with correct measures could be managed. In April 1962, for example, Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara, after being briefed by the Embassy and the Chief of the Military Mission, 
concluded that violence in Colombia, apart from being limited in territory, was mainly banditry 
involving complex motivations rather than communist insurrection. The country, in his words, 
was not suffering of ‘guerrilla activity in the technical sense of that term.’86  
The ideas of modernisation theorists like Walt Rostow, endorsed the view that the military 
should radically change its mind-set and assume a progressive role to assist in the ‘take off to 
modernisation.’87 President Kennedy publicly commended Latin American senior officers as a 
‘new generation of military leaders’ that showed ‘an increasing awareness that armies cannot 
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only defend their countries - they can, as we have learned through our own Corps of Engineers, 
help to build them.’88 Likewise, these ideas served to reaffirm the conviction that violence in 
Colombia had a manifest social character. Paraphrasing Ruiz Novoa, it was produced mainly 
by an unequally distributed economic development, which during the climatic years of La 
Violencia, had been eclipsed by ‘irrational partisan struggles’ and had prepared the ground for 
the expansion of communism.89 Hence, the best way to bring Colombia on to the right path 
was to stabilise the countryside through the active promotion of development policies and the 
improvement of the population’s well-being. A problem, however, as Michael Latham has 
pointed out, is that  modernisation theory as an ideology turned the analysis of social change 
into a particularly rigid template, which presented ‘sweeping economic and political reform as 
matters of simple volition and reiterated profound sense of manifest destiny’. 90 Modernisation 
theory made high-ranking officers like Ruiz Novoa envision themselves as part of a profoundly 
altruistic, humanitarian missionary effort. A policy implication of such an attitude resembles 
what Colin Jackson has referred to as the ‘technocratic conceit’ of counter-insurgency. That is, 
the belief that politics can be reduced to virtuous administration and public works applied by 
institutions staffed by competent bureaucrats, who wield resources to strengthen a state and 
restore order. 91  
In the context of the Alliance for Progress the search for a ‘national purpose’, as emphasised 
by General Ruiz Novoa, would translate in to the definition of a state-building mission for the 
Colmil, following the precepts of modernisation theory. In the words of Ruiz Novoa the 
military should be shaped into a tool ‘to aid civilian efforts to promote industrialisation and 
modern agriculture and to repair the social institutions damaged in the long period of 
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violence.’92 The mission was materialised in Colmil’s planning by raising the strategic 
importance of the concept of Civic Action, which was to be devised by the leadership not as a 
simple tactic to gain the support of the population during the execution of their counter-
insurgency operations, but as the central means to achieve the modernising goals by altering 
the socio-economic conditions that generated violence and spawned insurgency. 
Because of his seniority, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa was promoted to War Minister in 
August 1962, in time for the inauguration of President Guillermo Valencia. From that position, 
he attempted to elevate the strategic importance of the concept of Acción Cívica-Militar 
(Military Civic Action - MCA) based on his earlier theorisation. This operational concept was 
in essence described as a model for peaceful penetration in bandit controlled areas. But, the 
crucial point, is that for the General the tactic had a greater significance than merely winning 
the population over in the fight against the armed groups, as was emphasised in US doctrine. 
In a conference of Latin American armies at the Panama Canal Zone, General Ruiz Novoa 
explained his appreciations on the value of MCA, based on a fuller understanding of the 
premises of revolutionary war theory: ‘Pope Paul VI has said “we have to sow ideas” as the 
best way to confront the communist threat. Within this position is where Military Civic Action 
fits.  Although it is clear that war still is the continuation of politics by other means, the “modus 
operandi,” has changed amongst us.’93 In essence, the concept was seen as the materialisation 
of a civilising mission in support of the development of the country. The ‘Koreans’ made 
evident the wider scope of MCA, and the aims it intended to achieve, in an Army doctrinal 
manifesto of 1962: 
We call Acción Cívica the activity the Army can carry out with the end of improving the living 
conditions of the people. Its objective, apart from improving the living standards is to attract the 
people to the Army, awake in the civilians their trust in the men in arms and obtain the collaboration 
of the people of good will in the fight against the anti-socials that scourge vast regions of the country 
[…] This new mentality is of exceptional importance and means non else than a NEW MISSION 
[emphasis on original] for the Army. The mission of aiding the most vulnerable sector of the 
                                                          




Colombian population, fulfilling it next to the other two it already has of upholding national 
independence and safeguarding the institutions.  A NEW MISSION that incorporates the institution 
in the process of economic development of the nation, turning it into the Army Creator. Economic 
development requires mature institutions that function as its foundation, and no other institution is 
more appropriated than the Army for this end.94  
 
But how did the Colombians formulate the tactic and how did they adjust it to their strategic 
considerations? According to Colonel Valencia Tovar, the inception of MCA was part of a 
‘Colombian theory vis-à-vis revolutionary warfare’ rather than an imposition from ‘the Yankee 
military mission,’ as he argues local historians have portrayed the country’s adaptation to 
counter-insurgency.95 In his memoirs, he insisted that the US influence on the definition of the 
concept was limited. It was the Colombian’s involvement with ‘rehabilitation’ since the Rojas 
regime, its later evolution under Lleras Camargo, and the Colmil’s theory of addressing causes 
of violence, which ultimately gave shape to a strategy based on promoting social and economic 
initiatives in violence-stricken areas. Valencia Tovar even asserted that the Colombian 
operational experience of the early 1960s, for example the campaign against the MOEC in 
Vichada, provided as input for the elaboration of such population-centric concepts in US 
counter-insurgency doctrine. That experiment drew the attention of the US Army,’ he argues, 
‘which immediately decided to study it in depth, to analyse the possibilities of applying it in 
perturbed areas.’96 He concludes the anecdote with the bold affirmation that: ‘Later, after 
visiting the School of Special Warfare at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, I had the chance of 
seeing the process converted into an action plan for counter-insurrectional methodology, under 
the name Civic Action.’97 
Back in 1963, in one of the articles of the Revista del Ejercito, the Colonel did indeed 
emphasise that the country had to ‘develop its own doctrine to be applied to unique and 
particular conditions’ as the way in which ‘guerrilla warfare is waged in our soil under the label 
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of violencia is different to that which can occur in any other part of the world.’98 But, his ex 
post facto vindication of MCA as a Colombian concept was manifestly disingenuous. The fact 
is that the US had been devising, since the time of the Drapper Committee, the use of the 
military in countries vulnerable to communism in a ‘constructive role in economic 
development projects.’99 Moreover, the concept, under the terms Civil Action or Civil 
Development, had also been wide use since the late 1950s by Colonel Edward Lansdale, a guru 
of irregular war who promoted the idea in the evolving counter-insurgency doctrine of the US. 
From 1960, US manuals established it as a support task to be undertaken by indigenous military 
forces.100 The earliest adoption of the concept in Colombia and its association with the US, can 
be traced back to September 1961101 when Brigadier General Jorge Quintero, commander of 
the III Brigade operating in the department of Valle, instructed his battalion commanders to 
undertake Accion Civica programmes and public relations efforts with the peasant population 
in the north of the department, adjacent to the bandit-infested Tolima, so as to prevent the 
expansion of violence into his area of operations. The instruction recognised that the main 
problem for the Colmil’s pacification effort was not only the distrust of the local populace 
towards the soldiers, but the lack of support of the local authorities, like judges, school teachers 
and priests due to their partisan biases. The document, copied in a dispatch from the US 
Embassy to the Department of State, was considered to be an ambitious but still ‘heartening’ 
and ‘constructive development’ on the part of the Colombians, which showed that ‘highly 
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placed military men’ were demonstrating initiative in developing ‘programmes of action’ 
directed to wipe out a long relationship of mistrust of the population towards the Army.102 
However, Quintero’s instruction was nothing resembling a programme. It was, in the end, no 
more than a list of twenty concise points including exhortations for the good conduct of the 
troops, like ‘respect the honour of local women and private property’, and other vague and 
bucolic recommendations based on naïve assumptions, such as: ‘the Army should be an 
intermediary between peasant and the civil authority in order to bring to the latter’s attention 
to the needs of the peasant. The expectation is that the peasant will look on to the Army as his 
disinterested benefactor,’103 or simply: ‘visit schools, meetings, games, etc., in order to win 
over the youth, and convince them that the military rather than the local bandit leader is their 
friend and protector.’104 Whilst Colmil leaders like Valencia Tovar could have envisaged Civic 
Action as the solution to the underlying causes of revolutionary war, the concept was in its 
early days, as evidenced in a doctrinal manifesto of the Revista de Infanteria and transcribed 
in Figure 7, an appeal for a change in the military’s disposition. For officers, Civic Action 
signified, in short, a more ‘humane action’ towards what was considered to be a vulnerable and 
backward rural population.105  
Conclusion: Counter-insurgency theory and revival of state-building in Colmil thought 
 
This chapter showed how the Colmil reassessed the role of the armed instrument amid the rise  
of counter-insurgency theory. The theory offered a new understanding of the nature of the 
conflict, the limits of force and the importance of controlling the population. A main driver of 
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the Colmil’s ideas during the early 1960s was modernisation narrative, which in the context of 
Lleras Camargo’s Rehabilitation agenda and Kennedy’s The Alliance for Progress, revitalised 
the military’s state-building mission and the Colmil high command to elevate the strategic 
importance of the concept Accion Civico Militar (MCA). 
  As will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter, support for MCA 
throughout the 1960s was all but unanimous in Colombia. The concept found enemies in the 
civilian realm as well as within the ranks, becoming a serious object of political contention 
throughout the decade. It found champions and opponents on both sides of the political 
spectrum. Liberal and Conservative politicians who were in agreement with the spirit of the 
modernising agenda of Lleras Camargo, were not resistant in giving a wider state-building role 
to the Colmil, Conversely, Conservatives who had tense relations with the Army since their 
government had been victim of the military coup in 1953, considered that the concept of MCA 
politicised the Colmil and giving them political clout in the areas where they intervened. In 
particular, as the next chapter will describe, politicians felt such activities led to an improper 
intervention of the military in political affairs that broke the lineaments of the ‘Lleras doctrine’.   
Tensions within the ranks were also fierce, reaching their pinnacle by 1965 when Ruiz 
Novoa was forced into retirement. The political visibility of MCA and the defence Ruiz Novoa 
made of it, portraying it as the main line of effort, became a subject that divided the Colmil 
leadership between those that supported a state-building approach versus those who voiced the 
need to restrict the army’s action to the purely military suppression of banditry and insurgency, 
rather than performing what for them were mere civilian tasks.106 In short, it was the 
fundamental issue that marked the breach between the ‘Koreans’ and the ‘Traditionalists’. For 
the latter, Acción Civico Militar should be utilised as part of the preparation of the battlefield, 
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as a means to gain support of the population for the Colmil and facilitate the flow of actionable 
intelligence to improve the application of force. As Ruiz Novoa’s successor, General Gustavo 
Ayerbe Chaux, bluntly remarked in 1966: ‘against bandoleros and rebellious inhumane 
individuals the only solution is efficacious fire arms.’107 ‘Traditionalists’ could not contemplate 
MCA as the principal effort of the military.  Eventually, by the end of the 1960s, the concept 
was demoted, thereby marking a break with the early strategic formulation which was 
promoted by Ruiz Novoa, and with long-standing repercussions for the Colombian military 
mind, as the final chapter will elucidate. 
  
                                                          




PRESCRIBING COUNTER-INSURGENCY - THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY AND THE ORIGINS OF 
FARC, 1962-1966 
 
The first major operational test for the counter-insurgency innovations the Colmil had been 
developing at the onset of the 1960s was Plan Lazo (Plan Noose). Initialised in May 1962, it 
was a five-phase programme that attempted to synthesise the main components of the ‘new 
way of war’ and was originally expected to finally pacify the country in a period of 12 months. 
The implementation of the plan took place during the second government of the National Front 
when Major General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, Army CoS during Lleras Camargo’s administration, 
became War Minister. The General and his staff had conceived the plan with close guidance of 
the US military mission. In this sense, Plan Lazo was in great part a product of the visit that 
spring of 1962 of a second US assessment team headed by General William P. Yarborough, 
commander of the School for Special Warfare. One of the main conclusions of the Yarborough 
team was that there was a lack of planning and coordination for the unconventional warfare 
capabilities the Colmil had been accruing in the past two years; a vital deficiency the plan 
aimed to fix. US assistance for the implementation of Plan Lazo included a US$1.5 million in 
equipment enhancement, including vehicles, communications, and helicopters; intensified 
training by MTTs and the dispatch of Colombian personnel to the Panama Canal Zone to train 
in the US army run ‘School of the Americas.’1 
Eventually Plan Lazo proved to be an effective tool for the neutralisation of the most 
tenacious bandit groups across the central Andes. Its sustained execution up to early 1965 
substantially improved the security conditions of the coffee-growing departments of the Central 
cordillera. By the end of 1964, for example, 13 gangs led by captains with aliases like “Black 
blood,” “Sparks” or “Poker” were dismantled in well organised and executed operations 
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utilising the whole assortment of counter-insurgency tactics.2 With the threat of bandolerismo 
greatly reduced and the popularity of the armed forces soaring, the attention of the Government 
shifted to the self-governed communist enclaves or communes that dated from the 1950s.  But 
fundamental disagreements about the character and intentions of the irregular groups active in 
the country impaired the Colmil and the civilian leadership from developing a consistent 
understanding about the role and limitations of force. 
For the Colmil under Ruiz Novoa, the communist self-defence groups, bandolero gangs 
and eventually the insurgencies that developed with revolutionary agendas were all considered 
to be symptomatic of the same problems of lawlessness and the economic and social 
contradictions dating from La Violencia. It was believed that the supposedly identical origin in 
political, territorial and social terms of these groups determined why they employed the same 
methods for the application of violence (i.e. guerrilla warfare).  And, whilst the Colmil and 
civilian authorities could agree that the methods for the application of force, population control 
and grievance management of counter-insurgency were all adequate instruments to confront 
the modus operandi of all these groups for the remainder of the decade, there were evident 
differences in terms of intent, resulting from confused and mixed motivations harboured by the 
Colmil and the politicians. This posed major problems for the development of strategy. It was 
extremely difficult to define what had to be achieved via the counter-insurgency apparatus due 
to the lack of a clear understanding of the challenge the self-styled communist guerrilla groups 
posed. Whilst the mode in which the groups decided to fight was manifestly clear for the 
authorities, elucidating the reasons and motivations why they were fighting was a source of 
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contention. For example, it was convenient for some politicians, like President Guillermo 
Valencia, to declare the groups as ‘dissident elements acting in guerrilla bands, which sack, 
pillage and murder without cause or reason.’3 The intention was to close the door to any 
conciliation with them and hence distance himself from the Rehabilitation policy of his 
predecessor. As late as 1968, Colombians were still at odds when it came to categorise the 
groups they were facing. In an extensive report for the DoD on the conditions of insurgency, 
the US country team could not do any better in terms of explaining the character of the problem, 
and simply pointed out that the guerrilla warfare in Colombia had a ‘quicksilver nature’, and 
added that ‘[t]here is a difficulty in Colombia in distinguishing between guerrillas, insurgents, 
bandits, etc. The Colombian Armed Forces refer to them all as anti-sociales.’4 What lurked 
beneath the problems of categorisation was a muddled analysis, product of differing ideological 
motivations of political leaders, but also within the Colmil. 
To recapitulate, whilst the success of the Colmil against the bandolero gangs by 1965 
contributed a sense of infallibility of the operational developments contained in Plan Lazo, that 
is, a conviction that they could be effectively employed against all groups, differing ideological 
motivations led to different appreciations of the role of force. In this respect, for the 
Conservative government of Guillermo Valencia and the traditionalist sector of the Colmil, a 
highly proficient armed instrument could finally offer a military solution, by extinguishing the 
enclaves and ultimately defeating all the groups that employed guerrilla tactics. As it was 
bluntly put by a Tolima congressman, during the climax of Plan Lazo: ‘If the crusade against 
these bandits has shown us something today, is how naïve the attempts to rehabilitate them by 
offering money to start a decent living were. Kill the bitch, end the mange.’5 Following this 
                                                          
3 ‘Valencia makes inauguration address,’ Bogota Domestic Service, 7 August 1962. Accessed via FBIS. 
4  US Embassy to DoS, ‘ Notes on Current Internal Security Situation in Colombia’, 29 October 1968, RG 59, 
Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, Pol 2 Col to Pol 7 Col, Box 1991, NARA. 
5 ‘Opiniones’, 15 October 1962.  
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line of thought, rural bandits and communist self-defence forces were considered by many in 
Colombia to be manifestations of the same existential threat dating from the 9 April 1948 
rebellion, one that could only be dealt with through punitive action.6 A similar reasoning was 
employed when the second Castroist influenced guerrilla, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
(ELN), made its appearance in the country in 1964. Based on the Manichean partisan logic of 
La Violencia, imbued by the strong anti-communism of revolutionary war theory, the idea that 
‘anti-socials’ were irreconcilable enemies intensified within this section of the military. 
Conversely, after the exit of Ruiz Novoa in 1965, the remnants of the Korean school of the 
Colmil were still wedded to the view that the persistence of problems of poverty, landlessness, 
and inequality would require ‘political measures’ to solve the ‘structural material causes of 
insurgent violence in the country.’7 As presented in the previous chapter, the theory of causes 
of violence and the civilising narrative of much of the development ideas that had captivated 
the ‘Koreans’ since the presidency of Lleras Camargo, led from 1964 to a demand for an 
extension of Civic Action to deal with the areas prone to guerrilla warfare. In this sense, the 
main consideration was that a great deal of the ‘anti-socials’ could be coerced into compliance, 
and that the threat of communist inspired insurgency would be reduced if life standards 
increased and objective socio economic grievances were solved. But this could only happen if, 
in the view of Valencia Tovar, the ‘indifference of the government stopped’, and committed 
itself to the execution of a sustained ‘integral anti-violence action’ and increased resources for 
the implementation of state-building initiatives, which had until then depended mostly on US 
aid.8   
                                                          
6 ‘La minoria de violentos no podrá dominar el país,’ El Tiempo, 2 October 1962. 
7 Valencia Tovar, Testimonio, pp.416-417; A contradiction in Valencia Tovar’s writings, is that whilst he 
constantly refers, by citing Clausewitz, to war as continuation of politics. In his defence of MCA and the social-
origins of insurgency in the country, maybe unintendedly, he gives violence (i.e.: the application of force) an 
apolitical character, in opposition to what he calls ‘political measures.’ 
8 Ibid, pp. 420-423. 
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With these ideas in mind, the central argument of this chapter is that during the mid-
1960s, the Colombian military promoted an over prescriptive view of counter-insurgency as a 
panacea to deal with the myriad of guerrilla groups that arose in the period, and which 
ultimately pre-empted the formulation of balanced strategic judgement. In other words, 
counter-insurgency brought about a posture of determinism, which held that all insurgencies 
had discernible characteristics as a result of a similar social context in which they originated, 
matching recruitment and support bases and the adoption of the same methods for the 
application of force.9  
To systematically assess the Colmil’s practice of counter-insurgency during the period, 
the chapter is divided in two parts. The first reviews the Colmil’s development of Plan Lazo 
and the attitudes towards bandolerismo, emphasising the tensions between the understanding 
of the utility of force and the political conduct of the war. In particular, it will analyse the 
struggles of the Koreans to prolong the development and grievance management tools of 
counter-insurgency, in opposition to the views of traditionalists which called for a more 
assertive use of force via inventive tactics to look for a quick victory against the rebels. 
Differences of opinion over the correct application of the instrument stimulated power 
struggles within the leadership and with civilians. Following from this, it will be possible, in 
the second part, to establish how the Colmil’s behaviour facilitated the development of the 
FARC by 1966, resulting from the campaign against what were referred to as the communist 
enclaves or ‘independent republics’. This analysis will address the debates over the application 
of the counter-insurgency apparatus that ensued with the consolidation of not only FARC but 
                                                          
9 The core tenet of the present chapter is based on the argument developed by M.L.R. Smith that the overly 
prescriptive nature of counterinsurgency is due to a general rejection of Clausewitzian first principles. This posture 
advances the view that an adversary’s behaviour is predictable depending on the way he decides to fight and so 
that it can be countered with a pre-ordained plan. But as Smith argues, following the Prussian philosopher, the 
character and direction of war is unpredictable as the calculus of belligerents vary according to the variation of a 
multiplicity of material and immaterial factors –that is the interplay of the trinity of passion, reason and chance. 
See: M.L.R. Smith, ‘COIN and the Chameleon’, pp.47-49. 
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also the ‘Castroist’ ELN. In this respect, the chapter will examine the impact on Colmil 
attitudes produced by the changing posture of the Colombian government towards the conflict, 
as well as the review the threat of Communist insurgency in Latin America and the change in 
policy priorities of the US. 
The Korean strategic outlook - Plan Lazo and the politicisation of the Colmil 
 
The main assumption of the ‘Korean’ school was that violence in Colombia was the result of 
continuous social and economic contradictions that determined the underlying values that 
shaped the behaviour of all irregular groups that appeared since 9 April 1948. According to the 
War Minister General Ruiz Novoa, violence in Colombia had a visible political-partisan origin, 
but the erosion of the rule of law and of state authority, fomented by the ‘apathy and indolence 
of the political class’, had created stimuli for its growth and for the influx of communism.10 
The General explained in his first report to Congress that ‘three genres’ of violence could be 
identified in the country: first a ‘political violence’ perpetrated by partisan warlords who used 
force to alter the course of local elections by attacking the constituents of the other party, or in 
his words ‘winning elections by killing the votes;’ second an ‘economic violence’ that 
employed terror tactics to forcefully take control of productive land, essentially the coffee 
harvests in Quindio and Tolima; and thirdly a ‘social violence’ that manifested itself in outright 
banditry.  However, with respect to the latter type, General Ruiz Novoa had been clear since 
his time as Army CoS, expressing that it was violence perpetrated by individuals who knew 
nothing but banditry, and so the only solution in sight was to end it by force.11   
On the face of it, these reflections from the recently nominated War Minister came as a 
result of the deterioration of security by mid-1962, which was blamed on the failures of the 
                                                          
10 US Embassy to DoS, ‘Violence: The great “debate” in the Senate’, 27 August 1962, RG59 1960-63, 
720.5611/1246-462, Box 1544, NARA. 




amnesty programme of Lleras Camargo, which had been the backbone of rehabilitation 
agenda.12 Indeed, when the Liberal president left office in August 1962 there was a visible 
growth in banditry as well as a resurgence of Communist leaning guerrilla groups that had 
rearmed on the pretext of self-defence. With increasing acts of mass murder or pillage and with 
ambushes against military and police units occurring systematically across the central 
cordillera in the final months of the first National Front administration, Colmil leaders began 
to be criticised by politicians of both parties who declared that it lacked an offensive spirit and 
was not effectively combatting the armed groups.13 Moreover, they complained that their ideas 
on the socio-economic causes of violence were encouraging the military to intervene in 
politics.14 In this respect, hard-line politicians denounced that the Colmil should initiate a ‘war 
with no quarter or possibilities of truce against bandolerismo’,15 instead of being distracted by 
a theory which was considered to run against the military non-deliberation spirit of the ‘Lleras 
Doctrine’.   
Evidencing the loss of confidence in the strategy of Rehabilitation implemented by the 
previous government, the incoming Minister of Justice in August 1962 Hector Charry, stated 
in the Senate that ‘he was tired of hearing theories on the origins of violence, because what was 
needed was concrete solutions.’16 For the Minister, the past measures of rehabilitation and 
amnesty were ‘of little use’ and had to be ‘discarded’ as extending them ‘would be an excess 
                                                          
12 According to data of the US Embassy, 1962 was the deadliest year since the denouement of La Violencia after 
the National Front accord in 1958. With 2909 people killed in conflict zones. See: US Embassy to DoS, ‘Deaths 
by violence in December 1962,’ 23 January 1963, RG59 1960-63, 721.OOW/8/560, Box 1545, NARA. 
13 For example, even Liberal daily El Tiempo, which was normally pro-Lleras was critical of the Colmil: ‘Are the 
soldiers failing or is it the means employed to conjure the growing and terrible wave of violence? […] It seems 
the army only goes to pick up the corpses and not prevent further deaths.’ Quoted in ‘Editorial,’ El Tiempo, 4 
October 1961. 
14 US Embassy to DoS, ‘Violence: The great “debate” in the Senate’, 27 August 1962, RG59 1960, 63, 
720.5611/1246-462, Box 1544, NARA. 
15 Quoted in: Ortiz, La Violence en Colombie, p.46. 
16 US Embassy to DoS, ‘Violence: The great “debate” in the Senate’, 27 August 1962, RG59 1960, 63, 
720.5611/1246-462, Box 1544, NARA. 
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of magnanimity which the bandits do not deserve.’17 The solution to violence would require 
giving the government powers to make judicial and penal reforms, particularly to make martial 
law more efficient in violent regions where states of emergency were in place and exceptional 
penal procedures to judge the bandits were needed. In his mind the Colombian ‘judicial process 
was in confusion and was actually aiding the bandits’ as the ‘codes gave everything to the 
defendant and very little to the prosecution.’18 Paraphrasing this reading, the view of some 
cabinet ministers of Valencia, in opposition to Ruiz Novoa, was that the country was facing a 
law and order problem which required an improvement in the punitive instruments of the state. 
Obviously, such a policy would require an expansion of prisons and interment facilities, for 
which the Valencia administration, amongst other  judicial measures, decided to suit Gorgona 
Island (an inhospitable jungle island 22 miles off the Pacific coast) to house 1/3 of the 25,000 
inmates convicted of banditry and who were jamming the only 163 prisons of the country.19 
Despite the fact the Minister of Justice was supposedly tired of hearing ‘theories on the causes 
of violence,’ the decision to go forward with such a policy was also based on particular ideas 
about the nature of the conflict. Of particular influence for many Colombian hard-line 
politicians, was Horacio Gomez’s book ‘Gorgona Theory: Causes of violence in Colombia and 
the structuration of a system to end it’ which was published at the outset of the Valencia 
administration and which argued against the premises of the material causes of violence 
championed by Ruiz Novoa and the Lleras Camargo administration. According to Gomez: ‘the 
peasants that resorted to violence were innately aggressive, and could only be fought with their 
own weapons;’20 which meant that no rehabilitation was possible, and what could only be 
managed was to select groups of prisoners at Gorgona and train them to function as counter-
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Martz, Colombia survey, p.300. 
20 Horacio Gómez Aristizabal, Teoria Gorgona: causación de la violencia en Colombia y estructuración de un 
sistema para acabarla, (Bogotá: Editorial Iqueima, 1962), pp.53-70. 
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guerrillas where the conflict escalated, but that in the long run they could not be reintegrated 
into civilian life.21 
In short, this intense political antagonism in Congress and cabinet circles with the departing 
government’s policy reflected in pressure for the Colmil leadership to act more vigorously on 
all fronts.  But Ruiz Novoa was still wedded to the notions of the social and economic causes 
of violence. Hence he claimed that it was not possible to leave the Colmil as the sole institution 
responsible for handling the conflict. He was adamant that the employment of military force 
directed towards the neutralisation of the armed groups was a limited function that only dealt 
with the effects of the problem. In other words, force was considered only to be a palliative 
capable of generating any long standing results. So, a balanced counter-insurgency would 
require a correct application and sequencing of three other techniques that would complement 
Military Action (Acción Militar), directed what he considered were the roots of violence, not 
its effects:  Psychological Action (Acción Psicologica), Civic Action (Acción Civica) and 
Communal Action (Acción Comunal). These techniques were the basis, in his view, of Plan 
Lazo.  But by late 1962, General Ruiz Novoa was not alone in his analysis. There were still 
some voices, although mostly in private, of other cabinet members who considered the need to 
have a ‘comprehensive’ approach to deal with violence, based on Rehabilitation. Attorney 
General Andres Holguin, for example, confided to the political officer of the US embassy that 
whilst he agreed with the Minister of Justice’s analysis that the Colombian judicial system was 
in bleak state, and that rampant impunity was a stimulant of violence, distinctions had to be 
made, and no blanket solutions could be crafted. Agreeing with Ruiz Novoa, for the Attorney 
General there was an ‘apolitical type’ of violence which was the most grave as it was 
‘perpetuated by the absence of official justice, as well as by social and economic ills in the 
rural areas’ that occurred in parallel to one pursued by political motives that ‘laid principally 




at the feet of international communism.’22 In terms of the solutions offered by the Colombian 
official, the US diplomat summarised: 
Holguin stated that opposing violence with official violence, another state of siege or greater 
military mobilization would not resolve the problem. Although military action alone would partially 
succeed, to completely eradicate the problem it was necessary that the Executive, the Congress, the 
military, the policy and the judiciary coordinate their direct efforts and at the same time look for 
adequate indirect measures e.g. Alliance for Progress, social agrarian reform, education, judicial 
reform, in order to complete the pacification campaign. Holguin also stated that the re-institution 
of the death penalty for assassins had no relevance to solution [sic] of the violence problem since 
the bandits already live under a de facto death sentence by their own election.23 
 
Certainly, for the Colmil leadership under Ruiz Novoa, the bandolero groups whose 
loyalties were only loosely tied to one of the two political parties, and who used party labels to 
profit from extortion and pillage of either Liberal or Conservative citizens were the main source 
of violence. All these groups maintained support amongst the population by offering protection 
from possible counter-reprisals.24 Indeed, Ruiz Novoa in his report to Congress expressed that 
the most intractable difficulty in dealing with the problem was ‘collective complicity, that is, 
the peasants’ solidarity with the bandoleros.’25 For the General, despite the permanent 
repudiation by the party directorates and leaders, ‘solidarity continues like a deep sea in the 
countryside where the bandolero is considered a sort of hero.’26 General Ruiz Novoa explained 
in his speech that the way forward would require effective measures to separate the population 
from the bandits, introducing the congressmen to the logic of the population centric concepts 
of counter-insurgency. For the Minister of War population centric counter-insurgency could 
also be used against the bandits, given that their modus operandi, blending in with the 
population, was that of Communist guerrillas:  
Psychological action is intended to destroy the guerrilla warfare phenomenon valued by Mao Tse-
Tung, perhaps the leading exponent of the topic, as an indispensable [element] for the success of 
                                                          
22 US Embassy to DoS, ‘The Attorney-General reports on Justice and Violence’, 24 August 1962, RG59 1960-63, 
720.5611/12-462, Box 1544, NARA. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ruiz Novoa, El desafío, p.33. 




this type if campaign when he says that guerrillas should move ‘”between the people and the region 
where they operate like fish in the water”. This psychological action tries to remove the water and 
destroy the fish. 27 
 
With the above in mid, John Henderson wrote that the psychological component of Plan 
Lazo included the typical information and propaganda activities. Its core facet was the offering 
of rewards for information leading to the arrest of the bandit leaders. Psychological action also 
included parading from village to village the bodies of the most wanted bandits killed in combat 
and which were transported on the landing skids of helicopters. Apparently, such was the 
pressure generated by helicopters, that ‘Desquite’ one of the most skilled and deadly bandits, 
after escaping the pursuing army units complained that ‘it wasn’t proper for President Kennedy 
to send aircraft to kill people instead of money for the poor.’28   
For its part, Civic Action had by mid-1962 a robust basis in US doctrine, its operational 
relevance rising in line with the Kennedy’s administration reasoning about the improvement of 
living conditions as pivotal elements for the containment of communism in the third world. 
The first edition of the ‘Guide for the planning of Counterinsurgency’ of November 1963 
published by the Special Warfare School at Bragg, was translated into Spanish and used for the 
training of Latin American officers at Panama Canal Zone or in situ by the MAAG’s and MTTs, 
was one of the first publications to present to that audience the concept in all its doctrinal 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Henderson, Modernization, pp.399- 400; ‘To some persons in the ground,’ also writes Henderson, ‘the 
helicopters suggested birds of prey clutching hapless creatures in their talons.’ Indeed, the psychological effect of 
helicopters, on both the Colmil as well as the bandits and guerrillas and not least the population has been 
consistent. The Colmil has historically seen them as the most important asset to wage the war, initially during the 
1960s and later with the escalation of the conflict in the mid-1990s.  With the advent of Plan Colombia  the influx 
of helicopters, financed by the US, have been seen as vital in terms of increased mobility, to facilitate deployment 
of troops and reduce the ability of the guerrillas to attack in places and moments of their own choosing, but also, 
as a substantial ‘power to hurt’. Particularly the arrival of modern attack helicopters since 2002 and the 
development of elaborate close air support capabilities have pushed many of the most kinetic minded Colmil 
officers to consider that the ‘war is won from the air’. See for example the statements to the press of the first 
commander of the Army Air Branch, General Javier Rey, after the Colmil’s successful offensive against the 
FARCs main HVT’s and who were all neutralized via airborne actions: Stefanie Matiz, ‘La Guerra desde los 
cielos: Para el comandante de la Aviacion del Ejercito la guerra contra la guerrilla se gana desde los cielos,’ El 
Espectador, 31 March 2012. Available at: < http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/guerra-los-cielos-
articulo-335588> Accessed June 10 2015. 
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splendour.  That publication which most certainly was on Valencia Tovar’s reading list, and 
where he probably saw what he considered were originally Colombian ideas, devoted a whole 
chapter to an  A to Z guide to plan and implement an MCA programme.29 As with all counter-
insurgency manuals, the tactic was presented as a template to be presented by US military 
advisors in any host nation, through a Jominian interpretation of counter-insurgency,  
considering it to be informed by unchanging fundamentals. One of the supposed unchangeable 
aspects of counter-insurgency is what current practitioners would define as the onus of 
‘ameliorating the existing contradictions within the targeted society.’30 But while counter-
insurgency doctrine as thought by the US to the Colombians offered a specific set of tactics 
and operational advice to construct a perfect campaign to co-opt the local population; it would 
rest on the sagacity of the local soldiers like the Korean school in Colombia, to give the concept 
a strategic dimension, with their own understanding of the politics and underlying values that 
shaped the conflict.31   
             Undoubtedly, Ruiz Novoa and Valencia Tovar enriched US operational concepts with 
the political and ideological considerations that shaped their strategic thinking and could be 
traced to the escalatory years of La Violencia. Mainly, their narrative on the ‘causes of 
violence’ and their notions of the limitation of the use of armed force, served as the pivot for 
the development of the tactic. In the words Colonel Valencia Tovar, the tactic was above all a 
procedure to ‘address the sources of evil in its origins, and not only in its dire consequences.’32 
And clearly, underlying these assumptions was the belief that the Colmil had to fulfil a 
civilising mission through it to prevent the triumph of the communists and their ‘dissociating 
                                                          
29 Ejército de los EE.UU, Guía para el Planeamiento de la Contrainsurgencia - ST 31-176 (Fort Bragg: USASWS, 
1963), pp. 81-100. 
30 John A. Nagl & Brian M Burton, 'Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Modern Wars - A Reply to Jones and Smith', Journal of Strategic Studies, 33: 1 (2010), p.126. 
31 Jones & Smith, 'Grammar but No Logic, p.439.  
32 Valencia Tovar, ‘Cómo conducir una campaña’, p. 897. 
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ideology’33 as well as to ‘readjust a society maddened by a fight with no senses’ as the Koreans 
referred to La Violencia. In this sense, Acción Cívica was not to be mere Christian charity; it 
was an enterprise to alter the mentality of the people after winning their allegiance leading 
them through the path of progress. This belief was evidenced in the Colonel’s writings.  
The basis for the success of the [MCA] Campaign is the effective link of the civilian population 
to the constructive effort of the Army. Acción Cívica must not take in any case the form of 
hand-outs, which would encourage and negligence. On the contrary, what must be used are 
stimuli able to awaken the eager for progress, enthusiasm, healthy competition, elevate human 
dignity and produce conscience that a better life is available for all, even for the less favoured.34 
             The tactic, at the end, boiled down to an attempt to implement the ‘enlightened 
methods’ for countering rebellion practiced by the French colonial army, that, as Douglas Porch 
explains operated with a faith in ‘a vision of man as a rational being in the Idea of Progress.’35 
Like the French ‘improvers’ of the early 20th century,  Korea generation officers in Colombia 
were convinced that  they could reshape a rebellion-plagued rural society through the 
application of paternalistic theories onto the population, which would be grateful to their 
military benefactors for improving their living conditions, and would rehabilitate and renounce 
violence and reject the communist.36 Informed through these assumptions, one could ask an 
obvious counterfactual question, could Civic Action have survived as a viable and sustainable 
strategic option for the Colmil given the contentious premises it was based on?  More than its 
actual application, it was the vehement defence of its premises, which inevitably paved the way 
for what was to be a suicidal intervention of its proponents in politics. The fall of Ruiz Novoa 
marked the beginning of the concept’s decline, a situation that was unavoidable due to the 
ideological rudiments on which it was based and the political environment in which it played 
out. 
                                                          
33 Alberto Ruiz Novoa, ‘Justicia Social’, p.45. 
34 Valencia Tovar, ‘Cómo conducir una campaña de Acción Cívico Militar,’ p.900. 




Civic Action saw its foremost operationalization in the later stage of Plan Lazo during the 
campaign against the communist enclaves. During the initial phases, it was tied to the practice 
of psychological operations and public relations, delivering assistance especially through the 
Army’s health dispensaries with free medical and dental treatments, free meals for children, 
and alphabetization campaigns. But eventually it also focused on establishing rapport with local 
authorities and peasants with some level of social and economic leverage Civic-Military 
Committees, which were presented as an instrument for coordinating development works by 
registering and prioritising the needs of communities. 37 Obviously these initial steps, whilst 
resembling the ‘hand-outs’ Valencia Tovar exhorted to avoid, at least served to boost the 
collection of tactical intelligence to be used against the bandolero groups, and corrode their 
bases of support. A more elaborate method to engage with the population appeared by 1963, 
with the expansion of Communal Action which was supported extensively by the US Peace 
Corps. As Michael Latham shows, in Colombia US volunteers attempted to mobilise the 
peasant population working with counterparts in the Colmil and other civilian state agencies at 
the most local level (veredas) to discuss problems with the people, suggest meetings and help 
organise juntas comunales (communal boards) to decide which projects of Civic Action were 
more urgent, i.e. roads, school, aqueducts and so forth.38 According to ambassador Cabot 
Lodge, writes Latham, Communal Action could ‘transform the campesino into a useful 
receptacle for material and technical inputs and fostered commitment to a new group 
identity.’39 
The problem for the ‘Koreans’ and their strategic outlook was that, in general terms, 
mainstream conservative politicians were especially sensitive about the military’s new ideas 
regarding the relationship to the population. Indeed, the doctrine of the ‘causes of violence,’ 
                                                          
37 Rempe, 'Guerrillas, bandits, and independent republics,’ p.312. 




which began to be disseminated across public opinion in mainstream newspapers and 
periodicals, became the target of attacks against the military command from conservative as 
well as other political sectors, even those that had initially supported the rehabilitation policy 
of Lleras Camargo. Many came to consider that the whole argument of dealing with the so 
called objective causes of the conflict vindicated the bandits and somewhat justified the 
political discourse of the emerging insurgent groups.40 Still further, after their experience as 
victims of Rojas’ military coup, Conservatives had reservations about the Colmil having a 
strong voice, a substantial level of political influence in a modernising mission. For many of 
them, Lleras Camargo had been, ironically, bending his own doctrine of civil- military relations 
by expanding the scope of the Colmil’s role to incorporate state-building initiatives. In this 
respect, right wing political sectors argued that the Colmil’s mission should be limited, or in 
other words, circumscribed to the classic understanding of ‘public order.’41 But for other 
political sectors, especially Liberals and some pragmatic conservatives, who adhered to the 
priorities the Lleras Camargo Rehabilitation policy, curtailing the tactical preferences of Ruiz 
Novoa would mean a relapse to the chaos of the Laureano Gómez era.42   
President Guillermo Valencia tried to distance himself from the spirit of Lleras Camargo’s 
rehabilitation, and adamantly defended a more limited view regarding the role of the military 
instrument that clearly favoured an enemy centric rather than a population centric one. 
However, the strong rehabilitation narrative of the previous administration, based on the 
                                                          
40 As will be described in the following section, the most stringent political opposition to the ideas of the Colmil 
command came from the rightist wing of the Conservative party led by Álvaro Gómez, the son of former President 
Laureano Gomez. For this section of the Conservatives, Colombia simply had a law and order problem. Moreover, 
they argued the theory of the causes of violence legitimised the bandits. For extracts of the Conservative’s 
speeches in Senate attacking Ruiz Novoa’s ideas in English see: Henderson, Modernization, pp.402-403.  A good 
synthesis of Colombian right wing ideas about the nature of the conflict, particularly limiting it to a law an order 
issue during the height of the conflict in the 1990s, can be found in: Porch, ‘Autonomy in Conflict’. 
41 ‘Las palabras contra el General Ruiz’, El Tiempo, 28 May 1964. 
42 For example, newspaper La Republica in one of its editorial expressed: ‘There are those who want the army to 
remain with folded arms, abandoning the peasants to their fate […] Never before have seen such inversion of 
morality. The army has made itself worthy of public recognition.’ See: ‘Army vigilance praised,’ Bogota Radio 
Todelar Network in Spanish, 26 September 1963. Accessed via: FBIS. 
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currency of modernisation theory and its strong promotion by the US via the Alliance for 
Progress, meant that the new administration of Valencia could not radically change the strategic 
course the Colmil had begun to take.43 In other words, despite his opposition, it was during 
most of President Valencia’s tenure that the Colmil attempted to implement the state-building 
mission, particularly through the set of non-violent tactics of Civic Action, Communal Action 
and Psychological Action. More specifically, General Ruiz Novoa confronted the criticisms of 
his strategic vision with a strong discourse that directed responsibility for the escalation of 
violence to the politicians. His main targets were particularly regional authorities, and 
obviously their patrons in congress, who complained that development initiatives and grass-
roots organisation directed by Colmil officers undermined their influence.44   
Up to his retirement in 1965, General Ruiz Novoa was adamant in his view that violence 
was increasing due to partisanship rather than military inaction. ‘We surely know that it was 
not the Armed Forces who told the peasantry to murder men, women and children in order to 
wipe out the very seed of their political adversaries, but rather it was the representatives and 
senators, the Colombian politicians,’45 exclaimed the General during a Congressional session 
to which he was summoned to explain the ‘political’ nature of the Colmil’s view’s on the 
conflict. Less than five years after the transition from military rule, the War Minister’s vision 
regarding the nature and dynamics of the conflict became a catalyst for an already heightened 
political debate around the role of the military that disturbed the civil-military accord of 1958 
and increased mutual suspicions.   
Civic Action in crisis - The Communist enclaves and the birth of FARC 
 
                                                          
43 The diplomats in Bogota made it clear that: ‘From the U.S point of view, dealing with Valencia is likely to be 
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By the end of 1963 the military implementation of Plan Lazo was at its height and had proved 
operationally successful in the combat against the bandits, and so, the thrust of the armed forces 
could be shifted towards the management of the communist groups. For conservative 
Guillermo Valencia these groups became the first priority in the pacification agenda.  However, 
the new president, who was defined by US officials as an old school politician and ‘less 
satisfactory leader than his predecessor’ in the sense that he was ‘insufficiently sensitive to and 
knowledgeable about the government leadership needs of a modernising economy and 
society,’46 was not a supporter of rehabilitation.  Ironically, as discussed in the previous section, 
he had to oversee the extensive implementation of Civic Action campaigns, which with 
Alliance for Progress resources was being translated into projects of road building, and the 
construction of permanent infrastructure like electric power plants, schools and health-posts 
during the later stage of Plan Lazo.47    
But the pressure to confront the groups labelled as communist had already been voiced 
since late 1961. The reservations generated by the consolidation of enclaves (also referred to 
as communes) were not limited to the recalcitrant right wing political sectors. Members of both 
parties voiced concerns due to the heightened fears of the expansion of communism at the wake 
of the Cuban revolution, due to domestic political considerations.48 However the Lleras 
Camargo administration had privileged the fight against banditry and the MOEC in its first two 
years of government, whilst attempting to conciliate the peasant leaders of the enclaves through 
the aid programmes of Rehabilitation. As the DoS put it: ‘The policy of President Lleras at the 
moment seems to avoid any resort to force, so far as possible, and to attempt a solution by 
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finding unoccupied land that can be parcelled out to the needy refugees and peasants with a 
minimum of unpleasantness on the part of the owners.’49    
In fact, DoS officials were aware of the situation with the communist enclaves since 
the late 1950s and amidst the distress caused by Fidel Castro’s triumph, attempted to describe 
to high official in Washington the nature of these groups and the areas they controlled. For 
example, Albert Geberich, the Officer-in-Charge of Colombian Affairs, emphasised that many 
of the enclaves could trace their origins to 1936, when the Liberal administration of Alfonso 
Lopez passed a land reform bill which led many peasants to colonise unoccupied land. Chapter 
3 described how these groups became radicalised, during the height of La Violencia, as result 
of the efforts of the Gomez and Rojas regimes to prevent their expansion to other land or in 
their efforts to reinstate the territory to its previous owners.  In this sense, of particular concern 
for the US were the enclaves of the Sumapaz region, which had been the focus of the military 
effort during the late 1950s which had survived and grown. According to Geberich, ‘gradually 
these communities developed into a sort of socialist state and Communists settled among them 
and gradually came to hold a position of dominant influence.’50 In the final stages of the Rojas 
dictatorship, some of the groups in the Sumapaz region responded to the government’s 
offensive by forming peasant columns, evacuating the areas and installing themselves in the 
fringes of the Tolima department, deep in the isolated parts of the central Andes.51 As Eduardo 
Pizarro explains, in these areas the leftist peasants began rebuilding their organisations under 
the sway of the Communist party and maintained a ‘self-defence’ stance by avoiding open 
confrontation, and acquiesced to the appeasement approach of Lleras Camargo provided that 
the threat of use of force was not manifested.52 
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However, many Colombian Conservatives regarded these groups as implacable enemies 
that had intensified the war against the Gomez regime, and so felt they had benefited from 
Lleras Camargo’s Rehabilitation agenda to regroup and colonize new land. For Alvaro Gomez 
Hurtado, the former Conservative President’s son,  who led the right wing of the party in 
Senate, the Communist self-defence forces had been able to establish ‘Independent Republics’ 
due to the government’s ill-conceived Rehabilitation policy. ‘National sovereignty is 
collapsing like a handkerchief,’ exclaimed Gomez Hurtado in a Senate plenary, ‘there is a 
group of independent republics that do not recognize the sovereignty of the Colombian state, 
where the Colombian army cannot enter, where people say the army’s presence is frightening 
abomination.’53 Historian James Henderson writes that that speech of Gomez Hurtado’s was 
timely in that it came two days before Castro openly embraced Marxism-Leninism and two 
weeks before President Kennedy visited Bogotá, and so it resonated, in that it augmented 
pressure on the government to revise its general policy towards these groups. But as Henderson 
also explains, by the time of Gomez Hurtado’s speech, two well defined schools of thought 
existed concerning the enclaves, with different views in terms of the danger they posed to the 
government and how to handle them. On the one hand, there were those that considered the 
danger they presented was limited; that if they had embraced communism it was out of 
ignorance or the sheer harshness of the war against Gomez and Rojas and the grave socio 
economic situation the conflict had generated. Hence, if Rehabilitation had followed its path 
and the country’s situation had improved, these groups would eventually return to the 
government’s side.54 In those terms, what the government and society should do was improve 
its efforts to reduce partisanship, close the open wounds of La Violencia, in particular solving 
land tenure issues, and keep the resources flowing to improve the life standards of the peasants 
                                                          
53 Quoted in: Henderson, Modernization, pp.402-403. 
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via development initiatives. The other school of thought was in line with the growing anti-
communism of the Cold War and the fear of Castro, and so framed the enclaves as ‘a contagious 
disease that unless vigorously combated would spread through society.’55 As expected, both 
points of view were also present within the Colmil’s officer corps and demarcated, more or 
less, the frontiers between the Koreans and Traditionalists approach to the problem.56    
 According to records of the DoS, the first undertaking of the Colmil in a communist 
enclave, was a Civic Action program in October 1962 in the Sumapaz region. This was 
described as a short ‘impact project’ that lasted over a week, with the objective of analysing 
the reception of the Colmil by the local peasantry. The programme was composed of a small 
military team of doctors, dentists and veterinarians who moved in by horseback escorted by a 
company of Lanceros who hauled provisions and relief supplies.57 Embassy officials explained 
that given the proximity to Bogotá, and the fact that the armed resistance in the area had already 
been ‘softened’ after the armed campaign there in 1957, positive results could be expected with 
minor effort to encourage similar actions in more hostile regions.58 What can be inferred from 
this first step is that not only were the Colmil attempting to obtain local political will to expand 
the Civic Actions elsewhere, but it was also for the consumption of US authorities in order to 
secure resources to expand its activity. It was actually in the interest of the embassy to promote 
the possibility of obtaining visible results from these actions to secure resources from 
Washington for the financing of Colombia’s Internal Defense Plan. For example, by January 
1963, in an ‘urgent action telegram,’ the embassy was concerned that US authorities in 
Washington were delaying the procurement of engineering and medical supplies directed to 
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impact programs to be developed in ‘isolated and violence ridden areas.’59 ‘From stand-point 
of efficient realization of IDP’, the telegram continued, ‘Embassy believes rapid realization of 
these programs is essential. This all more true when Colombian Armed Forces view on Civic 
Action taken into account.’60 According to US diplomats, the programs developed by the 
Colmil in Sumapaz had demonstrated amply that the ‘breakdown of isolation and 
reestablishment of official services is one of the most effective ways to combat violence.’61 
The commitment of the US government to the development of Civic Action in the enclaves 
was certainly substantial, and augmented the power and influence of Ruiz Novoa’s strategic 
outlook. As Porch points out, 40 per cent of the US$40 million dollars that Washington gave 
to Colombia between 1962 and 1966 in military assistance went to Civic Action.62   
All these points reinforced the ‘Korean’ belief that the danger of communist subversion 
and stabilising the regions affected by violence could be achieved by grievance management. 
For Valencia Tovar, the fact that eventually in the Sumapaz area inhabitants were offered the 
possibility to become small holders allowed them to ‘integrate to the national community 
without the need of resorting to brutal measures.’ 63  In short, this appeared to show that a good 
combination of clemency with firmness could yield positive results in the long run. But 
perhaps, drawing a parallel with Porch’s reading of the campaign of General Lazare Hoche 
against during the French Revolution, the light touch approach of Valencia Tovar only 
succeeded precisely because of, not in contrast, to the brutal measures tried by his 
predecessors.64 The scorched earth tactics employed by the Rojas and Gomez regimes during 
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the 1950s, were not necessary anymore in the early 1960s when the campaign had reduced the 
armed resistance in the Sumapaz to a handful of holdouts and the main communist elements of 
had moved out of the region to neighbouring departments. Although, it is fair to say, that the 
narrative of the ‘Koreans’ did not suggest dismissing the use of force. On the contrary, as 
Valencia Tovar emphasised, it had to be ‘intelligently measures and applied,’ particularly to 
compel the most radicalised leaders of the enclaves, and to assure the protection of the peasants 
from possible reprisals for supporting the Colmil.65 Valencia Tovar developed this point further 
in his memoirs as follows:  
With Plan Lazo it became clear that Civic Action and its immediate subordinate Psychological 
Action did not exclude the employment of force. The latter was indispensable to restore order or 
stop outlaws with no possibility of redemption whatsoever. Civic Action rationalised force, 
removing the central character it had played in past times, and reduced to the minimum required to 
fulfil the military’s mission. 66  
 
But pressure to take definite military action against the enclaves increased during the second 
year of Guillermo Valencia’s administration, who had been pressured by his political allies to 
respond to the consolidation of two other enclaves in the Tolima department: Marquetalia and 
El Pato. The military offensive against the enclave of Marquetalia, which contained several 
thousand campesinos commanded by Manuel Marulanda Velez better known by his nom de 
guerre ‘Tirofijo’ began in May 1964.67  Code named Operacion Soberanía (Operation 
Sovereignty), it consisted of no less than 1,500 men distributed in three infantry battalions, and 
the support of the highly mobile counter-insurgency special units.68 Soberanía failed in its 
prime objective, the killing or capture of ‘Tirofijo.’69 He and his guerrillas, calculated at 
strength of no more than 50, eluded the offensive and retreated towards the south where they 
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rendezvoused with communists of El Pato, which in the spring of 1965 fell to an almost 
identical operation.70 ‘Tirofijo’ was able to escape once again, leaving his mountain hide-outs 
behind, and in the Colombian equivalent of ‘Mao’s Long March’ moved towards the south of 
the country towards the indomitable jungle fringe where he founded with surviving guerrillas 
and communist supporters , the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC. Hence, the 
only effect of the military effort was the removal of the physical communist enclave from 
Tolima, a ‘success’ that only proved to be temporary as eventually the  FARC’s mobile 
columns, would return to harass region after 1966. 71 
However, the immediate effect of Operacion Soberanía, increased the popularity of the 
Colmil. Violence had been reducing due to the elimination of the bandit gangs, whilst the move 
against Marquetalia, generated a sense of security in the central cordillera not experienced since 
the 1930s. Particularly benefiting of the improved security was the department Tolima, which 
had seen the blunt of the confrontation and had suffered in a period of less than three years, 
between 1957 and 1960, more than 16,000 death, 40,000 pieces of land abandoned and at least 
34,000 houses burned; a devastating picture for a never declared war, wrote Henderson.72 In 
this context, the acclaim and political profile of General Ruiz Novoa increased. He was 
pressing for a major surge in the application of Civic Action in the ‘liberated’ enclaves to 
consolidate the military results and incorporate them to the nation. Violence was being 
contained not solved he argued. According to a US embassy report, the Minister of War 
demanded a massive amount of funds to the government to underwrite the whole operation 
with social and economic programmes, which in the opinion of the diplomats would generate 
                                                          
70 ‘Combined Armed Forces Occupy El Pato Area’, Bogotá Radio Cadena Nacional in Spanish, 23 March 1965. 
Accessed via FBIS. 
71 Pizarro comments for example that Marquetalia was: ‘a truly phyrric military victory with tremendous 
implications. The use of thousands of soldiers to dislodge a few hundred of peasants resulted in a situation, twenty 
years later, in which the FARC had a network of twenty seven armed fronts.’ Quoted in Pizarro, ‘Revolutionary 
Groups’, p.181. 
72 Henderson, When Colombia bled, pp.223-224. 
268 
 
domestic political tensions over allocation of resources and strain the national budget.73 For the 
US the availability of sums in the dimension requested by Ruiz for Civic Action were 
questionable, and would not surely be provided by the government, pointing that ‘his tendency 
to try to poach on the financial reserves of other Ministries’ was a deep source of conflict.74 
Why would the politicians concern themselves in prioritizing public resources for an isolated 
area with a low population density, when they had to focus on assuring public spending for a 
growing urban population where votes were, and still are, materialised?75 
Civic Action was not only criticised because of financial matters. The greatest risk for its 
continuity was the fear of intervention of the army in the political arena. Given his increased 
popularity, General Ruiz Novoa was invited to speak continuously in public gatherings to 
present the conduct of the Colmil. In his speeches he espoused the ideas he had developed at 
the outset of the decade as Army CoS, and so demanded ‘social justice’ as the national purpose 
and defined unrest and insurgency as products of underdevelopment and government neglect.   
The concept of Civic Action, he noted, was the single most important element to successfully 
curb rural violence, and if expanded and prioritised by the government could help alter the 
country’s socio-economic structures. But the problem was that the General’s speeches, 
according to US diplomats, ‘closely resembled politicking.’76 According to US diplomats, this 
was a view that was also shared by many politicians, and the press, who accused him of 
advocating populist ideas that resembled those of General Rojas Pinilla.77 After a widely 
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publicised speech of Ruiz Novoa at a banquet offered by the Colombian Society of Agriculture 
to the Colmil, to celebrate the fall of the Marquetalia enclave in the spring of 1964, the General 
was confronted by a Conservative senator who demanded him that if he wanted to enter politics 
he should take off his uniform first.78 That phrase more or less summarised the general 
apprehension of the civilian elites to the ideas he was developing. Indeed, other politicians 
were more recalcitrant and moved against the whole value-system of the ‘Koreans’. As stated 
by Senator Caicedo Ayerbe, who happened to be the cousin of the Army CoS Ayerbe Chaux, 
and who had a tense relationship with Ruiz Novoa and would eventually conspire against him: 
Personally I believe after the banquet at Tequendama a very dangerous sociological typology 
appeared, in which violence is not only explained in economic terms but also in moral ones. All of 
these began with the celebrated books and reports on the subject [the commission for the study of 
violence of Lleras Camargo] and developed in lamentable reports of the army. This theory of 
bandits as heroes and victims leads to the moral impossibility of repressing violence. It also 
contradict the whole effort of the nation and the army to recover its unity.79 
To all those criticisms, Ruiz Novoa answered that the non-deliberative spirit of the Lleras 
Doctrine could not turn Colombian soldiers into second class citizens.  He was actually at the 
time even defended by president Valencia against the attacks of his own party congressmen. 
‘The General has not deliberated. He has opined, and in this country there is freedom of 
opinion,’ asserted the president.80 However, Ruiz Novoa rapidly turned into a political liability 
for the government, and opposition to his demands and style grew daily from representatives 
of both parties who grew weary for two main reasons. First, because Civic Action lost face due 
to the increased violence of the guerrillas of ‘Tirofijo’, whose mobile cuadrillas began creating 
havoc, and hence demanded a more assertive response from the Colmil. There was no option 
for ‘hearts and minds’. Second, as local politicians kept arguing that an expansion of the Colmil 
state-building mission via that tactic reduced their political influence. As former liberal 
President Eduardo Santos summarised in an op-ed in El Tiempo daily: 
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‘Sending missionaries to evangelise the heartless bandoleros and offering them money so they 
abandon their evil ways, and prefer the honest and rough duty of working, dispensing from the 
simple task of robbing and pillaging, is in my view optimist as it is dangerous […] General Ruiz 
Novoa, with demagogic attempts espoused the theory that to domesticate the bandits they should 
be lured to civic-military traps. The result is there at hand; Tiro-Fijo completely defiant. With 
bandolerismo now rethreaded with communism, there is no other recourse than force without 
contemplation.’81 
 
Finally, the opposition to Ruiz Novoa also became acute in sectors of the Colmil General 
Staff. In particular the Chief of the Armed Forces General Reveiz Pizarro and the Army CoS 
Ayerbe Chaux convinced the President that their superior had political ambitions, which paved 
the way for his dismissal in January 1965. As Porch explains, with the firing of Ruiz Novoa, 
President Valencia reorganised his Ministry of War into a Ministry of Defence in December 
1965 and a Consejo Superior de Defensa Nacional (High Council for National Defence) was 
created as a vehicle for the military to express their views independent of the highest ranking 
Colmil officer.82 President Valencia sided with Ruiz Novoa’s former Chiefs of Staff, and 
moved to demote Civic Action’s strategic importance and to shift the Colmil’s focus to the 
military suppression of the insurgents.  At face value, the reasoning of many of Ruiz Novoa’s 
subordinates to oppose Civic Action as the decisive means to wage counter-insurgency, was 
based on safeguarding the military’s interests by not taking major political risks. But a core 
issue is that they considered Civic Action as military malpractice, as it deviated the Colmil 
from its true mission and was ‘converting it into a welfare agency’.83 Giving emphasis to this 
‘secondary’ task, as it was actually stated in US Army doctrine, was simply not possible as it 
converted the Colmil into a social welfare agency. The Chief of the Armed Forces, General 
Reveiz – second in line after Ruiz Novoa, was convinced that such a politicised role for the 
Colmil would, in the long run, play badly for their institutional interests. He realised that they 
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would be unable to accomplish the mission set by Ruiz Novoa, and that the public display and 
unfulfillment of promises would politically backfire.84  
But for Ruiz Novoa, concentrating solely on the use of force was a throwback to La 
Violencia’s tactics, only comparable to ‘chasing a fly with a steamroller instead of a fly 
swatter.’85 After his retirement he emphasised that battlefield success against the guerrillas 
would not be the end of violence. It was the absence of strong institutions of civil society, and 
a growing apathy towards the National Front political system, that restricted participation in 
the political process to only two parties, which he saw as the source of growing dissent and a 
petri dish for the advance of communism.86 The General’s analysis proved to be correct to a 
great extent, as with a more militant guidance from the Communist party, the fundamental 
objections of the new insurgent groups to Colombia’s political order, were to be intensified 
with the advance of the National Front agreement into its third consecutive term of controlled 
democracy. By the 1970s, the National Front was denounced as an ‘oligarchic compromise’ 
that reproduced a system of political immobility which made it impossible to effect the 
economic and social reform of Colombian rural society short of revolution.87   
By 1966, the end of bandolerismo and the tactical successes against the communist 
enclaves, the premises of the ‘causes of violence’ rhetoric began to crumble, both for 
Colombian policy makers as well as for their US counterparts.  Civic Action began to lose its 
political basis as the main strategic concept for the Colmil. ‘The very elimination of criminal 
or communist anti-social elements appears to have produced a certain rehabilitative effect per 
se, and it cannot be demonstrated with certainty that all areas with miserable economic and 
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social conditions are necessarily violence prone’ concluded a report by the US military 
mission.88 Such conclusions came in a period when the Alliance for Progress began to fall into 
an ‘ideological vacuum,’ as Hal Brands suggests.89 Given that the high hopes for rapid 
development it had created under modernisation theory, the initiative soon produced 
disappointment in Washington.90  
However, Richard Maullin argued in his 1971 Rand report that Civic Action continued the 
prime aspect of counter-insurgency operations for the Colmil, pointing to the fact that field-
grade officers who supported the concept eventually were to rise to high positions. He cited the 
case of Colonel Valencia Tovar who in September 1966 assumed command of the Army’s 5th 
Brigade, in charge of the eastern frontier of the country with Venezuela, and which under his 
command had to deal with the rise of the Castroist influenced ELN. Against the ELN Valencia 
Tovar continued to stress the need for a military approach that dealt firmly with improving the 
living conditions of the rural population following his population centric approach to counter-
insurgency.91 In 1968 the Army CoS General Guillermo Pinzon attempted to revive the state-
building elements of Plan Lazo, proposing a short lived spin off named Plan Andes to attack 
the ELN. The plan called again for the classical three stage operational sequence of isolation – 
destruction and consolidation of counter-insurgency theory. However, the government of 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo decided not to support his Army CoS, and eventually dismissed General 
Pinzon in 1969 for his criticisms to the government’s decision to reduce the military budget.92    
The denouement of Valencia Tovar’s professional drama, however, escaped Maullin’s 
timeline. By 1973 he was promoted to General and soon named Army CoS, following in the 
steps of his mentor Ruiz Novoa, achieving a degree of public display with bold statements that 
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angered the politicians which eventually drew him into political disagreements with President 
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen in 1974, who did not hesitate in dismissing him.93  
Like Valencia Tovar, other staff officers of the ‘Korea generation,’ proponents of the state-
building and development mission also remained in active service after Ruiz Novoa’s 
dismissal, and were promoted to the upper ranks from which they continued to argue that the 
Colmil should be a part of the economic development of the nation to deal with the economic 
and social roots of the insurgency. They all followed their predecessor’s footsteps, dismissed 
by governments that would not tolerate them arguing that the military was isolated in its 
mission and not been offered the required tools for pacifying the country. 
Conclusion: Counter-insurgency as an end in itself 
 
By the turn of 1960s, it can be concluded that the practice of counter-insurgency became an 
end in itself for the Colmil, The overemphasis on technical and operational factors of the 
conduct of counter-insurgency led to increased disputes within the Colmil leadership about 
how it should adjust to a given understanding to the nature of the conflict, and over the adequate 
choice and sequencing of its methods. Counter-insurgency in the long run became a rigid 
approach for the Colmil that pre-ordained the application of the repository of techniques and 
procedures collected in Plan Lazo. 
For example, when Civic Action began to lose its primacy after the dismissal of Ruiz 
Novoa, the view championed by his critics of the ‘Traditionalist’ school emphasised the need 
to move away from state-building and improve the instruments for the application of force that 
were being developed in parallel. In this sense, a widespread idea in Colmil thinking 
consolidated after the fall of the Marquetalia enclave was that ‘only well-led small units are 
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successful in irregular war.’94 Lieutenant Colonel Villamarin, the historian of Operacion Anori, 
in which the ELN was defeated in the battlefield in 1973, according to the Colmil official 
account, considers that the experience was paradigmatic, in the sense that it incorporated the 
major lessons of counter-insurgency planning developed in the early 1960s. ‘Contrary to 
regular warfare, in counter-guerrilla operations it is the addition of small events that make a 
difference; they impact the morale of the enemy.’95 The author goes on to explain that this was 
why ‘Anori could not be conceived as a pre-planned detailed strategy […] in this sense tactical 
flexibility allowed a permanent action against the objective.’96 In other words, the imagination, 
constancy and prowess of officers is what counted in the long run in conducting effective 
counter-insurgency. For many officers in the Colmil, particularly those who ascribed to the 
‘Traditionalist’ school of thought, this led to the belief that operational proficiency in counter-
insurgency, applying tactical responses considered to be correct, could translate into strategic 
results.97  
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the Colmil’s practice of counter-insurgency 
during the mid-1960s is that it also underlined the breach between the Colmil and its civilian 
masters, particularly as politicians were accused of not offering sufficient political will or 
resources to accomplish an optimal counter-insurgency campaign. The main influence of this 
civilian-military divide is that it offered a degree of inner consistency to the different strands 
of Colmil thought throughout the escalation of the conflict since the mid-1970s, as described 
in Chapter 1. The following concluding chapter will draw together the main findings of this 
thesis, which includes addressing the consequences for strategic formulation in Colombia of 
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the interaction of this civil-military tension with the other central components that form the 




















   
The primary purpose of this thesis has been to dissect the central features that configure the 
Colombian military’s (Colmil) strategic tradition and to understand the origins of their 
approach to counter-insurgency. It has argued that the Colmil’s experience with counter-
insurgency during the 1960s left a deep legacy in its thinking that offers insight into their 
present behaviour. With reference to elements of strategic theory, the thesis attempted to 
analyse the military’s judgements on the character of the conflict, the use and limits of force, 
and the political control of the armed instrument. One of the main conclusions reached in this 
analysis is that Colmil thinking is characterised by its oscillatory nature, influenced by the 
interaction of two identifiable schools of thought. The interaction of these schools of thought 
has been conducive to an absence of strategic consensus over the ends to be sought, and by a 
lack of precision about how the means required to attain them would be employed. 
To construct the Colmil’s strategic tradition, the thesis began by placing their most 
recent counter-insurgency effort in historical perspective. Looking beyond the technical 
aspects of the Colombians’ publicised operational success during the Presidencies of Álvaro 
Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos in dealing with their historic insurgency threats, Chapter 1 
identified thematic lines of continuity and change in their behaviour since the turn of the 1990s, 
and their longer five-decade old engagement with counter-insurgency. The identification of the 
distinct motivational patterns and assumptions in Colmil strategic thinking was continued in 
Chapter 2 which examined the themes that have historically influenced their evolution. The 
themes outlined included the antecedents to the problem of military autonomy in the country; 
the competing views about the causes of the Colombian conflict; the depiction of the Colmil 
not only as a protector of the nation but also as its creator via colonisation; as well as the 
political effects of a long-standing military relationship with the United States.  
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The evidence presented in the first two chapters demonstrates that the debates leading 
to the configuration of two distinct schools in the Colmil have remained mostly unchanged 
since the inception of counter-insurgency thinking in the country. Various reasons explain the 
permanence of such debates in Colmil thought. Firstly, the ideas of those senior officers who 
originally promoted different approaches to counter-insurgency played a definite influence on 
their subordinates, who in turn reached commanding positions after the late 1990s. 
Additionally, several of the debates that had been promoted by the most vocal veteran senior 
officers would, in some cases, be intensified after their forced retirement at different stages of 
the conflict. Finally, the majority of these veteran officers became the public voices of a 
military establishment wary of the consequences of trespassing the thin line established in the 
non-deliberation clause of the ‘Lleras Doctrine’ civil-military accord.  
The first two chapters of the thesis also identified various intertwined strategic debates 
that have remained constant in the military’s mind since the beginning of the conflict in the 
late 1940s. First, the fundamental disagreement about the causes of the conflict has led to 
different interpretations of the character and motivations of the insurgencies that have grown 
on the territory. These discussions about the nature of the conflict and the motivations of their 
adversaries evidenced a lack of a common understanding as to how the conflict should be dealt 
with, in particular in the absence of agreement over the limits of force. Should the Colmil seek 
to achieve a crushing victory over the insurgent groups or, instead, use force as a bargaining 
instrument? This lack of clarity over the political ends sought, combined with an ingrained 
distrust about the intentions of the insurgency increased military discontent with the 
government’s reliance on open-ended negotiations with the enemy, from the 1980s up to today.  
Finally, these debates also demonstrate the existence of long-running common ideas over the 
political conduct of the conflict that intensified a convoluted civil-military dialogue.   
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Whilst there has been an enduring debate over the underlying causes of the conflict, 
there is at least agreement over its starting date which is traced to the national revolt that 
resulted from the assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán on the 9th of April 1948.  
With this in mind, the analysis of the progression of the Colmil’s strategic tradition began with 
an examination of their participation in La Violencia during the 1950s. The arrival to the 
presidency of Laureano Gómez in August 1950 marked an intensification of hostilities between 
the Conservative government and Liberal rebel guerrillas that confused the Colmil’s traditional 
outlook on internal public order missions. Whilst the administration kept defining the role of 
the Colmil in terms of public order maintenance, to avoid giving belligerent status to the rebels 
and reduce the nominal character of their threat by criminalising them, La Violencia began to 
be understood by a section of the Colmil as a state of war.  The purpose of the armed instrument 
was hence defined by the ultra-partisan administration and its military chiefs as defeating the 
guerrillas in battle.  
The reaction by many field and especially company grade officers to the military policy 
of the government of Laureano Gomez served as a basis for a review of the Colmil’s role in 
the conflict that would favour the adoption of counter-insurgency thinking in the next decade. 
In this sense, Chapter 3 evidenced how the Colmil’s participation in the Korean War and the 
rapprochement of many of the younger officers with the US was a determining influence for a 
reappraisal of the internal roles and missions of the military. In particular, they judged that the 
Colombian conflict was not comparable to an actual war like the one they had experienced in 
Korea. But the reaction to the administration’s conduct of La Violencia was also influenced by 
other factors. For example, given the lengthy and mixed experience in dealing with the Liberal 
guerrillas, many of the officers became aware of the harsh realities of rural life, thus laying a 
foundation for the future debate within the Colmil as to the nature of the conflict and the limits 
of force.  As a consequence, there was also a growing notion that many Colmil’s commanders’ 
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tolerance of brutal action against the population in areas where the political opposition to 
Gomez had ascendancy, was a self-defeating move that had served only to escalate violence. 
In this respect, the foundational changes in the Colmil mind were reaffirmed following the 
experience of General Rojas Pinilla’s military regime between 1953 and 1957. As evidenced 
in the Chapter, in its early days the military regime, reasoning that La Violencia had mainly a 
socio-economic origin, set the tone for the promotion of a state-building narrative as the core 
strategic course of action for the Colmil. Putting an end to the conflict by improving the living 
conditions of the population presented itself as a basic requirement. These tensions, arising 
with the Colmil during La Violencia, marked the beginning of the transition to counter-
insurgency that gathered momentum during the 1960s. 
A central argument in Chapter 4 was that the rationalist features of counter-insurgency 
theory became explicit in Colmil thinking in the early 1960s.  The theory consolidated a 
conviction that if its norms were correctly followed, counter-insurgency would be an effective 
formula to fight what they judged was a separate category of conflict defined as ‘irregular war’ 
that manifested itself in Colombia. This view grew as a result of the effectiveness of the military 
in combatting the rebel groups that survived from La Violencia during the 1950s and various 
operational successes against the first Communist-influenced insurgency groups that appeared 
in the territory. Likewise, the strong promotion by the US of counter-insurgency thinking and 
the extensive material assistance offered to the Colmil underpinned the standing of the theory 
within the ranks. But whilst considering themselves proficient enough to face the operational 
challenges of ‘irregular war’ by adopting the techniques of counter-insurgency, Colmil officers 
close to the ‘Traditionalist’ school faulted the civilian administration for the political conduct 
of the conflict. They argued that politicians calculated that insurgent attacks were a tactical 
nuisance that did not seriously challenge the political order, and that therefore they did not 
offer enough political will for the Colmil to fulfil the ultimate goal of defeating the insurgency. 
280 
 
In the long run, this civil-military divide resulted in the divorce of the strategic dimension of 
counter-insurgency from the operational level, with no coordinated political approach to frame 
an effective state response. 
 Essentially, what this thesis reveals is that from the mid-1960s, soldiers have been left 
alone with the techniques of counter-insurgency to deal with problems rooted in political 
conditions. As a result, the response of the Colmil either took the form of proliferating Special 
Forces and intelligence collection mechanism, or consisted of the regurgitation of the Civic 
Action model championed by the narrative of modernisation, with no definition of clear 
political ends. If there was a perceptible political objective for the Colmil in the conflict against 
the Communist-inspired insurgencies from the mid-1960s up to the year 2002, it was to contain 
the insurgency rather than to devise a long-term strategic solution.  Military action, in short, 
was left on its own to produce operational results. For this lack of strategic formulation 
Colombians paid a high a price, as by the late 1980s the state had found itself almost completely 
overmatched by the twin explosions of drug mafias led by Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel on 
the one hand, which had declared an open war against it, and guerrilla organisations, in 
particular the FARC, with a nationwide presence and delineated strategies for the seizure of 
power. 
On the other hand, in Colombian military thought and practice, the standing of state-
building via Civic Action, which in the 21st century is referred to as Acción Integral in Colmil 
doctrine,1 has varied in response to the political context. The thesis has analysed how the 
concept of state-building became a distinguishing source of tension in the attempt to formulate 
strategy.  After its decline in the second half of the 1960s, the standing of state-building in 
                                                          
1 Acción Integral is referred to in current doctrine as ‘non-armed actions (not lethal-not kinetical) that are a 
fundamental part of the national strategy to neutralise the terrorist threat.’ See: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional – 




Colmil thought rose again since the 1980s. This is in part due to the vocal opposition of the 
then Minister of Defence, General Fernando Landazábal to the initiation of peace talks with 
the M-19 and the FARC by the Belisario Betancur administration and the proposal of a blanket 
amnesty for the guerrillas. As US intelligence sources put it: 
The Armed Force’s approach to countering the insurgent movements, particularly under 
Landazabal, involves going after the roots of the problem. In this sense, civic action programs 
are receiving increased emphasis under his leadership. He argues that any amnesty program not 
taking into account the underlying factors of poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity 
will never eliminate violence in Colombia. Thus, the military’s price for accepting amnesty 
agreements will probably include a demand for increased resources for civic action programs, 
especially engineer-related activities.2 
 
The question of military state-building in the country’s peripheral areas restarted during 
the late 1990s with the US sponsored Plan Colombia. One of the components of this counter-
narcotics programme was to promote initiatives of economic development for peasants as part 
of the eradication and substitution of coca crops. Finally, the concept played an important role 
in the configuration of Alvaro Uribe’s Policy of Territorial Consolidation.  In this context, 
officers close to the line of thought of the ‘Korean’ school  have seen these efforts as central 
elements of counter-insurgency, as they attempt to solve what are considered to be unattended 
social grievances that exist in the most volatile rural and jungle areas, and which are being 
exploited by the FARC. 
However, as detailed in Chapter 4, the Colmil’s adoption of the state-building and 
grievance management mission since the 1960s, more than just a breaking point in its efforts 
at strategic formulation, also responded to the immediate political requirements and 
calculations of both the John F. Kennedy and Lleras Camargo’s administrations. Following 
modernisation theory, they considered that national development policy efforts could use a 
helping hand from the Army in non-military roles. A well-executed development initiative, it 
was assumed, would serve to contain internal unrest and the advance of Communist insurgency. 
                                                          
2 Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Colombia: The Army and Amnesty’ Secret, Intelligence Appraisal, December 
29, 1982. Accessed via: DNSA. 
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However, by the mid-1960s the political conditions which gave Civic Action its strategic 
importance changed. A boost in economic and social development was no longer considered 
the main means to avoid the expansion of Communist-inspired insurgency. On the contrary, if 
the security apparatus of the state could contain the threat, that seemed enough.  As Chapter 5 
demonstrated, no matter if the ‘Korean school’ still considered state-building to be the ultimate 
strategic solution to deal with the roots of the Colombian conflict, US assistance withered and 
the government was not willing to finance such an endeavour. Moreover, the fears that Cuba 
would systematically export its revolution to the South American continent proved exaggerated 
and led to a revision of US policy goals.3  
 The key point made in this analysis is that the frustrations of the officers that 
formulated the state-building mission of Colmil left an important legacy.  ‘Colombia is a nation 
of singular things: civilians give war and the military peace’4, attested Valencia Tovar in his 
memoirs whilst remembering the political upheaval the concept of Civic Action produced in 
the mid-1960s. In his view politicians – and citizens alike – have not come to understand that 
‘the application of force does not exclude the humanitarian and comprehensive treatment of a 
situation like that which configures Colombian violence,’5  which in his mind would explain 
why there has been no definite solution to what seemed to be an endemic problem in the country 
that could only be solved via a ‘comprehensive approach’, to use a contemporary term.  As this 
thesis has argued throughout, a consequence of this mentality evolved more or less into a stab-
in-the back notion as a guiding theme of civil-military relations. This phenomenon, explains 
historian Douglas Porch, is common when politicians engage in state-building endeavours with 
                                                          
3 ‘Given the declining state of the Cuban economy, Soviet disagreement with fomenting armed revolution in Latin 
America (at least for the moment), it appears unlikely that external support for the guerrillas will increase in the 
short run. Political and economy appear reasonably secure during the time frame of this CASP’, explained the US 
embassy in Bogota in their country analysis for the period 1968-1973. See: ‘Country Analysis and Strategy Paper 
– Colombia’ April 1968, Pol –Col US Box 1992 NARA. 




a counter-insurgency dimension, as by winning or losing, the military normally ends up feeling 
betrayed by the civilians.6  
Impact and further research 
This research has been motivated by the changes in the Colombian conflict that became 
palpable at the end of 2011, when the offensive initiated by Alvaro Uribe in 2002 succeeded in 
substantially reducing the threat posed by the FARC insurgency to the stability of the country. 
In the past few years Colombia has been again in the international spotlight, but not because of 
the negative reasons that drew attention to it during the late 1990s. In this respect, the 
Colombian government’s military effort against the FARC has also turned into a sort of 
consoling narrative for US recent foreign policy. When looking at the balance sheet of the 
‘Global War on Terrorism’, after a decade of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, Colombia 
appears to show how, with little taxpayers’ money and no need for ‘boots on the ground’, 
Washington was able to advance its policy goals by assisting a foreign government in dealing 
with its own security problems with the right tools and techniques. If anything, this thesis is a 
call for prudence before attempting to use the Colombian case as a model for so called ‘small 
footprint’ intervention, by avoiding generalisations and exploring the case study within its 
unique historical and political context. 
If we follow philosopher Benedetto Croce, who said that ‘all history is contemporary 
history’, given that it is written from the point of view of our contemporary preoccupations,7 
this thesis might also come as a necessary contribution to knowledge as it provides a much 
needed study of the understudied Colombian counter-insurgency, now that the conflict seems 
to be moving into a different phase. During the course of the research, in November 2012, a 
                                                          
6  Douglas Porch ‘Writing History in the “End of History” Era—Reflections on Historians and the GWOT’, The 
Journal of Military History Volume 70, Number 4 (2006), pp.-1078-1079. 
7 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘I believe in yesterday’, New Statesman, 17 December 2009. Available at: 
<http://www.newstatesman.com/2009/12/contemporary-history-public> (Accessed 31 October 2015). 
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third round of peace negotiations with the FARC began, but this time under the government’s 
ascendancy. The negotiations are aimed at finding a definite closure to the conflict and 
convince the FARC to enter the political process and renounce its armed struggle. There are 
high expectations of the signature of a peace agreement sooner rather than later, even before 
the end of 2016.8 If this happens, this research could have potential for expansion for two 
related reasons. First, because as part of the pre-agreements signed between the government 
and the FARC in the past two years, it has been established that Transitional Justice 
mechanisms including a Truth Commission will be set up to support the reconstruction of 
historical memory.9 Given the role of the Colmil as a main actor in the conflict it will be 
required to stimulate the study of its history, and this is a task in which this research can be 
valuable. The second reason, is that if the will to advance Transitional Justice mechanisms in 
the country does flourish, this might translate into an extensive declassification of national 
security and military archives. Such an event could lead not only to a revision of some of the 
points made in this thesis, but, most importantly it could allow the expanded exploration of the 
most turbulent years of the conflict after the 1970s, something that could not be fully addressed 
here due to the limited access to primary sources of those years. The history of the Colmil, in 





                                                          
8 ‘Colombia Special Report: The road to peace. This time is different’, The Economist, 31 October 2015. 
Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21676952-peace-process-could-become-
example-world-time-different> (Accessed 31 October 2015). 
9 International Crisis Group, Transitional Justice and Colombia’s peace talks, Latin America Special Report No. 
49, 29 August 2013.  Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/049-





Figure 4: Estimated Number and Size of Bandit Gangs active in the Coffee-growing 
departments in 1962 
 
Department Number of 
bandit gangs 
Total Bandits Average Bandits 
per gang 
Number of 
gangs with more 
than 50 bandits. 
Caldas 33 (37%) 513 (29%) 15 1 
Valle 30 (33%) 512 (29%) 17 1 
Tolima 27 (30%) 756 (42%) 28 7 
Total 90 (100%) 1,781 (100%) 20 9 
 
Source: Copied from Sanchez and Meertens, Bandits, p.68. Original data found in Colombian 
National Police statistical handbook of 1965.  
Figure 5 : Average structure of the Colombian Army 
Year Divisions Brigades COIN Units 
Total 
Personnel Conscripts 
    1952 * 0 6 0 25,000 n.d 




1970 0 8 n.d 50,000 n.d 
1982 0 10 1 Ranger bn 57,000 28,500 
1991 4 15 
2 bde ( each with 
9bn) 
115,000 38,000 
2002 5 17 
3 Mobile bde (each 
with 4 COIN bn ) 3 
CN bn 
136,000 63,800 
2014 9 (1 air assault) 24 
3 Mobile bde (each: 
4 COIN bn); 1 
Rapid Reaction 
Force (1 SF bde 3 
mobile bde); 1 CN 
bde (3 bn) 
235,000 63,800 +/- 
 
   
   
    
Source: IISS Military Balance 
*: Source: Russell Ramsey, Guerrilleros y Soldados, 1981. 
n.d: No details 
bde: Brigade 
bn: Battalion  
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Figure 6: Progression of Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia since 1948 
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Figure 7: Colombian Army Doctrinal Manifesto 1962 
IRREGULAR WAR  
BEHOLD THE ENEMY BEHOLD THE SOLUTION 
GUERRILLAS…! 
  A concept as old as the world, modernised and revived it 
prevails again in warfare…. 
ADAPTABLE TACTICS TO THE TERRAIN AND THE 
NATURE OF THE ENEMY! 
FLEXIBLE AND LIGHT ORGANIZATIONS!  
IRREGULAR WAR….! 
   Struggle of small and elusive groups that hit and run, 
kill, and, vanish in impenetrable terrain.        
  Hard labour is to find an invisible enemy, locate him and 
destroy him….! 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR…! 
On the enemy, on the mind of the peasant that does not 
recognise us or fear us, over citizen indifference, over the 




    Hidden action of dark foreign inspiration to undermine 
the basis of social organization and the political structure 
of a country, substitute a free government by totalitarian 
rule of foreign ideologies. 
    Violent form of imposing through terror and force rule 
by organized and audacious minorities over an indifferent 
and invertebrate mass without collective conscience.  
 
ADOCTRINATION OF COMBATANTS.…! 
Building of a conscience, develop and spiritual attitude, of 
a proud and solid sense of superiority of Regular Forces 
when employed with genius…Development of an 
enthusiastic and vigorous mystique. 
 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE.…! 
Informative networks extending their tentacles, their ears, 
and their acute capacity of perception thought the affected 
areas; penetrates the mystery that surrounds the 
anonymous bandit and the shadows in which the criminals 
and murderers hide. 
  
VIOLENCE….! 
Useless, bloody and atrocious destruction of life and 
wealth. Savage intimidation of the countryside, elimination 
of the weak and vulnerable with sick cruelty and 
unforgivable brutality…dark and beastly form of life out 
of crime…assault and mass murder of workers, women, 
children and elders….! 
CIVIC ACTION….! 
   Solution to the problem that engenders 
violence…solidary approach to the man who is our co-
citizen and has to be our friend…humane attitude towards 
the deep problems of a disposed and ignorant mass. 
CORRECT BALANCE OF GENIUS, 
RESOURCEFULNESS. AUDACITY AND SERENITY 
IN COMMAND. 
BEHOLD THE ENEMY! BEHOLD THE SOLUTION! 
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